Conclusion

This book’s ethnographic narrative ends with a description of the last months of the Moscovici cabinet, which dissolves as he and his collaborators look for new opportunities, while the incoming Commission headed by Ursula von der Leyen is engulfed in political controversy and Brexit negotiations. Exiting fieldwork through a collective reading of the book manuscript, I discuss the methodological challenges of embedded observation, while the Moscos take stock of their collective experience. What did the political commissioner and his staff achieve? What were the limits of political work? The conclusion is an opportunity to reflect on Juncker’s “Political Commission” experiment and on what it means to do politics in the European Union.

Introduction

In this Introduction, I frame the book’s argument around two issues: the project of a Political Commission, which Jean-Claude Juncker and Pierre Moscovici embodied, and political work in international organizations more generally. Political work, I argue, is the practice of trying to carve out a space for political agency in an environment that is heavily constrained by bureaucratic rules, international norms, and intergovernmental power structures. I contrast political work with other logics of action: technocratic expertise, the application of legal norms and institutional rules, market pressures, and diplomacy. Then I explain the effects and social dynamics of international political work.

Tax justice

After his initial success in tax policy, the Moscos became more ambitious. Pushed by the French government and in competition with the OECD, they promoted an overhaul of the entire European tax system that would have allowed member states to tax multinationals more effectively, including a digital tax on the so-called GAFAs and the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), creating a level playing field for corporate taxation. The commissioner promoted his ideas in different forums, including the G20 and in Washington. But after two years, this political work lost momentum, as a handful of governments managed to veto efforts in the Council. Despite the support of the European Parliament, the Commission’s efforts stalled in the Council, where the opposition of tax-light countries such as Ireland prevailed.

Italian populists and the Pact

Still on the Stability and Growth Pact, this chapter focuses on the Italian case, the third largest economy in the eurozone. After years of trying to find with Matteo Renzi’s Democrats a “narrow path” that would allow Italy to reduce its public debt, relations between the commissioner and Italy turn into an open political crisis when the Lega–Five Star Movement coalition government comes to power and decides to openly flout budgetary rules. After the Greek summer of 2015, the Italian autumn of 2018 is the most dramatic moment in the cabinet’s life. The chapter explains why, despite Rome’s growing isolation, the Commission ended up not sanctioning Italy.

A socialist, French commissioner

Before he became a European commissioner, Pierre Moscovici was a French Minister of Finance, close to President François Hollande, and an influential member of the Socialist Party. Even after he moved to Brussels, Moscovici never neglected French politics. Members of his cabinet worked hard to make sure he remained politically relevant in France, and kept his options open there. Meanwhile, the commissioner also tried to position himself as a leader of the European left. This chapter shows how, after Emmanuel Macron’s victory, the prominent socialist politician gradually lost his political base in his home country, which led to tense relations with both the Socialist Party and the Elysée Palace—a key European player.

Epilogue

The entry into office of the von der Leyen Commission on December 1, 2019 allows the commissioner and cabinet members to envisage a transition before the end of the year. Career officials return to the administration. For them, the cabinet’s political experience is over. Olivier is being considered for a deputy director-general position in a noneconomic sector of the Commission, Reinhard for a director position at DG ECFIN. David and Ioana return to their respective DGs, TAXUD and ECFIN, Maud to Michel Barnier’s task force on relations with the UK....

“We have to build a success story”

After the July 2015 Greek referendum and the departure of Varoufakis, Moscovici moved closer to Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, and Euclid Tsakalotos, the finance minister who replaced Varoufakis. Trying to find an “alternative within the program,” they all defended a more socially sensitive application of austerity measures. This led Moscovici and his staff to engage in fierce battles with the Eurogroup and especially the IMF, backed by Germany. On visits to Washington and Athens, I observed the commissioner trying to find allies and communicate messages. To some extent, his political work succeeded, but this left a bitter taste for several members of the cabinet.

Facing Varoufakis

The threat of Grexit was the first crisis Moscovici and his staff had to handle during their term of office. Highly critical of the commissioner who was his counterpart in Brussels, former Greek minister Yanis Varoufakis has become the most influential commentator on this period. This first of two chapters dealing with Greece shows the other side of his story: how Moscovici and his staff tried—but failed—to find common ground at a challenging time, when they had just moved in the Berlaymont building in the winter of 2015.

The failed reform of the eurozone

This chapter is the story of a political failure. When Moscovici arrived in Brussels, he promised to reform eurozone governance, with a eurozone budget and a European finance minister. The Commission’s ambition was laid out in a Five-President Report that promised great institutional advances. Moscovici’s staff devoted considerable time and effort to push for federalist and Keynesian ideas against the ordoliberal consensus originating from Berlin and The Hague. Focusing on discussions and working meetings between political advisors and DG ECFIN officials, this chapter documents the battle of ideas waged—and lost—by the Moscos against the New Hanseatic League…until COVID-19 changed everything.

No representation without taxation

In addition to economic and financial affairs, Moscovici was in charge of taxation and customs union. In recent years, there have been growing calls for and initiatives to harmonize tax rules at the global level. Now, the day Juncker and Moscovici came to office, the EU was marred by tax scandals, notably in Juncker’s home country, Luxembourg. This chapter describes how the commissioner and his staff, alongside Competition commissioner Margarethe Vestager, forged an alliance with civil society groups and members of the European Parliament to adopt a series of new legislation against tax evasion, including a list of tax havens. They did so despite the need for unanimity in the Council and against the will of several member states such as the Netherlands. The chapter also recounts the Moscovici cabinet’s political role on two seemingly technical issues: the reform of the Value Added Tax code and the impact of Brexit on the customs union.