Everybody's Problem
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Published By University Press Of Florida

9780813054971, 9780813053424

Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter argues that ongoing plans at the local level spurred by black and white community leaders inside and outside Craven Operation Progress (now named CPI) proved effective in improving the imbalance between local and federal control during the War on Poverty. The most notable of these was the rate of economic development (namely industrial growth) in Craven starting in 1968. Building upon the foundation of previous efforts in the mid-1960s, it went far in helping to meet the original goals of the War on Poverty by providing broader access to steady and well-paying jobs that the poor most desired. Economic development would remain both a crucial goal and extension of the original antipoverty campaign in Craven well into the 1970s and beyond. While it had a varied impact on low-income individuals and was not a universal salvation out of poverty, Craven’s successes in job creation and job matching that benefited both whites and minorities appear to be in stark contrast to the chronicled shortcomings of similar efforts in urban areas such as Detroit, Philadelphia, and Oakland.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter discusses the Office of Economic Opportunity’s shift away from local ideas. This primarily entailed OEO funding fewer projects originating from local people and instead pushing national emphasis programs, such as Head Start, designed by federal officials. Although congressional cuts to OEO’s budget in 1967 played a role, the federal campaign to standardize the types of programs within the nation’s Community Action Agencies was perhaps more in response to other factors. For one, there was growing congressional disapproval for the controversial (and sometimes violent) direction of some local community action groups. Additionally, there was a continuing belief within OEO that national-emphasis programs would be more effective in reaching those most in need than were programs conceived by local people, most of whom were not poor themselves.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

Many of Craven County’s leaders continue efforts to remove COP’s first executive director from his job, feeling that he was more interested in meeting federal guidelines than with working with local people. Despite these efforts, Craven’s leaders abide by most federal guidelines and agree to expand poor and minority representation to both his and the Office of Economic Opportunity’s wishes.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter discusses the tensions that began to rise between Craven Operation Progress’s first executive director and local leaders with regards to program goals and his relationship with Washington, D.C. Craven County’s leaders chose to endure as board members, still believing the experimental program held great promise for solving their problems of poverty. Their growing commitment to progress and greater well-being for all citizens (as manifested in their accommodation to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, willingness to stand up to the local KKK, and efforts to attract higher-paying industries to the area) explains a good deal of their decision to stay on with COP.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter discusses the founding of Craven Operation Progress (COP) and the broad and enthusiastic support it received from the North Carolina Fund, its first funding agency. When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Economic Opportunity Act in August 1964 critical antipoverty plans and programs for Craven County and nearby counties had been under way for more than half a year. These included a strawberry marketing program, a rural environmental sanitation program, adult basic education classes, and manpower training. From the very beginning, plans and incentives to combat the causes of poverty in Eastern North Carolina did not await direction or guidance from the federal government but grew instead out of local needs and circumstances.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter introduces Craven Operation Progress, the nation’s first rural Community Action Agency (CAA), and how its experiences help to add to the standard narrative of the War on Poverty.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter discusses the increased intervention from the Office of Economic Opportunity and the North Carolina Fund in Craven Operation Progress matters. Federal officials within both the OEO and the Department of Labor had begun to conclude, similarly to Fund staff, that local control of community action would never allow the types of social and institutional change they believed were necessary to meet the needs of the poor. From their perspective in Washington, D.C., too many businessmen, elected officials, and other power-structure types served on local boards. Moreover, these men and women were either incapable of making or unwilling to make the kinds of decisions likely to enhance the poor’s political influence or economic standing. Eventually, save for the rare instances in which the poor made up a majority of a Community Action Agency board, local community action experiments began to be seen as a roadblock to the War on Poverty’s goals of improving opportunities and justice for indigent populations (especially in the South, where many of the long-term poor were black). The executive director ultimately resigns following pressure from both groups to step down.


Author(s):  
Karen M. Hawkins

This chapter introduces Craven Operation Progress’s new executive director who desired to ensure more poor people were reached, especially the white poor who were participating in very low numbers. A moderate compared to the previous director, he also sought to cooperate more with the local people and move COP in a less controversial direction. North Carolina Fund and Office of Economic Opportunity leaders generally distrusted the new director and believed he was too accommodating to the local power structure at the expense of those being served by COP. Yet despite such criticisms, some of COP’s greatest successes begin to show during Monte’s tenure, particularly within the Manpower training program. This chapter also details how black and whites on the COP board generally see the need to cooperate and work together for the sake of the community.


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