Transient Neural Activation of Abstract Relations on an Incidental Analogy Task

Although a large proportion of the lexicon consists of abstract concepts, little is known about how they are represented by the brain. Here, we investigated how the mind represents relations shared between sets of mental representations that are superficially unrelated, such as car–engine and dog–tongue, but that nonetheless share a more general, abstract relation, such as whole–part. Participants saw a pair of words on each trial and were asked to indicate whether they could think of a relation between them. Importantly, they were not explicitly asked whether different word pairs shared the same relation, as in analogical reasoning tasks. We observed representational similarity for abstract relations in regions in the “conceptual hub” network, even when controlling for semantic relatedness between word pairs. By contrast, we did not observe representational similarity in regions previously implicated in explicit analogical reasoning. A given relation was sometimes repeated across sequential word pairs, allowing us to test for behavioral and neural priming of abstract relations. Indeed, we observed faster RTs and greater representational similarity for primed than unprimed trials, suggesting that mental representations of abstract relations are transiently activated on this incidental analogy task. Finally, we found a significant correlation between behavioral and neural priming across participants. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate relational priming using functional neuroimaging and to show that neural representations are strengthened by relational priming. This research shows how abstract concepts can be brought to mind momentarily, even when not required for task performance.

When norm violations are spontaneously detected: an electrocortical investigation

One fundamental function of social norms is to promote social coordination. Moreover, greater social coordination may be called for when tight norms govern social relations with others. Hence, the sensitivity to social norm violations may be jointly modulated by relational goals and a belief that the social context is tight (vs loose). We tested this analysis using an electrocortical marker of norm-violation detection (N400). Ninety-one young American adults were subliminally primed with either relational or neutral goals. Then they saw behaviors that were either norm-violating or normal. In the relational priming condition, the norm-violation N400 increased as a function of the perceived tightness of societal norms. In the control priming condition, however, the norm-violation N400 was weak regardless of perceived tightness. Thus, normative tightness was associated with increased neural processing of norm violations only when relational goals were activated. Implications for norm psychology are discussed.

Relational processing in conceptual combination and analogy

We evaluate whether evidence from conceptual combination supports the relational priming model of analogy. Representing relations implicitly as patterns of activation distributed across the semantic network provides a natural and parsimonious explanation of several key phenomena observed in conceptual combination. Although an additional mechanism for role resolution may be required, relational priming offers a promising approach to analogy.

Growing cognition from recycled parts

In this response, we reiterate the importance of development (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic) in the understanding of a complex cognitive skill – analogical reasoning. Four key questions structure the response: Does relational priming exist, and is it sufficient for analogy? What do we mean by relations as transformations? Could all or any relations be represented as transformations? And what about the challenge of more complex analogies? In addressing these questions we bring together a number of supportive commentaries, strengthening our emergentist case for analogy (in particular with insights from comparative psychology), and review new supportive evidence. We also rebut those commentaries that ignore development at their peril. Along the way, we revisit the main assumptions underlying the analogy as relational priming (ARP) account of analogy, clarifying and elaborating as necessary.

Creativity or mental illness: Possible errors of relational priming in neural networks of the brain

If connectionist computational models explain the acquisition of complex cognitive skills, errors in such models would also help explain unusual brain activity such as in creativity – as well as in mental illness, including childhood onset problems with social behaviors in autism, the inability to maintain focus in attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and the lack of motivation of depression disorders.

Relational priming: Obligational nitpicking

According to the target article authors, initial experience with a circumstance primes a relation that can subsequently be applied to a different circumstance to draw an analogy. While I broadly agree with their claim about the role of relational priming in early analogical reasoning, I put forward a few concerns that may be worthy of further reflection.

Analogy as relational priming: The challenge of self-reflection

Despite its strengths, Leech et al.'s model fails to address the important benefits that derive from self-explanation and task feedback in analogical reasoning development. These components encourage explicit, self-reflective processes that do not necessarily link to knowledge accretion. We wonder, therefore, what mechanisms can be included within a connectionist framework to model self-reflective involvement and its beneficial consequences.

Relational priming plays a supporting but not leading role in adult analogy-making

Leech et al.'s analysis adds to an emerging consensus of the role of priming in analogy-making. However, their model cannot scale up to adult-level performance because not all relations can be cast as functions. One-size-fits-all accounts cannot capture the richness of analogy. Proportional analogies and transitive inferences can be made by nonstructural mechanisms. Therefore, these tasks do not generalize to tasks that require structure mapping.