Transient Neural Activation of Abstract Relations on an Incidental Analogy Task

2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei-Chun Wang ◽  
Liang-Tien Hsieh ◽  
Gowri Swamy ◽  
Silvia A. Bunge

Although a large proportion of the lexicon consists of abstract concepts, little is known about how they are represented by the brain. Here, we investigated how the mind represents relations shared between sets of mental representations that are superficially unrelated, such as car–engine and dog–tongue, but that nonetheless share a more general, abstract relation, such as whole–part. Participants saw a pair of words on each trial and were asked to indicate whether they could think of a relation between them. Importantly, they were not explicitly asked whether different word pairs shared the same relation, as in analogical reasoning tasks. We observed representational similarity for abstract relations in regions in the “conceptual hub” network, even when controlling for semantic relatedness between word pairs. By contrast, we did not observe representational similarity in regions previously implicated in explicit analogical reasoning. A given relation was sometimes repeated across sequential word pairs, allowing us to test for behavioral and neural priming of abstract relations. Indeed, we observed faster RTs and greater representational similarity for primed than unprimed trials, suggesting that mental representations of abstract relations are transiently activated on this incidental analogy task. Finally, we found a significant correlation between behavioral and neural priming across participants. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate relational priming using functional neuroimaging and to show that neural representations are strengthened by relational priming. This research shows how abstract concepts can be brought to mind momentarily, even when not required for task performance.

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (11) ◽  
pp. 1749-1759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin D. Zinszer ◽  
Andrew J. Anderson ◽  
Olivia Kang ◽  
Thalia Wheatley ◽  
Rajeev D. S. Raizada

Two sets of items can share the same underlying conceptual structure, while appearing unrelated at a surface level. Humans excel at recognizing and using alignments between such underlying structures in many domains of cognition, most notably in analogical reasoning. Here we show that structural alignment reveals how different people's neural representations of word meaning are preserved across different languages, such that patterns of brain activation can be used to translate words from one language to another. Groups of Chinese and English speakers underwent fMRI scanning while reading words in their respective native languages. Simply by aligning structures representing the two groups' neural semantic spaces, we successfully infer all seven Chinese–English word translations. Beyond language translation, conceptual structural alignment underlies many aspects of high-level cognition, and this work opens the door to deriving many such alignments directly from neural representational content.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (6) ◽  
pp. 399-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Bischoff-Grethe ◽  
Richard B. Buxton ◽  
Martin P. Paulus ◽  
Adam S. Fleisher ◽  
Tony T. Yang ◽  
...  

AbstractHuman neuroimaging studies of reward processing typically involve tasks that engage decision-making processes in the dorsal striatum or focus upon the ventral striatum’s response to feedback expectancy. These studies are often compared to the animal literature; however, some animal studies include both feedback and nonfeedback events that activate the dorsal striatum during feedback expectancy. Differences in task parameters, movement complexity, and motoric effort to attain rewards may partly explain ventral and dorsal striatal response differences across species. We, therefore, used a target capture task during functional neuroimaging that was inspired by a study of single cell modulation in the internal globus pallidus during reward-cued, rotational arm movements in nonhuman primates. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging study, participants used a fiberoptic joystick to make a rotational response to an instruction stimulus that indicated both a target location for a capture movement and whether or not the trial would end with feedback indicating either a small financial gain or a neutral outcome. Portions of the dorsal striatum and pallidum demonstrated greater neural activation to visual cues predicting potential gains relative to cues with no associated outcome. Furthermore, both striatal and pallidal regions displayed a greater response to financial gains relative to neutral outcomes. This reward-dependent modulation of dorsal striatal and pallidal activation in a target-capture task is consistent with findings from reward studies in animals, supporting the use of motorically complex tasks as translational paradigms to investigate the neural substrates of reward expectancy and outcome in humans. (JINS, 2015, 21, 399–411)


Author(s):  
Njuguna Jane Ngoiri

The objective of the study was to describe appropriateness of modal auxiliary verbs in class six written English. The study focused on the use of English modal auxiliary verbs by class six pupils from diverse language backgrounds in Kenyan primary schools. Modal auxiliary verbs are difficult as their use entails syntactic and semantic appropriateness. As such, most pupils often find themselves unable to use this complex linguistic feature in written English. In spite of this, there is no known documentation that focuses on modal auxiliary verbs among children. It is this gap that the current study sought to fill. Forty pupils were randomly selected from four primary schools in Nakuru County. Data was elicited by means of written composition and grammar exercises. Further, it was analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively and presented in the form of graphs and tables. The Representational Theory of The Mind was used to explain the research findings. The findings revealed that modal auxiliary verbs are indeed difficult and their appropriate use present difficulties in pupils' written work. It was therefore recommended that learning of English should be meaningful. In order to enrich pupil's mental representations pupils should be exposed to a linguistically rich environment to enhance acquisition and learning. It is hoped that these findings will be of benefit to school stakeholders in ensuring that appropriate learning environment is created for pupils. Additionally, it could be a reference for researchers interested in language use at the school level.


