Fichte’s Theory of the State in the Foundations of Natural Right

2019 ◽  
pp. 329-351
Author(s):  
James A. Clarke
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 349
Author(s):  
Aidir Amin Daud

Right to life is non-derogable rights. A natural right that should not be revoked arbitrarily by anyone, including the state. A mass murder in events 1 October 1965 and Timor-Timor is a double series of states’ failure in protecting the rights of Indonesian peoples. Moreover, these two events get different treatment in its handling. The disparity in treatment between two cases is a big question related to the consistency of human rights enforcement in Indonesia. This study is a descriptive-qualitative research. While, to prove the truth, this study will use a comparative study. The findings show that the attitude of the United Nations that treat serious human rights violations in Timor-Timor and the events of 1965 in Indonesia, cannot be answered differently in the perspective of international law. Since it has a weakness where the political interests of ruling is very strong in influencing the decisions of the UN. The disparity in law enforcement in the event of serious human rights violations in 1965 and Timor-Timor due to the dynamics of international politics when it does not allow for the demands of human rights violations to the UNs’ International Court due to advantage for a certain state after the event. In order to reduce disparities in human rights violations, reconciliation is the most rational solution at this time compared remains demand the state for the violations. Besides, many human rights violations in certain countries that have successfully resolved through reconciliation approach.


Author(s):  
Douglas John Casson

This chapter illustrates how Locke's Second Treatise can be read as a revolutionary call for subjects to employ this new notion of probable judgment. In order to teach his readers to be active, critical, and even revolutionary members of the polity, Locke sets out to convince them not only that they are capable of making crucial determinations concerning the limits of political power, but also that they are obligated to do so. His account of the state of nature is not simply a heuristic device illustrating an abstract theory of government, but an attempt to provide tangible support to his contention that individuals have a natural right of judgment. Along the way he seeks to guide his readers in the proper exercise of this capacity by showing them the reasonableness of limiting their judgment to the concrete, visceral experiences of neediness and injury.


2020 ◽  
pp. 73-102
Author(s):  
Charlotte Epstein

This chapter assesses how security was established as the first absolute and natural right of the subject. Thomas Hobbes remains in focus, insofar as he articulated the furthest what had already become an established dogma of early modern thought, notably in natural right theories, and of nascent state practice. The chapter then considers the different kinds of natures that troubled the enterprise of naturalisation. For nature was also appearing, as a result of the scientific revolution, as a source of disorder. It was no longer simply the stable referent for the task of political ordering. This new, epochal instability in the constructions of nature and the way it was addressed by Hobbes in his epistemological writings contains resources for short-circuiting the naturalising work that Hobbes, amongst others, was engaged in. These resources include Hobbes’s nominalism, which marks him as the original constructivist, and his critique of universals, including ‘paternal dominion’, his term for patriarchy. Hence, the purpose of the chapter is to parse the initial naturalisation of security as the subject’s constitutive right, in order to denaturalise it. Ultimately, Hobbes played a central role, not only in theorising the state, but in securing what the author seeks to unsettle with this book: the body as history’s great naturaliser.


2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Hallenbrook

AbstractThis article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hobbes's thought as providing only minimal protection for the natural right of individuals in political society. Natural right requires the protection of not just the subjects' lives, but their ability to live commodiously, and as a result the protection that natural right receives in political society places substantive constraints on the actions of the sovereign. When those entrusted with sovereign power overstep this constraint, they cease to be sovereign and the former subjects are returned to the state of nature to seek protection as each judges fit. I develop the substance of commodious living more thoroughly than similar analyses and demonstrate that this understanding is not limited to Leviathan but can be found in Hobbes's earlier political work as well.


1940 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 218-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. J. Friedrich

IN A FAMOUS dialogue between the Athenian ambassadors and the Council of the small island of Melos, Thucydides has given the classical statement of the “right” of the stronger. “The brave Milesians soon see that they cannot appeal to the Athenians' sense of justice, because the Athenians recognize no standard but their own political advantage…By making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and transform God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucydides gives the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine.” The Dutch, in the days of Peter Breughel, used to say: “the big fish devour the little fish” to which Spinoza added “by natural right.” That is the doctrine of the “state,”as inherited from the Greeks. Similar situations still haunt us. Did the Russians by natural right seek to destroy Finnish independence?


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Ismatu Ropi

This article examines the idea of religious freedom as the constitutional rights of some countries. In the beginning, the principles of freedom of religion (liberty of religion) was deeply rooted and strongly associated with the concept of 'freedom of thought and conscience', a phrase that first appeared in the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 which ended a long war in the name of religion in Europe. In this context, religious freedom was understood as freedom to believe (or not believe), adhere (or not adhere) to a religious proposition, belief or doctrine on the basis of individual experience or reasoning. It also contained the freedom to change that belief at any time if desired for the reason that basically human being through out his/her life continues to carry out what to be called as the process of preference and selection from the 'better' life. Nevertheless, religious freedom is not merely a natural right belonging to every individual but in turn also a given right granted by the state as a political authority manifested later in the respective Constitution. For this reason, the state as the holder of the people's mandate has the right to take actions in maintaining this order which in turn may in principle be possible to limit the rights of the community itself, including those relating to religion. Hence this article discusses several important matters on the issue. First, how and to what extent international law guarantees religious freedom normatively; second, how do the general portrait of various state constitutions when discussing religious freedom, and third, to what extent freedom is practically influenced by conditions such as the concept of the public sphere and the existence of a dominant majority group.


