The Fall of Fort Ticonderoga

This chapter discusses Burgoyne’s successful seizure of Fort Ticonderoga, the vital American position that guarded southern Lake Champlain and Lake George approach to the Hudson River and, ultimately, Albany. The significant leadership failures by the American commanders, especially Major General Arthur St. Clair and Major General Philip Schuyler, is examined in some depth. A combination of American failures—in preparation, execution, and the retreat—and the competent British conduct of operations, including the establishing of artillery on Mount Defiance, something the Americans believed was impossible, is discussed. Improperly sited fortifications, failure to secure key terrain, and an incompetently planned and executed retreat, ensured American failure to hold the fortification.

Defeat, Retreat, Disgrace

This chapter discusses the military operations that took place in the immediate aftermath of the British capture of Fort Ticonderoga and its surrounding fortifications. The Battle of Hubbardton, during which the American rear guard, led by Ebenezer Francis and Seth Warner, stopped the British pursuit by Simon Fraser and Friedrich Riedesel and enabled the escape of St. Clair’s Ticonderoga garrison is discussed. In addition, the successful British water pursuit on the southern arm of Lake Champlain of the Americans who escaped Ticonderoga to Skenesborough on vessels, is examined as another failure of leadership. Finally, the British pursuit of American survivors and the action at Fort Anne is discussed.

British Strategic Reassessment

This chapter discusses the British military strategy reassessment after the Saratoga defeat. Shortly after learning of Saratoga, British senior leaders embarked on a several-months-long reassessment of their military strategy and policy for the American war. They replaced senior commanders, including Howe, with Sir Henry Clinton. They offered Americans everything short of independence, but it was too little, too late. For the Americans, after Saratoga, there was no turning back. Their initial revised strategy was undermined by the news that the French had signed an alliance with the Americans. Now the British faced an expanded and more challenging war. Their new strategy included naval operations, attacks on French overseas possessions, and limited operations in North America. They directed Clinton to conduct operations in the American South in the future. The British reassessment was good, but they never fully addressed the underlying objectives of their strategy toward the American rebellion.

A New British Strategy

This chapter covers in detail British strategy development in late 1776 and early 1777. During this period, British senior leaders—King George III, Lord George Germain, Lieutenant General John Burgoyne, and General Sir William Howe—created a military strategy they hoped would win the war in 1777. Howe’s plans called for an offensive to seize Philadelphia and Burgoyne’s a three-pronged offensive to split the rebellion in half. The chapter covers the competing plans in detail, the underlying assumptions, and the failure of British leaders to reconcile and coordinate Howe’s and Burgoyne’s plans. Instead of one comprehensive strategy commanded by one leader, the British essentially unleashed two uncoordinated military strategies without unity of command. The 3,000 miles between London and Howe’s headquarters in New York exacerbated the poor coordination. An appendix lists all the key orders and meetings and demonstrates the key issues that led to the faulty British strategy.

Retreat, Pursuit, and Surrender

This chapter discusses the retreat of Burgoyne’s army from near Bemis Heights north to Saratoga and their surrender to Gates on October 17, 1777. After the Americans seized Burgoyne’s right flank, he had no choice but to pull out of his fortifications and retreat north. Gates followed slowly due to his innate caution and because he had lost both generals Arnold and Lincoln to serious wounds. Gates’s army continued to grow due to the influx of militia units, swelling to over 17,000 men. Burgoyne’s exhausted army soon ground to a halt and they were quickly surrounded at Saratoga (present-day Schuylerville). After several days of negotiations, Burgoyne secured favorable terms from Gates, a convention was signed, and the army surrendered on October 17. Burgoyne defended his actions in letters to Germain blaming everyone but taking no responsibility himself. News of the monumental victory soon spread throughout America and across the Atlantic.

Introduction: Fatal Ambition

THE QUEEN’S HOUSE WAS modest as royal palaces went in eighteenth-century England. In 1761, King George III purchased the former country home of the Duke of Buckingham for his young wife, Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strelitz. This unpretentious retreat for the royal family—later expanded substantially—would one day be known as Buckingham Palace. A family home, only a few steps from St. James Palace, the official royal residence, the Queen’s House provided the king and queen with some respite from their official duties....

The First Invasion

This chapter describes the first British invasion of New York via the historic Lake Champlain, Lake George, and Hudson River route in the autumn of 1776. It starts with General Sir Guy Carleton’s successful defense of Canada and repulse of the American attempt to seize Quebec. The increasingly fraught relationship between Carleton and Lord George Germain is also addressed as is the naval arms race between the Americans and the British. This race delayed Carleton’s offensive south on Lake Champlain more than the celebrated Battle of Valcour Island, and he was forced to abandon the offensive after he reached Crown Point, much to the dismay of his second-in-command, Lieutenant General John Burgoyne. This failed first invasion planted the seeds for a new plan created in part by Burgoyne.

The Battle of Freeman’s Farm

This chapter discusses the September 19, 1777, battle of Freeman’s Farm. In this battle, Burgoyne wanted to probe the American positions on Bemis Heights, skirt around Gates’s left flank, and then dash to Albany. Burgoyne advanced with three columns. Gates ordered Morgan’s and Dearborn’s units to attack, keeping the rest of the army behind their fortifications. Americans struck the British center column, then two more brigades attacked. Elements of Burgoyne’s other two columns marched to the middle, and the Americans repulsed. Burgoyne held the ground and claimed victory, but he suffered heavy casualties that he could not replace. As Burgoyne’s army grew weaker, Gates’s army grew stronger. After the battle, Arnold and Gates quarrelled bitterly for days over credit for the battle’s outcome and the follow-on actions. Contrary to most accounts of the campaign, Gates and Arnold had reconciled by the time of the second battle.

Opening Moves

This chapter sets the political, strategic, and operational context for the Saratoga campaign. Many of the key personalities are introduced to the reader including General Sir William Howe, Admiral Lord Richard Howe, General Sir Guy Carleton, General George Washington, Major General Horatio Gates, Major General Philip Schuyler, and Major General Benedict Arnold. This chapter also covers the American Revolution’s initial military operations including the battles and siege of Boston, the battles on Long Island and Manhattan, and the failed American invasion of Canada, including the attack on and siege of Quebec. The chapter concludes with Washington’s twin victories at Trenton and Princeton and his adoption of a modified Fabian military strategy.

The Fruits of Victory

This chapter discusses two issues: the threat to Washington’s position after Saratoga and the American diplomatic triumph in Paris. After Saratoga, Gates’s reputation soared, and this coincided with Washington’s failures against Howe during the Philadelphia campaign. Washington skilfully thwarted the so-called Conway Cabal—a faction that advocated replacing Washington with Gates as commander-in-chief. In France, Louis XVI’s foreign minister Vergennes, reopened discussions about a formal alliance with Franklin and the other American diplomats. The Saratoga victory provided evidence of American resolve and competence. The Franco-American alliance, due in large part to Franklin’s brilliant diplomatic efforts, on the heels of the Saratoga military victory, changed the very character of the war. Washington would now have access to French sea power and its army, which ultimately resulted in the war-winning 1781 Yorktown campaign. The American success at Saratoga was not sufficient for ultimate victory, but it was necessary.