Audit Committees in Supervisory Boards of Polish Public Companies: Theory, Practice and Regulations

Author(s):  
Agata Adamska ◽  
Leszek Bohdanowicz ◽  
Jacek Gad
2013 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Zhang ◽  
Kurt Pany ◽  
Philip M. J. Reckers

SUMMARY: Public companies are required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to establish an anonymous reporting (whistleblowing) channel for employee reporting of questionable accounting practices. Corporate audit committees are provided flexibility in implementing this requirement and a controversial choice is the type of reporting channel. Most commentators argue that “best practices” call for an externally administered “hotline.” To examine the efficacy of externally administered versus internally administered channels we conducted a behavioral experiment. Our results reveal a significant main effect with reporting intentions being greater if the hotline is administered externally. We then examine whether this finding is robust across selected environmental and employee-specific conditions and find that it is not. Our results suggest that the primary reporting benefits of an externally administered hotline are for organizations with a history of poor responsiveness to whistleblowing and for employees registering relatively low on the proactivity scale. Specifically, we find that an externally administered hotline obtains higher reporting intentions under conditions wherein a previous incidence of whistleblowing notably failed to achieve a good outcome. Also, this effect is only statistically significant for participants registering as relatively low on a “proactivity” scale.


Author(s):  
Husam Abu-Khadra

All public companies in the United States are required by the securities and exchange commission (SEC) to have an audit committee. Such enforcement can be attributed to high-profile corporate failures and their connections to nonexistence, ineffective or weak audit committees and governance. Despite the efforts to establish a similar argument and enforcement structure for the nonprofit sector, the internal revenue service (IRS) has not pursued legislation, and no empirical evidence has been established to support any public policy changes. This paper contributes to the literature in this field by being the first study to examine 124,980 nonprofit organizations during the period of 2010 to 2015 to test the association between governance in nonprofit organizations and audit committees. We included fifteen measures from these organizations’ IRS Form 990 filings to formulate the study variables. We found significant evidence that the existence of audit committees improves the governance scores of nonprofit organizations. Our study findings have significant implications for nonprofit executives, policy makers and any other interested parties; these findings act as preliminary evidence to support more proactive policies regarding mandatory audit committees for nonprofit organizations. 


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-389
Author(s):  
Elisabetta Basilico ◽  
Hugh Grove

This article extends prior research on the relation between earnings quality (assessed by accruals) and future stock price returns and adds new research on the relationships between direct and indirect corporate governance mechanisms of control with accruals and future stock price returns. We study public companies of the Netherlands and find the presence of mispricing associated with very high and very low accruals. We also find evidence that direct corporate governance control mechanisms, such as the existence of separate, independent, and skilled audit committees, are related to higher earnings quality and higher future stock price returns.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Schaffer

The audit committee of public interest entities performs a public function through its auditing of financial reporting, which can be broadly broken down into three facets: (i) its role of relieving the burden on the state by supplementing or replacing government supervision, (ii) its role as guarantor of the capital market’s confidence and (iii) its role as guarantor of an audit and thus as the ‘guarantor of the guarantor’. This public function is emphasised by the recent introduction of hitherto non-systemic state supervision of supervisory boards and audit committees. This supervision is, however, to be viewed critically as it could result in the beginnings of ‘stock authorities’. This study examines how the aforementioned public function radiates to the other supervisory bodies in companies, namely the auditor and the supervisory board. It also examines the dangers which European strengthening of audit committees pose to corporate governance based on the dualistic system and to the balance of power in public limited companies.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Behrend ◽  
Marshall K. Pitman

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effect of cash versus equity compensation on audit committee decision-making after the Public Companies Oversight Board’s 2007 censure of Deloitte. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 2,588 firms, this paper uses two different compensation measurements to empirically examine the effect of audit committee compensation on decision-making. Findings The authors find that audit committee compensation effects the post-censure decision-making of Deloitte’s clients. The results support the hypothesis that cash compensation paid to audit committees influences audit committee members to retain their auditors post-censure. Additionally, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that equity compensation increases the propensity to switch auditors post-censure. Practical implications This study will be of interest to regulators, policymakers and researchers as it provides further evidence in the area of audit committee decision-making and the effect of cash and stock compensation paid to audit committee members. Originality/value This study provides empirical evidence of the association between audit committee compensation and audit committee decision-making by investigating the effect of cash-based compensation and stock-based compensation on audit committee decision-making.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suwardi Bambang Hermanto ◽  
Ikhsan Budi Riharjo

The research objective was to analyze the influence of corporate governance and performance, as well as the publication of financial statements as the moderation of company value. Institutional ownership variables, number of commissioners, number of directors, and number of audit committees and independent commissioners as corporate governance. Return on asset variables as performance, and audit delay as the publication of financial statements, and Tobin's Q as a company value. The research objects were 70 public companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, with a sample of 122 observations of financial statements from 2013-2017. The results showed that the number of commissioners, audit committees and return on assets had a positive effect on firm value. Publication of financial statements affects the value of the company, and moderates the effect of financial performance on firm value. Whereas institutional ownership, the number of directors and independent commissioners does not affect


Author(s):  
Husam Abu-Khadra

All public companies in the United States are required by the securities and exchange commission (SEC) to have an audit committee. Such enforcement can be attributed to high-profile corporate failures and their connections to nonexistence, ineffective or weak audit committees and governance. Despite the efforts to establish a similar argument and enforcement structure for the nonprofit sector, the internal revenue service (IRS) has not pursued legislation, and no empirical evidence has been established to support any public policy changes. This paper contributes to the literature in this field by being the first study to examine 124,980 nonprofit organizations during the period of 2010 to 2015 to test the association between governance in nonprofit organizations and audit committees. We included fifteen measures from these organizations’ IRS Form 990 filings to formulate the study variables. We found significant evidence that the existence of audit committees improves the governance scores of nonprofit organizations. Our study findings have significant implications for nonprofit executives, policy makers and any other interested parties; these findings act as preliminary evidence to support more proactive policies regarding mandatory audit committees for nonprofit organizations


2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama ◽  
William J. Read

The functioning of corporate audit committees was criticized in recent years by the Treadway Commission, the Public Oversight Board, the Kirk Panel, and the SEC Chairman. In response, the NYSE and NASD sponsored the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees. The BRC Report includes recommendations aimed at strengthening director independence and qualifications, and highlights the role of internal auditors in assisting audit committees in the corporate governance process. Moreover, the first three recommendations of the BRC relate to audit committee composition: absence of inside or “gray” directors, and presence of a member with financial expertise. This study examines the association between audit committee composition and the committee's interaction with internal auditing. Our results, based on responses from chief internal auditors of 114 public companies, indicate that committees comprised solely of independent directors and with at least one member having an accounting or finance background are more likely to (1) have longer meetings with the chief internal auditor; (2) provide private access to the chief internal auditor; and (3) review internal audit proposals and results of internal auditing. These findings provide empirical support for the BRC's recommendations related to audit committee composition.


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