Cumulation

Chapter 8 considers what cultural evolutionists call cumulative cultural evolution, that is, the idea that culture increases in complexity. For a cultural domain being defined as cumulative, it needs to show accumulation (more traits), improvement (traits are more efficient), and ratcheting (new traits build on previous innovations). The author proposes that this is not a necessary outcome, and that different domains show different signs of cumulation. It is suggested that the fidelity and the hyper-availability provided by digital media allow for more cumulation in domains where it was limited before. Not surprisingly, they also allow for the retention of vast amounts of useless information—junk culture. A central challenge for the coming years is thus finding efficient mechanisms of online cultural selection. Algorithmic selection is finally discussed, along with how mainstream criticisms, such as the fact that algorithms are biased or opaque to users, are not decisive arguments against their efficacy and utility.

Misinformation

This chapter takes a broad view of misinformation: the spread of factually false claims is as old as cultural transmission itself, and to assess the real danger represented by social media we need to understand what kind of cognitive triggers are activated by successful information, online or offline. The chapter critically reviews some hypotheses for which digital media are especially suited for the spreading of misinformation, and then it explores in detail the idea that some cultural traits possess features that make them particularly well suited to be retained and transmitted, conferring on them a selective advantage relative to other traits. From this perspective, misinformation can be manufactured building on features that make it attractive in an almost unconstrained way, whereas true news cannot, simply because it needs to correspond to reality. Misinformation can be designed to spread more than real information does,—whether this is consciously planned or not.

Popularity

The tendency to copy the majority is the topic of the fourth chapter. The fact that online popularity produces long-tailed distributions is often presented as an argument to show the power of online social influence. However, long-tailed distributions are a trademark of many cultural domains, from first names to dog breeds. In addition, these distributions do not necessarily imply the existence of an individual-level tendency to prefer popular things, but they can be the result of bare availability: the more examples of an item, the more likely we will encounter it, and the more likely we will become interested in it. Conformity is next considered: as defined in cultural evolution, conformity implies an effective tendency to copy the majority. As for celebrities, various experiments are reviewed, and the author defends a view for which conformity is far from automatic, as it interacts with many other psychological tendencies. How digital technologies permit radically new forms of popularity advertisements, from the real-time quantification of “likes” in social media to the explosion of consumer reviews, or top-lists of virtually everything, is also examined and discussed in relation to cultural evolution theory.

Transmitting and sharing

The chapter examines in more detail the processes that underpin cultural transmission offline and compare it with the online equivalents. Starting from the cultural evolution criticism of memetics, it discusses how cultural stability can be achieved both with preservative processes, where new information is passed on with fidelity, and reconstructive ones, where the material is transformed by individual minds in a non-random way. Different domains are characterized by different degrees of reconstruction and preservation. Whereas internet memes are not always replicated exactly, as often thought, digital technologies do provide several fidelity amplifiers that make online transmission, in this respect, an interesting case of cultural transmission. The author finally discusses possible consequences of this difference between online and offline transmission.

Echo chambers

In this chapter, the focus is on the phenomenon of online echo chambers, trying an evaluation from the broad perspective of cultural evolution. It has been noted that individuals associate on social media in communities of like-minded people, where they are repeatedly exposed to the same kind of information and, even more importantly, they are not exposed to contrary information. How strong are echo chambers? What are their effects on the flow of online information? Although the formation and existence of echo chambers is consistent with the cognitive and evolutionary approach defended here, individuals are exposed online to a considerable amount of contrary opinions: in fact, against current common sense, to more diverse opinions than what happens in their offline life. As a consequence, the increase of polarization, which many link to a more informationally segregated society, could also have been overestimated, or, in any case, may be due to motifs other than our social media activity.

Prestige

Drawing on the background developed in the second chapter, this chapter examines specifically online phenomena, scrutinizing the role of influencers, celebrities, and famous people in general. Cultural evolutionists talk about prestige bias in this regard: one can make use of signs of deference, respect, or simply check from whom other people are learning, and choose those individuals as cultural models. This tendency gives us today, in large and opaque networks of cultural transmission—the story goes—the celebrities “famous for being famous,” if not the danger of radical proselytism from charismatic leaders. We will see, however, that experiments and data tell something more nuanced: celebrities’ influence works only in specific conditions and it is far from being a blind force. Recent internet trends, such as the rise of micro-influencers, figures who are expert in their domain, and who can engage in direct relationship with their followers, are consistent with this picture.

A growing network for cultural transmission

The first chapter discusses how digital media increased, and are still increasing, the network in which cultural transmission can occur. Research inspired by the social brain hypothesis shows that our social networks did not change radically in the last years. The size of our digital social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) is similar to the size of our offline social networks, and some of their characteristics, such as their geographical extension, are also comparable. Nonetheless, it is argued that digital connections, together with our tendency to share information for limited or null gains, made cultural transmission relatively detached from these networks. In cultural evolutionary terms, online digital media increased cultural population sizes, that is, the number of individuals with whom we may exchange information. This hyper-availability together with new opportunities pose new problems related to cultural evolution. One is that, when we can copy from everybody, it may become potentially more difficult to decide from whom we should.

Wary learners

Cultural evolution is a diverse field of research, but some similarities can be found: cultural evolutionists defend a quantitative, naturalistic, and interdisciplinary approach to the study of human culture. Importantly, cultural evolutionists are committed to develop sound hypotheses about the individual psychology that drives our cultural behavior. Although there are different nuances, a common idea is that human cognition is specialized for processing social interactions, communication, and learning from others. From an evolutionary point of view, the cognitive mechanisms involved should produce, on average, adaptive outcomes. From this perspective, social learning strategies (a series of relatively simple, general-domain, heuristics to choose when, what, and from whom to copy) provide a first boundary to indiscriminate social influence. I critically examine the concept of social learning strategies, and I discuss how cultural evolutionists may have overestimated both the effect of social influence and, possibly, our reliance of social learning itself. I also discuss the perspective from epistemic vigilance theory, which gives more weight to the possibility of explicit deception, and proposes that we apply sophisticated cognitive operations when deciding whether to trust information coming from others.

Conclusion

The book concludes by mentioning some of the topics that it did not consider, such as concerns about data privacy, monopoly of social media companies, effects of digital media overuse on psychological well-being, or the fact that, for many people, online access is still barely achievable. Despite this, the research discussed in this book, which focuses on the informational aspects of our digital and online lives, suggests there are grounds for cautious optimism. Another problem is mentioned, which is thought to be urgent: the increase of available information also increases differences in how people access and use information, being advantageous for some and disadvantageous for others. How we will face this informational inequality will be a pressing problem in the next years. Finally the main message of the book with respect to cultural evolution theory is summarized: “culture” is not an entity with causal powers, but a property that artefacts, ideas, and behaviors have to a certain degree. Social influence is not blind and automatic, and the reasons why cultural traits become successful are many: cognitive preferences are only one of them.