El cerebro y la conciencia: una propuesta integradora entre Damásio y Zubiri

El estudio del sistema nervioso y sus funciones es fascinante y complejo. Uno de los asuntos más intrigantes de este campo es cómo la neurobiología produce estados conscientes. Para el estudio del complejo problema de la conciencia, son necesarios conocimientos tanto de neuroanatomía y fisiología como de lingüística y filosofía, lo que lo convierte en un problema temido o sencillamente ignorado tanto por científicos como por filósofos. Pero este desprecio del problema, lejos de resolverlo, desemboca en una reflexión reduccionista, que trata de ver un dilema donde hay un problema. En este artículo pretendemos aproximar las neurociencias y la filosofía, en el sentido de comprender cuál es la contribución que cada una puede ofrecer y, al mismo tiempo, sistematizar el conocimiento que de esta relación podemos extraer. Para ello, nos centraremos en las reflexiones del neurocientífico Damásio, especialmente de su concepto de conciencia ampliada, pero también en la teoría filosófica de Zubiri, y sus conceptos de biografía, «inteligencia sentiente» e «intimidad».

Eradicating xenophobia and aporophobia: Compassion as a key capacity of moral neuroeducation

Drawing on the contributions of some of the most recent and relevant studies on neuroethics and moral neuroeducation, this paper undertakes an analysis of compassion. In order to focus on the results of this neuroscientific research a reductionist naturalist framework is set aside in order to embrace the broader outlook of a moral neuroeducation that, firstly, refuses to reduce its normative character to the human capacity for evolutionary adaptation; and, secondly, seeks to locate within the brain the neuronal foundations for the development of a capacity for compassion towards those of one’s own community, and also those from outside it. Thereby, this capacity for compassion moves beyond empathic tribalism.

Cognition as a process in dynamic systems

The purpose of this article is to show the importance of the neurophenomenological approach for education, specifically in the digital society, where, more than ever, learning requires the co-development of our observation and analysis skills in conjunction with our abilities to design and implement actions in our surroundings in order to reduce complexity and increase our capacity for action. To this end, the connections between neurophenomenology and related theories will be firstly addressed. These theories provide us with the hermeneutical framework to introduce then some of the most relevant cognitive approaches to learning, with emphasis on new literacies related to advances in information technologies. Finally, the most relevant conclusions of the study are summarized, stressing the importance of promoting pedagogical innovations in the age of digital technologies that can facilitate inclusive education and learning environments.

The dual process model of moral judgement

In this article I analyse the dual process model of moral judgement. First, I set out Joshua Greene’s and Jonathan Haidt’s propositions, which represent two schools of thought on this theory. Next, I conduct a number of methodological reviews. On the one hand, I argue that the method used is tautological, while on the other, I show that the use of dilemmas is not an adequate tool with which to account for moral deliberation.

«Homo reciprocans» from the neuroscientific literature

The present work has a twofold objective: firstly, to critically trace the concept of reciprocity used in neuroscientific studies, particularly from the domain of neuroeconomics; and secondly, to specify the normative frame from which human reciprocity can be defined, from which philosophical neuroethics can develop, and to identify plausible ways to promote it through brain stimulation in order to impact the epigenetic footprint by reinforcing cordial reciprocity.

Virtue, habit and neuroscience

Neuroscience has much to offer to our understanding of human action, including its ethical dimensions. However, while neuroscience has been applied to questions of personal identity, emotion and moral decision-making, its implications for the classical notion of virtue have hardly been considered. This likely has much to do with the way in which the classical notion of virtue, together with closely related concepts of nature and habit, has been forgotten or distorted within the context of modern thought. As a consequence, the standard neuroscientific concept of habit as automatic and routine behavior is fundamentally opposed to teleological activity and thus cannot be reconciled with the classical concept of habit that is essential to virtue. The recovery of the classical notion of virtue in contemporary philosophy invites us to rethink the neuroscientific concept of habit in light of a different view of human behavior for which plasticity is not just indeterminacy but rather openness to freedom and growth.

The formal structure of practical rationality

The concept of rationality is strongly normative. Indeed, qualifying an action as rational implies demarcating spaces of inclusion and exclusion that have a practical impact. However, the notion of rationality is not fully explained. In this article I intend to clarify the constitutive elements of the formal structure of practical rationality in order to facilitate its conceptualisation.

Critical Naturalism

In this paper I map the conceptual framework of naturalism, its ontological implications and its current projection in the field of neurophilosophy. I show how critical naturalism formally differs from radical ontological naturalisms, both global and sectoral, in order to become a critical instance. Its theoretical implications lead to a definition of natural causality from the emergentist perspective and to metaphysical scenarios ranging from ontological pluralism to noumenal monism.

Critical Neurohermeneutics

The article supports the proposal for a critical neurohermeneutics. For this purpose it begins by considering the recently coined term «neurohermeneutics» and the various meanings it contains. The article then explores neurohermeneutics as the hermeneutics of neuroscience, and identifies some of the main limitations of naturalistic neuroethics that arise from the deficit of critical hermeneutics in its approaches. Finally, critical hermeneutics is defended as the necessary foundation of neuroethics.

Can the human person be naturalised?

The article attempts to clear up what naturalising means in the present context and to show that the naturalistic approach is not sufficiently justified. It proposes the alternative of a hermeneutical approach based on the world of life in which we find ourselves as historical and social participants. To overcome neuroscientific naturalisation and reach a non-naturalistic concept of the person, the Heideggerian approach of the facticity of the Dasein is nevertheless insufficient and Zubirian philosophy is more fruitful.