Ethnicity and “Muslim fraternity”

The chapter begins by introducing the case with the help of vignettes from the field. After setting the stage for the empirical puzzle, it goes on to the theoretical framework and situates the research question in the broader debates on religion and conflict, paying specific attention to religion’s role as a conflict resolution tool. It then ties these debates to the sociological literature on identity formation and ethnic boundary making and introduces the fourfold typology of religious and ethnic identities in the Kurdish conflict. To elaborate on the structural changes that have brought about these identity categories it turns to Bourdieusian field theory, discusses briefly the emergence of an autonomous religious field under the AKP, and familiarizes the reader with the actors in the political and religious fields in Turkey.

“Only Turks Can Lead a Muslim Union”: The Case for Ethno-Religious Identity

Chapter 4 revolves around “ethno-religious” identity and argues that another reason the idea of Muslim unity does not work well in the Kurdish conflict is the strength of Turkish nationalism among Turkish religious elites. Through interview data, it reveals how Turkish religious elites, who seemingly advocate Islamic unity, end up privileging Turkish identity upon further interrogation. With the help of a historical overview that goes back as early as the nineteenth century, the chapter first explains in detail how this attitude and the endurance of Turkish nationalism among Turkish Muslims has its roots in the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS) and the formation of the Turkish nation-state as a Sunni Muslim entity. Through a systematic analysis of newspapers and public statements, it then documents how the AKP has replaced its emphasis on “Muslim fraternity” with an emphasis on Turkish-Muslim nationalism.

“Islam as Cement”: The Way Out?

Chapter 2 scrutinizes the contours of the Muslim unity project. Through interview data it demonstrates how the belief in “Islam as cement” comes to life in the discourses of several religious elites who characterize Sunni Islam as an overarching supranational identity and see Muslim fraternity as the only solution to the Kurdish conflict. Citing certain hadiths and verses from the Qur’an, they reproduce the belief that Sunni Islam could indeed bridge the ethnic divide between Kurds and Turks. To provide some historical context, the chapter goes on to analyze this discourse in relation to the Muslim ummah and Ottoman pan-Islamism. Finally, building on systematic analysis of statements by AKP cadres—mostly by President Erdoğan—it demonstrates how the AKP came to embrace a pan-Islamic solution to the Kurdish conflict, what steps it took toward accomplishing it, and how its attitude toward Kurds compares to that of the Ottomans toward their Muslim subjects.

Muslim Kurds

Chapter 3 introduces “religio-ethnic” identity via a focus on Civil Friday Prayers. It provides an overview of how the institutional and policy changes introduced during the AKP rule made possible the employment of Islam as a tool of resistance in the hands of Civil Friday Prayer imams. Building on interviews with these imams as well as observations from Friday prayers, it draws attention to imams as autonomous agents of contestation who have turned religion from a tool of assimilation into a tool of nonviolent resistance. Though acknowledging Islam’s capacity to unite, these imams are quite suspicious of the Muslim unity discourse. By quoting Qur’anic verses and hadiths that highlight ethnicity as a religious, God-given (fıtrî) identity, they claim that rejecting one’s Kurdish identity and assimilating into Turkish culture means going against God’s will. Hence, rather than the ethno-religious approach, these imams promote a “religio-ethnic” identity, which traces the origins of ethno-national identity back to religious identity.

“Green Kemalism”

Chapter 1 opens with the analogy of “Green Kemalism,” used by some Kurdish political elites to criticize the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Muslim fraternity project. This line of thinking claims that the AKP is no different than the founders of the Turkish Republic in its intention to assimilate Kurds and that it differs from the latter only in its employment of religion to that end (hence the allusion to “Green”). To provide the historical and political background needed to make sense of this metaphor, the chapter then provides a detailed historical account of the role Islam has played in the Kurdish revolts and in the way the state has handled them since the late nineteenth century until 2002.

Conclusion

The concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and contributions of the book. It reiterates that although Turks and Kurds might seem to be “united in religion, divided by ethnicity,” the data at hand display that identity dynamics in Turkey’s Kurdish conflict are more complex than meets the eye. Building on this discussion, it goes on to briefly debate how the political developments in Turkey since the resumption of clashes in 2015 might influence the future of the conflict and the role of Islam in it. Lastly, it highlights the relevance of this case to understanding the relationship between religion and ethnicity in other similar cases.