Complexes of activity on the Sun in solar cycle 21

The paper provides statistical data on solar activity complexes (ACs) observed in solar cycle 21. From the synoptic charts for the 1976–1986 sunspot activity, we have detected the regions where the sunspot generation was observed at least through three Carrington Rotations (CRs). These regions were identified as AC cores. We have compiled an AC catalogue. ACs are shown to evolve quasi-periodically, in pulses that are 15–20 rotations long. We have analyzed the North-South asymmetry in the AC location. In cycle 21, 90 % of the proton flares that affected the natural environment are shown to have occurred in ACs. We note a tendency for AC activity to decrease, as well as the manifestation of the Gnevyshev—Ohl rule in AC properties, in solar cycles 21–24.

Complexes of activity on the Sun in solar cycle 21

The paper provides statistical data on solar activity complexes (ACs) observed in solar cycle 21. From the synoptic charts for the 1976–1986 sunspot activity, we have detected the regions where the sunspot generation was observed at least through three Carrington Rotations (CRs). These regions were identified as AC cores. We have compiled an AC catalogue. ACs are shown to evolve quasi-periodically, in pulses that are 15–20 rotations long. We have analyzed the North-South asymmetry in the AC location. In cycle 21, 90 % of the proton flares that affected the natural environment are shown to have occurred in ACs. We note a tendency for AC activity to decrease, as well as the manifestation of the Gnevyshev—Ohl rule in AC properties, in solar cycles 21–24.

NORTH–SOUTH ASYMMETRY IN TARIFF BARGAINING: A BLESSING FOR THE URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT?

In this study, North–South asymmetries are incorporated into a general equilibrium model to re-examine tariff bargaining. The asymmetric two-country model indicates that an import tariff charged by the North generates positive externalities that ameliorate structural unemployment in the South. The findings of this study yield two critical respects. First, the consideration of the urban unemployment in the South may reverse the consensus that a reciprocal tariff concession benefits both of the negotiators. Second and hence, this suggests that developing countries may bargain with opponents by manipulating second-best tariffs.