Control and Management of Government Expenditure: Institutional structure of budget decision-making

1996 ◽  
pp. 57-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. K. T. Postma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Budget Decision ◽  
Control And Management

Towards an Enhanced Institutional Structure of the Eurasian Economic Union

2020 ◽  
Vol 152 ◽  
pp. 102-111
Author(s):  
Igor V. Pilipenko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Eurasian Economic Union ◽  
Economic Commission ◽  
Economic Union ◽  
The Eu

This article considers how to enhance the institutional structure of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in order to enable timely decision-making and implementation of governance decisions in the interests of Eurasian integration deepening. We compare the governance structures of the EAEU and the European Union (EU) using the author’s technique and through the lens of theories of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism elaborated with respect to the EU. We propose to determine a major driver of the integration process at this stage (the College of the Eurasian Economic Commission or the EAEU member states), to reduce the number of decision-making bodies within the current institutional structure of the EAEU, and to divide clearly authority and competence of remaining bodies to exclude legal controversies in the EAEU.

scholarly journals La peculiare costituzione dell'Unione Europea

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Erik Fossum ◽  
Agustin José Menendez
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
European Union ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Constitutional Reform ◽  
Democratic Legitimacy ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Distinctive Features

A unique political animal, the European Union has given rise to important constitutional conundrums and paradoxes that John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez explore in detail in this book. The authors consider the process of forging the EU's constitution and the set of fundamental norms that define the institutional structure, the decision-making procedures, and the foundations of the Union's democratic legitimacy. Their analysis illuminates the distinctive features of the EU's pluralist constitutional construct but also the interesting parallels to the Canadian constitutional experience and provides the tools to understand the Union's development, especially during the Laeken (2001–2005) and Lisbon (2007–2009) processes of constitutional reform.

Integrating Budget Transparency into E-Government Websites

2010 ◽  
pp. 305-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ernita Joaquin ◽  
Thomas J. Greitens
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Budgetary Process ◽  
Present Information ◽  
Budget Decision ◽  
Government Websites ◽  
The Government ◽  
Government Website ◽  
Previous Scholarship

This chapter provides a basic template that governments can use when integrating budgetary information into any type of e-government website. Building on previous scholarship on citizen participation, budgeting, and budgetary transparency in e-government, the template divides budgetary information into two broad categories: process-based information that gives citizens a better understanding of budget decision-making and their avenues of participation, and outcome-based information that shows citizens the types of revenue collected by the government and how those revenues are used. We examine these two categories of budgetary information on state governmental websites in the United States and find that as governments increase the technological presentation of budgetary outcomes on their websites, a decline in the presentation of some types of budgetary process information occurs. We suggest that regardless of the sophistication of the e-government website, governments must present information on both the budgetary process and outcomes for true budgetary transparency via e-government to occur.

Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bendor ◽  
Dilip Mookherjee
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
Herbert Simon ◽  
Conditional Cooperation ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Selective Incentives ◽  
Individual Choices

Work by Axelrod, Hardin, and Taylor indicates that problems of repeated collective action may lessen if people use decentralized strategies of reciprocity to induce mutual cooperation. Hobbes's centralized solution may thus be overrated. We investigate these issues by representing ongoing collective action as an n-person repeated prisoner's dilemma. The results show that decentralized conditional cooperation can ease iterated collective action dilemmas—if all players perfectly monitor the relation between individual choices and group payoffs. Once monitoring uncertainty is introduced, such strategies degrade rapidly in value, and centrally administered selective incentives become relatively more valuable. Most importantly, we build on a suggestion of Herbert Simon by showing that a hierarchical structure, with reciprocity used in subunits and selective incentives centrally administered, combines the advantages of the decentralized and centralized solutions. This hierarchical form is more stable than the decentralized structure and often secures more cooperation than the centralized structure. Generally, the model shows that the logic of repeated decision making has significant implications for the institutional forms of collective action.

scholarly journals Effect of Government Infrastructure Expenditure on Poverty in the East African Community

2021 ◽  
pp. 71-77
Author(s):  
Phoebe Mshai Mwasagua ◽  
Dr. Alphonce Juma Odondo* ◽  
Dr. Destaings Nyongesa
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Government Expenditure ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
East African ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Correlational Research ◽  
African Community ◽  
The Difference

The East African Community (EAC) level of economic integration is among the most advanced Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa. With advancement in integration, efforts are being made by the member countries to have collective decision making on fiscal policies with the view of addressing poverty situation among other economic factors. However, while economic theory indicates that increased government expenditure leads to reduced poverty, empirical literature pits conflicting results. The difference in opinions poses lack of predictability of public finance decision making as to whether a perceptible relationship exists between public expenditure on infrastructure and poverty. This study thus, assessed the effect of government expenditure on infrastructure and poverty in EAC. Poverty was measured by private consumption per capita. The study was anchored on the Ferroni and Kaburi resource allocation framework. Correlational research design was adopted in the study. The analysis span between 2007 and 2018. The study used data drawn from five countries, namely, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Panel data analysis was employed to interrogate the study topic. The Random Effects Model was used to estimate the relationship after converting the log transformed data to stationary series. The results indicated that Government expenditure on infrastructure was significant in lowering poverty (β2=0.1577; p=0.0000). Thus, the need to enhance allocation and expenditure on infrastructure to arrest poverty. The findings may be beneficial to policymakers, strategists, government and advocacy groups.

Budgeting Procedures and Democratic Ideals: An Evaluation of Swedish Reforms

2001 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Per Molander
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Budget Process ◽  
Government Budget ◽  
Policy Area ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Budget Decision ◽  
Macroeconomic Impacts ◽  
Fundamental Values

The choice of rules for the central government budget process represents a trade-off between potentially conflicting goals. Budgetary reforms triggered by serious imbalances in public finances over the last two decades indicate that a political reorientation has taken place, giving more emphasis to macroeconomic impacts, long-term budgetary restrictions, and transparency in budget decision making. The paper analyses a number of generic problems of collective decision-making in the fiscal policy area and their relation to fundamental values upon which democratic states are built. The discussion is illustrated by experiences from a major budget process reform in Sweden between 1992 and 1997. The conclusion is that tighter fiscal discipline can be achieved without encroaching upon democratic values; it is argued that democracy can in fact be strengthened by such a shift of regime.

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