Political Theology as Theodicy: The Holy Spirit’s Performance in the Economy of Redemption

Although Political Theology examined mainly the political dimension of the relationship between God-Father and God-Son, it is paramount to consider the political performance of the Holy Spirit in the Economy of Redemption. The Holy Spirit has been characterized as the binding cause and the principle of relationality both referring to God’s inner life and to God’s relationship with His creatures. As the personalization of relationality, the Holy Spirit performs a unique task: to bring together what is apart by means of organisation. This power of the Spirit to turn a plurality into a unity is manifested in the Latin translation of oikonomía as disposition, that is, giving a special order to the multiple elements within a certain totality. Within this activity of the Spirit, Theodicy can be regarded as the way to depict God’s arrangement of the world and of history, bringing everything together towards the eschatological Kingdom of God. The paper aims at showing this fundamental activity of the Holy Spirit in Christian Theology, and intends to pose the question on how to think on a theology beyond theodicy, that is, how to think on a Trinitarian God beyond the categories of sovereignty and totalization.

Special Issue of Scientia et Fides on Experimental Psychology and the Notion of Personhood

"More recently, cognitive psychologists have used the resources of psychological science to study the foundations of religion, and to discuss and possibly illuminate issues of concern for theologians. The new field, known as the cognitive science of religion (CSR), draws from work by Ernest Thomas Lawson, Robert McCauley, Pascal Boyer and Justin Barrett, among others. Many of its scholars are inspired by a spirit of collaborative work with theologians and philosophers of religion, emphasizing the need of serious cross-training between disciplines. Driven by the same spirit, the present issue of Scientia et Fides documents instances of integrative work at the intersection of psychological science and philosophical or theological knowledge, specifically centered around our understanding of what a person is. We hope that, apart from their individual worth, as a whole these contributions will stimulate further interdisciplinary studies, in order to achieve genuine science-engaged philosophy and theology, and a science that is aware of philosophical and theological discussions." (from the introduction)

The Person at the Core of Psychological Science

The paper has been written from a philosophical perspective and triggered by the recurrent discussions in psychology about the most suitable methods to study our multifaceted subjectivity. Its main point is that a phenomenological understanding of the human person provides a robust and also flexible philosophical framework for psychology. The first part discusses three classical distinctions –individual/general; explaining/understanding; induction/interpretation– which, in spite of possible deficiencies, are useful to illustrate the specificity of the human sciences relative to the natural sciences. If not understood as an either-or dichotomy these distinctions represent the search of the right balance to reflect the complexity and richness of psychological science. The second part presents the phenomenological notions of ‘vital reduction’ and ‘personalist reduction’, where reductions does not take on an eliminativistic meaning, but of directing the mind’s gaze to attend to what is originally the case. The ‘vital reduction’ reveals a subject of experience at the center of the lifeworld, and the ‘personalist reduction’ sees in rationality –i.e., the power to grasp the meaning of things and to recognize other subjects of experience­– a deeper dimension of the subject, who we can thus call a person. Psychology and phenomenology converge in disclosing the person-centeredness of our lifeworld.

¿La comunicabilidad operativa de la persona requiere su comunicabilidad ontológica? Discusión sobre un dogma filosófico de nuestro tiempo

La idea de que una filosofía de la persona substancialista e individualista ha atravesado toda la metafísica occidental y ha constituido un obstáculo para pensar la comunión y la intersubjetividad, se ha convertido en un lugar común del pensamiento contemporáneo. Se problematiza aquí esta perspectiva. Se sugiere que sus distintas formulaciones, muy variadas, obedecieron a un argumento similar, dependiente también de fundamentos teóricos muy cercanos entre sí. Se compara este planteo con el del personalismo ontológico y se evalúan los resultados del intento llamado “postmetafísico” de alcanzar una filosofía de la comunión superando el humanismo. Asimismo, se sugieren algunas influencias de esta problemática en psicoanálisis, filosofía analítica, y fenomenología. Autores variados como Heidegger, Foucault, Vattimo, Esposito, Scheler, Freud, Fromm, Kohut, Lacan, Deleuze, Madell, Stump, Ricoeur y Butler, entre otros, son referidos para ilustrar el debate.

Gratitude to God: Jonathan Edwards and the Opening of the Self

The study of gratitude has become an increasingly important topic among psychologists to address the nature of human flourishing. Of more recent interest is how gratitude to God specifically functions within an account of human flourishing, with theologians seeking to provide a distinctively Christian account of the nature of gratitude. This article enters into the ongoing conversation by attending to Jonathan Edwards’s (1703-1758) theological anthropology and development of natural and supernatural gratitude. In particular, Edwards’s anthropology includes within it an account of how the self can, and should, enlarge to receive another in love. This “enlargement” is the creaturely mirror of God’s self-giving and is the supernatural response to the creature who has received God’s grace and been infused with divine love. As a supernatural response based on God’s action in the soul, this account of gratitude differs from its natural counterpart. On Edwards’s account, therefore, there is a need to develop studies that differentiate natural and supernatural gratitude. Furthermore, this article ends with a suggestion for a study that could pick up this task based on recent psychological studies that attend to how gratitude affects self-relation. On Edwards’s account of the enlargement of the self, as well as his notion of supernatural gratitude, there is meaningful research to be done on how these can help assess development in the formation of gratitude and human flourishing.

