scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 3591 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Yuxiang Yang

In this paper, we study the supply chain coordination problem between a manufacturer and a retailer regarding consumers’ low-carbon preferences. The retailer considers the market demand to determine the order quantity; the manufacturer chooses how to reduce emissions according to the retailer’s order quantity. We consider four cases, including the non-emission abatement, the emission abatement of decentralized decision-making, the centralized decision-making and the retailer providing a cost-sharing contract. By comparing the four cases, we find that the case of a retailer providing a cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain, achieving a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer and retailer. In addition, we use the Rubinstein bargaining model to determine the cost-sharing ratio. Finally, numerical simulations are given to analyze the impact of the cost-sharing ratio on the equilibrium results, including the profit and the emission abatement level. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of the cost-sharing ratio and consumers’ low-carbon awareness on the profits of the members in the supply chain. We find that the equilibrium results, including the order quantity, the emission abatement level and the profits of the members in the supply chain under contract, are higher than the ones under centralized decision-making. The results show that in the higher low-carbon awareness market, retailers should formulate a reasonable cost-sharing ratio to achieve emission reduction coordination.


Author(s):  
Lang XU ◽  
Chuanxu WANG ◽  
Hui LI

We study a two-echelon supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their component/product carbon emissions. With the vertical technology spillovers, we explore the optimal decisions of centralized and decentralized supply chains with price dependent demand and propose coordination strategy for the decentralized supply chain. Considering the cost contraction effectiveness of the technology spillovers, the centralized and decentralized game theoretic models of a two-echelon supply chain are developed to investigate optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emissions reduction. Through a systematic comparison and numerical analysis, we show that the profits of both players and the entire supply chain improve with the effect of technology spillovers increasing. Carbon emissions reduction will be taken by various protective measures so that the supplier and the manufacturer who do not innovate can hardly share the results of innovating via the “free-riding” methods when the technology spillover is relatively small. We also propose a revenue-cost sharing contract through bargaining to enhance the performance of the decentralized supply chain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-86
Author(s):  
S. M. Shahidul Islam ◽  
Risat Hossain ◽  
Mst. Jamila Yasmin

Green supply chain management coordinates environment issues into the supply chain business. It has been popular to both academicians and practitioners. Smooth supply of processed agricultural products is essential for human beings and pets. In some models, excess raw materials, byproducts and defected products are kept neglected in producing and marketing finished products. Here, we have presented a three-tier green supply chain model for an agricultural product where byproducts are used for some purposes. Solution procedure of the model is derived. We have demonstrated the model using two numerical example problems.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
ziyuan zhang ◽  
Liying Yu

Abstract In the context of low-carbon economy, supply chain members’ joint emission reduction issue has become a research hotspot, while there are few researches which synthetically studies the effect of consumers’ reference low-carbon effect and supply chain members’ altruistic behavior on their decisions. To study the impact of supply chain members’ altruistic behavior and consumers’ reference low-carbon effect on their joint emission reduction decisions and profits, we build optimization models under four decision scenarios, in which we solve the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s optimal emission reduction strategies and other equilibrium solutions by differential game theory. We obtain some findings. First, consumers' reference low-carbon effect will harm the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer, discourage the manufacturer's enthusiasm to reduce emissions and retailer's enthusiasm for low-carbon publicity. Second, the altruistic behavior of the manufacturer and the retailer can not only weaken the negative impact of the reference low-carbon effect, but also promote both parties to actively reduce emissions, help achieve Pareto improvement of their own profits and utilities, and obtain additional social welfare. Third, the cost-sharing contract can encourage the manufacturer to increase emission reduction investment without affecting the retailer’s low-carbon publicity investment, and can achieve a Pareto improvement of both parties’ profits and utilities. In addition, the cost-sharing ratio is only proportional to the marginal profits and altruistic intensity of both parties, and is not affected by the reference low-carbon effect. Meanwhile, the cost-sharing ratio will decrease as the manufacturer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase, and will increase as the retailer’s marginal profit and altruistic intensity increase. In particular, when the retailer is completely altruistic, the cost-sharing contract can achieve perfect coordination of the supply chain.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Yi Hu ◽  
Lin He

Considering that the demand for fresh agricultural products is affected by product freshness and price, a two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain decision model consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer is constructed. In order to increase consumer demand for fresh agricultural products, the supplier will make appropriate efforts to preserve the freshness of agricultural products. The optimal fresh-keeping effort level of the supplier and the optimal pricing decision of the retailer under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making modes were studied, respectively; through the design of traditional cost-sharing contracts, traditional cost and revenue-sharing contracts, and cost-sharing and compensation strategies, the supplier was encouraged to improve their fresh-keeping effort. The research shows that the traditional cost-sharing contract and the traditional cost-benefit sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Under the strategy of cost sharing and compensation, when the amount of compensation meets certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be realized. Finally, the important parameters of the model are analyzed by numerical simulation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 236 ◽  
pp. 04014
Author(s):  
Hui Zhou

Cost sharing contracts is one of the most common contracts to coordinate green supply chains. In this paper, we examine whether it can coordinate green supply chains in the set up of overconfidence. We assume that the manufacturer is overconfident and the retailer is rational. The manufacturer overestimates consumers’ sensitivity to product greenness and accurately estimates the uncertainty of demand. The overconfident manufacturer and the rational retailer cooperate through cost sharing contracts. Then, we construct a game theoretical model to analyze the impact of manufacturers’ overconfident on product greenness, pricing, profit and supply chain cooperation. At last, a numerical experimentation is presented. We find that, (1) the product greenness, wholesale price and retail price increase with the manufacturer’s overconfidence as well as the retailer’s cost sharing proportion. (2) no matter how much the cost sharing proportion is, the profit of manufacturers and retailers decreases with the manufacturer’s overconfidence level. (3) cost sharing contracts can achieve the green supply chain coordination in rational setting. But under manufacturers’ overconfidence, it cannot.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Ali Wahdan ◽  
Mohamed Ashraf Emam

This paper presents the impact of applying the supply chain management (SCM) on the agribusiness field to optimize productivity and decreasing cost which will have a direct impact on the net income of the organization. The main two research questions are: is there a significant impact of supply chain management on financial performance? and is there a significant relationship between supply chain management and financial performance as well as responsibility accounting? To answer the research questions, data was collected from financial statements of agribusiness case from Egypt and the survey was conducted. The findings of the study indicated that there is a significant impact of supply chain management on financial performance through enhancing the productivity, decreasing the cost and improving profitability. Moreover, applying the efficient supply chain management can improve the use of responsibility accounting through the efficient usage for the budget of the crop.


Author(s):  
Yongtao Shen ◽  
Boonsub Panichakarn

Agriculture is widely treated as a base of national economy. The product provides the basic need for human, and its safety and stability are exposed to the constant attention of everyone. With the progress of human science and technology, more and more resources can be extracted from nature, and agricultural products nowadays are not be limited to food, but also be used as raw materials for fuel or other products. Meanwhile, trade between the two regions is often due to a comparative advantage in the production of a product, such as better technology, easier access to raw materials and the like (Dollar & Kraay, 2004). Therefore, agricultural product trade is a very important topic. This study believes that supply chains are an effective way to increase the value of agricultural product trade, for example effectively collaborating makes agricultural products available to end-consumers as quickly as possible. Supply chain management aims to satisfy consumer demands and improve the competitiveness (Dias & Ierapetritou, 2017) in various industries (Oelze et al., 2018). However, there is still blank between agricultural product trade and supply chain academically, figuring out what is agricultural product trade supply chain and what is related to this chain would be essential.


2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.


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