The Supply Chain Diversification and India–South Korea Cooperation in a Contested East Asia in the Post-COVID-19 Era

This paper analyzes the dynamics of supply chain diversification in a contested East Asia and their implications for India–South Korea cooperation in the post-COVID-19 era. Major powers have sought to restructure supply chain by designing a strategy to reduce their reliance on China-controlled supply chain. The United States–China trade and technological war, Asian regional powers’ escalating conflicts with a rising China, and pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions have played key roles in driving the restructuring process. India and South Korea, Asia’s two major economies, have also re-evaluated their supply chain strategies. As this paper explains, on the one hand, India has been striving to emerge as a supply chain hub for key industries by ending China’s control. On the other hand, South Korea has also been aiming to diversify its supply chain beyond China under the New Southern Policy. Against that backdrop, critical developments concerning supply chain cooperation have occurred between the two countries amid the COVID-19 crisis. The pandemic has not only facilitated the opening of high-level political exchanges on supply chain but also brought tangible outcomes, as Korean companies have become active participants in India’s quest to build an India-centric supply chain. I conclude this study by contending that the two countries are “natural partners” in reshaping the supply chain dynamics in East Asia in the post-COVID-19 era.

Introduction: India–East Asia Relations in the Post-COVID-19 Era

This article argues that India-East Asia relations are likely to enter a new phase in the post-COVID-19 era. The COVID-19 pandemic has hastened the decline of the post-Cold War liberal order that has so far promoted mutual trust and cooperation and underpinned peace and prosperity. This development has enormous implications for East Asia’s international relations. Indeed, significant changes appear to have occurred in the region during the pandemic. On the one hand, the pandemic has accelerated China's growing supremacy, but on the other hand, it has also enhanced its rivalry with all major liberal powers, including the US, India, Japan and Australia. Moreover, the geo-economic front has also witnessed drastic changes as pandemic-induced economic nationalism, economic retaliation, and supply chain restructuring have swept across the region. Hence, it is not premature to proclaim the post-pandemic East Asia will differ from the post-Cold War liberal era. That, in turn, raises important questions: How has the COVID-19 influenced India–East Asia relations? Will the post-COVID-19 era transform India's ties with East Asia? If so, how will this relationship change, and to what extent? This article, and this special issue more broadly, seek to answer these questions. In doing so, we first examine the major geopolitical and geo-economic issues between India and East Asia. Thereafter, we analyze India's relations with South Korea, China, Japan and ASEAN.

India–ASEAN Relations: Riding and Transcending the “Indo-Pacific” Wave

This paper surveys India–ASEAN relations since the late 1990s amid the ongoing quest for a new regional compact in a post-pandemic era to advance India’s growing security and economic interests in Southeast Asia. During the cold war, India preferred to engage bilaterally with Southeast Asian countries than engage ASEAN directly. This tack shifted after 2000 as new security challenges arrived, particularly the need to secure the Indian Ocean. India’s overtures with ASEAN and ASEAN states grew alongside defense cooperation, which are now being renewed and renegotiated under the “Indo-Pacific” rubric despite differences over how India and ASEAN states regard the concept. Economic liberalization changed India’s calculus in the 1980s, which led to a series of overtures to economically tether India to the ASEAN. India–ASEAN trade grew dramatically over the last decade but fears abound over whether India’s rejection of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement will reverse its economic footprint in Southeast Asia. Given both security and economic differences between India and the ASEAN, opportunities exist in joining to address shared transnational challenges like cybersecurity and counterterrorism.

Japan–India Relations Beyond Coping with China in the Indo-Pacific Region

The Indo-Pacific region is said to be the center of the 21st century, unlike the Asia-Pacific in the 20th century. In the region, China is emerging rapidly in terms of economic strength, defense capability, and international presence. The US and other concerned countries are striving to cope with the new development. It looks that the US manages to somehow retain its Pax Americana as in the latter half of the last century. China which dreams to head for Pax Sinica has been implementing various measures including removing unfavorable circumstances to promote its dream. At the moment, it is hard to make prompt predictions on how these two Pax would be going. The key question would be ways to deal with China. Typical policies now under implementation are engaging policy represented by the RCEP and balancing policy by the Quad. These two policies have a timeline of short-term policy and middle-term policy. Perhaps, contents of the policies would be finalized depending upon China’s economic development as one of the major factors. To bring about peace and stability of the region, in tandem with them, it might be necessary to bring about a regional order of the Indo-Pacific where it has been lacking. The close relations of Japan and India could be utilized for such a purpose also. Although COVID-19 is afflicting the whole region, it is hoped that the pandemic could be overcome by vaccines and other measures in the near future. It is the right time now to ponder over the future direction of the Indo-Pacific region before it is too late.

India in the Indo-Pacific: China, COVID-19 and the Reconfigured Regional Order

Comprising aspiring economies, significant reserves of social, human and natural capital, and witnessing the bulk of maritime trade, global as well as intra-region interests are inextricably tied to the Indo-Pacific. Since 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in exposing the fault lines in the Indo-Pacific which was already fraught with competing as well as cooperative geopolitical equations. In the context of regional and global actors being called upon to reign in the ensuing disruptions and establish alternate response mechanisms, this paper examines the geopolitical landscape of the Indo-Pacific and the evolution of India’s role as a key participant and contributor to regional dynamics. In doing do, the paper analyzes intra-region partnerships which have witnessed a steady expansion with New Delhi’s involvement. It also underscores the key responses and adaptations of countries in the region and how India’s engagement is poised to underwrite the same.