The Dialogical Self Analogy for the Godhead: Recasting the “God is a Person” Debate

May God may be understood and referred to as a “person”? This is a live debate in contemporary theological and philosophical circles. However, despite the attention this debate has received, the vital question of how to account for God’s trinitarian nature has been mostly overlooked. Due to trinitarian concerns about the unqualified use of “person” as an analogy for the Godhead, I intervene in this debate with a two-fold proposal. The first is that proponents of using a person as an analogy for the Godhead will be better served by using a psychologically informed analogy of a “self” instead. In particular, the Dialogical Self model of a person holds much promise. In what follows, I argue that the “Dialogical Self Analogy” for the Godhead is more likely to uphold God’s trinitarian nature, avoid trinitarian confusion and related problems than “person” analogies do. The primary benefit of speaking of God as a Dialogical Self is that it offers a psychologically modelled analogy for God, whilst avoiding the language of person, yet strongly taking into account God’s trinitarian nature. This has the important benefit of preserving the concept and language of “person” for the trinitarian persons (the prosopa/hypostases), and hence avoiding the linguistic, conceptual and ecumenical confusion that arises when referring to the Godhead as a person. The strength of using the model and language of a Dialogical Self as an analogy for the Godhead (instead of person) is demonstrated by showing its compatibility with Erickson’s criteria for describing the Trinity.

La acción humana: una propuesta integral para el diálogo interdisciplinar sobre la personalidad

La necesidad de categorizar la personalidad es recurrente en estudios filosóficos, teológicos y, especialmente, psicológicos. No obstante, la falta de diálogo entre las distintas disciplinas da lugar a diversos análisis que parecen dividir la realidad humana en “parcelas” que, a menudo, son incompatibles entre sí; ¿cómo hablar, por ejemplo, de libertad antropológica desde las numerosas aportaciones conductistas de la psicología? Atendiendo a este problema, el presente artículo propone el análisis integral de la acción humana (el modo en el que la persona se actualiza) como una perspectiva que da lugar a una parametrización psicológica ajustada a la complejidad de la personalidad. Partiendo de la visión integral de la acción, su aspecto comportamental y mental comúnmente estudiados se advierten como insuficientes y se amplía el horizonte al elemento de la interioridad. Este modo más completo de parametrizar a la persona atiende su complejidad y apunta, simultáneamente, a lo que no es conceptualizable en ella. Traer al escenario la interioridad supondrá una lectura renovada de la psicología, la filosofía y la teología, así como su evidente necesidad de interacción.

Do we Need a Plant Theodicy?

In recent decades, philosophers and theologians have become increasingly aware of the extent of animal pain and suffering, both past and present, and of the challenge this poses to God’s goodness and justice. As a result, a great deal of effort has been devoted to the discussion and development of animal theodicies, that is, theodicies that aim to offer morally sufficient reasons for animal pain and suffering that are in fact God’s reasons. In this paper, I ask whether there is a need to go even further than this, by considering whether effort should be made to extend theodicy to include plants as well. Drawing upon ideas found in some recent animal theodicies as well as in the work of some environmental ethicists, I offer three arguments for supposing that plants should indeed fall within the purview of theodicy: (1) the argument from non-flourishing as evil, (2) the argument from moral considerability, and (3) the argument from intrinsic value. I also consider a possible objection to each of these arguments. Having outlined and defended the aforementioned arguments for broadening theodicy to include plants as well as humans and animals, I conclude by considering what a plant theodicy might look like.

¿Incapaces de Dios?

José Cobo maintains that the worldview of contemporary man does not allow him to believe in the sense that the first Christians believed. And he argues that the main cause of that vision has been the development of empirical science. Here I argue that in reality the cause can best be described as an anthropological error, which carries with it a metaphysical deficit. On the other hand, we rectify certain intellectual resources with which we intend to get out of this situation.

A Tale of Two Perspectives: How Psychology and Neuroscience Contribute to Understanding Personhood

Empirical science, such as psychology and neuroscience, employ diverse methods to develop data driven models and explanations for complex phenomena. In research on the self, differences in these methods produce different depictions of persons. Research in developmental psychology highlights the role of intuitive beliefs, such as psychological essentialism and intuitive dualism, in individuals’ singular, cohesive, and stable sense of self. On the other hand, research in neuroscience highlights the de-centralized, distributed, multitudes of neural networks in competition making selves, with arguments around whether the interpretation of these data imply that the self is somehow fundamental and special to human functioning. In this paper, I explore these discrepant pictures of the self to advance understanding about personhood. Specifically, I suggest that these divergent pictures of self from psychology and neuroscience have the potential to inform philosophical and theological discussions around personhood by anchoring models of persons in empirical views of persons. Likewise, I explore the opportunity for philosophy and theology to inform and enhance scientific research on the self by critiquing scientific bias and construct development as well as highlighting potential limits in understanding selves with empirical models.