Optimal Decisions of the Manufacturer and Distributor in a Fresh Product Supply Chain Involving Long-Distance Transportation

Author(s):  
Xiaoqiang Cai ◽  
Jian Chen ◽  
Yongbo Xiao ◽  
Xiaolin Xu ◽  
Gang Yu
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chongfeng Lan ◽  
Jianfeng Zhu

New product presale is a strategic behavior of manufacturers to transfer inventory risks to consumers. The research purpose of this paper is to examine the presale discount, inventory, and service level decisions in an e-commerce supply chain, where the first period is the presale period and the second is the selling period for the new product. First, consumers were divided into two types—those who are risk averse and those who are not. Then, considering different presale discounts applied for new products, three presale strategy models were discussed: no-presale strategy, presale strategy with a moderate discount, and complete presale strategy, and the optimal decisions of e-commerce supply chain members were obtained under different valuations of the new product by consumers. Finally, the effects of the correlation coefficient between the numbers of the two types of consumers, the loss aversion degree of consumers, and the marginal profit in the sales period on the optimal discounted price and the maximum expected profit were analyzed. The conclusions of this article show that the presale strategy is not always optimal but depends on the parameters of the market and the type of consumers. For example, when the correlation coefficient between the two types of consumers is high, it is more profitable for the suppliers if they choose the presale strategy with a moderate discount, while e-commerce platforms tend to adopt the no-presale strategy. The optimal discounted price in the complete presale case is not necessarily lower than that in the moderately discounted presale case. If the marginal profit is high in the normal sales period or consumers are less averse to losses, suppliers are more likely to adopt the complete presale strategy. The research conclusions provide some theoretical reference for companies in the development of new product presale strategies in the e-commerce supply chain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.


Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.


IEEE Access ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 123877-123892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Han Zhao ◽  
Shiji Song ◽  
Yuli Zhang ◽  
Jatinder N. D. Gupta ◽  
Anna G. Devlin

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Shuang Liu

This paper investigates the optimal decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers who face price-sensitive and stochastic demand. The retailers are risk averse with conditional value at risk (CVaR) as their risk measure, and the manufacturer is a risk-neutral agent. We construct manufacturer-Stackelberg games with retailers, who engage in horizontal price competition. For the multiplicative demand model and expected demand as an exponential function of both prices, we show that there exists the optimal pricing-ordering joint decision uniquely. We then explore the influence of the price sensitivity, risk aversion, and retail competition on optimal decisions and channel efficiency. The results show that retail competition contributes to manufacturer and improves channel efficiency of the decentralized supply chain. When the retailers are more risk averse, the channel efficiency becomes much lower. However, the level of retailers’ risk aversion has no significant impact on the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and retailer’s optimal selling price.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honglin Yang ◽  
Ya Yu ◽  
Yong Zha ◽  
Jijun Yuan

In real supply chain, a capital-constrained retailer has two typical payment choices: the up-front payment to receive a high discount price or the delayed payment to reduce capital pressure. We compare with the efficiency of optimal decisions of different participants, that is, supplier, retailer, and bank, under both types of payments based on a game equilibrium analysis. It shows that under the equilibrium, the delayed payment leads to a greater optimal order quantity from the retailer compared to the up-front payment and, thus, improves the whole benefit of the supply chain. The numerical simulation for the random demand following a uniform distribution further verifies our findings. This study provides novel evidence that a dominant supplier who actively offers trade credit helps enhance the whole efficiency of a supply chain.


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