A New Quest for Self-Reliance: East Asia and Indian Economic Nationalism

Since 2017, India has introduced an increasing number of protectionist economic policies including higher tariffs, import duties and production subsidies while also rejecting and reviewing free trade agreements and imposing new regulations on foreign companies. This paper seeks to make sense of India’s recent foreign economic policies and their potential impact on its relations with East Asia. It does so by analyzing the economic, political and geopolitical drivers of these policy changes and placing their emergence within a broader historical context. It is argued that India is entering a new period of “neo-mercantilist” economic nationalism that simultaneously seeks to protect and nurture industries while attracting foreign investment and integrating India into global value chains. This is the outcome of the consequences of “liberal” economic nationalist policies and a changing geopolitical environment — including a broader global impetus toward neo-mercantilist policies and conflict with China. The COVID-19 pandemic has intensified this pre-existing turn toward neo-mercantilism. India’s new economic nationalism has the potential to produce significant changes in India’s relations with East Asia but also faces significant challenges in its implementation in the post-COVID era.

India’s China Challenge: Foreign Policy Dilemmas Post-Galwan and Post-Covid

The paper analyzes the challenge to India from China, and the dilemmas faced by India in shaping an appropriate response. A two-level theory analysis indicates that some diminishing cooperation is possible at the global level, for example over environmental issues. However, regionally, this has been overtaken structurally by increasing sharp confrontation along the Himalayas and by rising geopolitical and geo-economic competition across Asia and the Indo-Pacific. This has been overlaid in 2020–2021 by the particularly negative effect on Indian relations with China of the clashes and casualties at Galwan and the impact of Covid-19. Given this sharpening challenge, the paper finds that India’s cherished axiom of full strategic autonomy now has to be tempered in its response by balancing dictates, particularly in the light of Stephen Walt’s balance of threat model. India’s responses pose various dilemmas in terms of effectiveness and counter-productiveness. Geopolitically, dilemmas continue to revolve for India around how far to invoke a Tibet Card and a Taiwan Card in its One China policy; and how far India can shape an immediate web (in effect around China) through strengthening security links with Vietnam, Mongolia and South Korea. Dilemmas also follow from how far India should pursue tighter security/military arrangements with more powerful China-concerned states like Australia, Japan, France, and above all, the United States. Geo-economically, India’s dilemmas revolve around how to respond to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and to China’s Maritime Silk Road scheme. Looking forward, an important factor will be how far India pulls away from Covid-19 disruption to the economy, and how far it will need to divert long-term economic funding away from immediate short-term military projects.

India’s Grand Strategy in East Asia in the Era of COVID-19

Since the election of Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in May 2014, India’s approach to East Asia has changed, principally in response to pressures exerted by China. The Modi government inherited an East Asia strategy that combined a push for greater diplomatic and economic linkages with the region, an effort to improve Sino-Indian relations through a mix of engagement and deterrence, and a strengthening of security ties with the United States (US) and its allies. During its first three years in office, this paper argues that the Modi government stuck with this approach but attempted to pursue it more energetically as well as to assert India’s interests more clearly and forcefully in interactions with Beijing. After the Doklam standoff in 2017, however, India was pushed to assume a more clearly competitive stance, despite concerns about the reliability of Donald J. Trump’s new administration in Washington, China’s growing belligerence towards India and the rest of the region, and the impact of COVID-19. This stance entails both internal and external balancing, and a push for greater economic self-reliance that implies some decoupling from China, but which also has implications for India’s relations with other countries in East Asia.

Impacts of a Bathing Space on the Lives of the Rural Women in India

According to the 2011 Census of India, around 55% of rural households do not access a private bathing facility. The research study examines whether a bathing space’s presence improves the quality of life of the women using it. The study was conducted in two Indian states, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal, where two private agencies had facilitated bathing spaces. 54 women were interviewed for the purpose of the study. Individual interviews were conducted to understand the perception of the women who had recent access to the bathing spaces. The research shows that women who have access to bathing space have perceived positive changes in their health. Because of access to a private and secluded area, they can carry out Menstrual Hygiene Management practices. Along with the health benefits, the women participants also perceived changes in their daily lives. While there were numerous benefits of the bathing space, the burden of filling water and maintaining the bathing spaces on women increased. The paper also tries to understand what are the reasons for not constructing a bathing space. Cultural norms, lack of land, lack of water and water connectivity, lack of awareness, and economic reasons came across as reasons for not constructing a bathing space in the study.

Convergence Potentials in SAARC and ASEAN Economies

This study has set to compare the usefulness of the regional integration efforts taken by two important economic blocs, SAARC and ASEAN, within the Asian continent to reduce the regional income inequality. Therefore, the existence of income convergence (or divergence) among the SAARC and ASEAN countries is the aim of this study. To investigate whether (or not) there exists income convergence across the SAARC and ASEAN blocs over the period of 1970-2017, [Formula: see text]-convergence, σ-convergence and club convergence estimation methods have been applied. The results confirm the convergence of income across the ASEAN member countries, which is absent for the SAARC member countries at the intra-regional level. Although we considered all countries of the SAARC and ASEAN blocs together in the panel, an evidence of income convergence over the years has been found. The analysis supports the view of trade liberalization and recommends investing in the human capital to narrow down the regional disparity in future. To achieve a favorable impact of Asian rising growth, regional integration is important, for that a collective policy framework at the regional level is needed for both SAARC and ASEAN.