2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (5) ◽  
pp. 233
Author(s):  
Yurii Orlov ◽  
Andrii Yashchenko ◽  
Yevheniia Hladkova

The objective of the article is to identify, describe, and explain the grounds and conditions for realizing the right of rebellion, delimitation of the relevant democratic procedures from anti-state crimes. The main results of the research are that we have established the liberal and democratic principles for the realization of the right of rebellion. It has been established that it can be realized only on the grounds of the extreme necessity in restoring the rule of law, that is, while having an exclusively criminal and preventive purpose. We have also discovered that both a democratic procedure of realizing the right of rebellion can be solely considered on condition of sufficient justification, proof of the long ineffectiveness of other means of influencing the criminalized apparatus of the state, in particular judicial ones. It has been substantiated that the essential condition for the realization of such a right is the critical level of nonconfidence to the personnel of the highest agencies of state power in the overwhelming majority of the population, as well as the actual impossibility to apply (implement) the statutory forms of influence on their personnel. It is mandatory to consider the requirement of ensuring national security on the basis of a scientifically grounded criminological forecast of the deployment of mass resistance, taking into account the probable reaction to it by the subjects of international law. Thus, the realization of the right of rebellion should be non-violent. In all other cases, there is a criminal seizure of state power. The applied value of the research is the fact that due to the developed system of grounds and conditions for realizing the right of rebellion, the latter, as it is, may be delimitated from political criminal practices aimed at dismantlement of the Constitutional statehood, the seizure of state power. The results of the research may also be taken into account by political actors, as well as law enforcement agencies, courts while criminological substantiation, prediction of mass resistance measures, and legal assessment of such actions. Value/originality. The authors of the work have improved the criminological vision of the movement of mass resistance, which can take place both in the form of the realization of the natural right of rebellion and in the form of anti-state crimes. The use of these developments can be useful in the retrospective legal assessment of the situation of mass protests, forms, means, and consequences of responding to them by the authorities, preventing abuse of the right of rebellion and related crimes.


1989 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Depré ◽  
S. J. William O'Neill

Modern principles of morality are inadequate for solving the structural problems faced by contemporary societies. Early in the modern epoch the normative, social concept of nature that had supported Greek, Roman, and medieval ethical theories, became transformed into a purely empirical, private one. Thus for Hobbes, Locke, and most eighteenth-century political theorists, the “state of nature” referred to the opposite of a social state, ruled by lawful custom, it had meant before. The idea of “natural right” which gradually emerged as a substitute principle was denned in individualist terms. With the notion of “general will” Rousseau attempted to establish a more genuinely social basis for the State.


2011 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Sheridan

AbstractThe degree to which Hobbes's citizenry retains its right to resist sovereign power has been the source of a significant debate. It has been argued by a number of scholars that there is a clear avenue for legitimate rebellion in Hobbes's state, as described in the Leviathan – in this work, Hobbes asserts that subjects can retain their natural right to self-preservation in civil society, and that this represents an inalienable right that cannot, under any circumstances, be transferred to the sovereign. The conclusion frequently drawn from this feature of Hobbes's account is that it places a considerable limit on sovereign authority. The right to self-preservation has been taken as proof that Hobbes sought to ensure that the sovereign's power relies upon the continual consent of the individuals that make up his or her constituency. I want to examine Hobbes's account of this civil right in Leviathan in order to show that this line of interpretation is ultimately unfounded. While self-preservation results from the individual's own judgment of threats to her personal safety, it is justified in only the most strictly delineated contexts. Judgments regarding the overall peace and security of the state do not, and cannot, fall to individual experiences and judgments. Hobbes is quite adamant that individuals are not appropriate judges of right and wrong action in matters the sovereign legislates.


2009 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1105-1135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiang Fang

This essay is a first attempt at examining the origins and development of Chinese complaint systems before 1900, so as to understand the nature and character of this institution in historical perspective. The essay argues that the Chinese complaint system originated as an informal system in the pre-Han period and developed gradually from the late Han to the Sui. The Tang first institutionalized such a system and distinguished three major forms of complaints: direct, jumping, and gradual appeals. Subsequent states generally followed the Tang model but also made significant changes. Chinese rulers, deeply influenced by the Confucian concept ofminben(people as the foundation of the state) and by notions of heaven–human interaction(tianren ganying), tended to accept illegal appeals no matter how annoying they were for fear that any grievance might prompt heavenly punishments, while complainants regarded their appeals as a natural right no matter how useless they were. In this way, the complaint system become a hot potato for rulers that was too hot to hold but too valuable to drop.


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