2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Ryan Yousif

Mental representations are the essence of cognition. Yet, to understand how the mind works, we must understand not just the content of mental representations (i.e., what information is stored), but also the format of those representations (i.e., how that information is stored). But what does it mean for representations to be formatted? How many formats are there? Is it possible that the mind represents some pieces of information in multiple formats at once? To address these questions, I discuss a ‘case study’ of representational format: the representation of spatial location. I review work (a) across species and across development, (b) across spatial scales, and (c) across levels of analysis (e.g., high-level cognitive format vs. low-level neural format). Along the way, I discuss the possibility that the same information may be organized in multiple formats simultaneously (e.g., that locations may be represented in both Cartesian and polar coordinates). Ultimately, I argue that seemingly ‘redundant’ formats may support the flexible spatial behavior observed in humans, and that we should approach the study of all mental representations with this possibility in mind.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaru Kanetani

Abstract Japanese mimetics, and its psychomimes (e.g. gakkuri ‘disappointed’), in particular, are usually accompanied in speech with bodily movements, including gestures and postures. I have already argued that certain patterns in co-speech gestures and postures that accompanied psychomimes showed a relatively high rate of concord across speakers (Kanetani 2019). Taking the co-speech bodily movements as metonymic representations of embodied metaphors of emotion, this paper suggests that these kinetic features may be stored as part of the speaker’s knowledge of the words and argue that Japanese psychomimes are multimodal lexical constructions. I also show how such multimodal constructions are represented in the mind and how they are expressed in actual use. In particular, I describe and examine two-dimensional form-meaning pairings (based on Kita 1997) and show that one of the two dimensions may be selectively expressed in a given context.


Author(s):  
Hamid Dabashi

Mir Damad is primarily a gnostic philosopher, arguing that the activity of the mind makes possible the experience of spiritual visions, while visionary experience gives rise to rational thought. He brings together a variety of different traditions in Islamic philosophy, incorporating both the sort of philosophy advocated by Aristotle and its later development by the Neoplatonists, and combining them with the mystical views of Islamic thinkers. The principles of his thought are the backbone of the celebrated ‘School of Isfahan’, which developed this rich mixture of philosophical traditions even further. His approach to the analysis of being was a considerable extension to previous views on this subject, and enabled him to make important contributions to the notion of time. Mir Damad’s philosophical style is characterized by a treatment of abstract concepts behind which lies the living experience of the mystic.


2008 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-414
Author(s):  
Robert Leech ◽  
Denis Mareschal ◽  
Richard P. Cooper

AbstractIn this response, we reiterate the importance of development (both ontogenetic and phylogenetic) in the understanding of a complex cognitive skill – analogical reasoning. Four key questions structure the response: Does relational priming exist, and is it sufficient for analogy? What do we mean by relations as transformations? Could all or any relations be represented as transformations? And what about the challenge of more complex analogies? In addressing these questions we bring together a number of supportive commentaries, strengthening our emergentist case for analogy (in particular with insights from comparative psychology), and review new supportive evidence. We also rebut those commentaries that ignore development at their peril. Along the way, we revisit the main assumptions underlying the analogy as relational priming (ARP) account of analogy, clarifying and elaborating as necessary.


Philosophy ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock

AbstractThe debate about concepts has always been shaped by a contrast between subjectivism, which treats them as phenomena in the mind or head of individuals, and objectivism, which insists that they exist independently of individual minds. The most prominent contemporary version of subjectivism is Fodor's RTM. The Fregean charge against subjectivism is that it cannot do justice to the fact that different individuals can share the same concepts. Proponents of RTM have accepted shareability as a ‘non-negotiable constraint’. At the same time they insist that by distinguishing between sign-types and – tokens the Fregean objection cannot just be circumvented but revealed to be fallacious. My paper rehabilitates the Fregean argument against subjectivism. The RTM response rests either on an equivocation of ‘concept’—between types which satisfy the non-negotiable constraint and tokens which are mental particulars in line with RTM doctrine—or on the untenable idea that one and the same entity can be both a shareable type and hence abstract and a concrete particular in the head. Furthermore, subjectivism cannot be rescued by adopting unorthodox metaphysical theories about the type/token and universal/particular contrasts. The final section argues that concepts are not representations or signs, but something represented by signs. Even if RTM is right to explain conceptual thinking by reference to the occurrence of mental representations, concepts themselves cannot be identical with such representations.


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