Permanent Campaigning and Pitfalls of Proportional Representation with Fragile Parties. Elections and Party System in Czechia

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Stanislav Balík ◽  
Vít Hloušek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Proportional Representation

Designing Electoral Institutions: STV Systems and Their Consequences

1996 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Farrell ◽  
Malcolm Mackerras ◽  
Ian McAllister
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Party System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Generic Type ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Party Strategies

Although championed by advocates of proportional representation, the single transferable vote form of PR has been used consistently in only a small number of countries – principally Australia, Ireland and Malta. This paper examines the origins and development of STV and its implications for the political systems that use it. The results show that STV varies so widely in its form and application, differing on no less than five major characteristics, that it is impossible to identify any single generic type. These differences are also reflected in the party strategies that are used to maximize the vote under STV. A regression analysis of the various types of STV shows that Malta is the most proportional system, followed by Ireland and Tasmania. Ireland has the largest party system among the countries that use STV, net of other factors.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

scholarly journals Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
East European ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Spatial Coverage ◽  
As If

Scholarship on the classification, origins, incentives, and consequences of mixed-member electoral systems has matured, especially over the last two decades. While mixed-member electoral systems (also known as mixed electoral systems) have been in constant use since Germany adopted a mixed-member proportional system for assembly elections following World War II, researchers did not begin to fully probe the implications of this electoral system until its expansion across the globe beginning in the 1990s. Mixed-member electoral systems share an important characteristic: voter preferences are translated into outcomes by at least two allocation formulas applied in the same election. While voters typically receive a ballot to select a representative in a constituency (often using first-past-the-post) and a ballot to select a party list (often using a form of proportional representation (PR)), the institutional features of mixed-member systems vary substantially. A crucial distinction among mixed-member systems is whether or not seat allocation in the constituency and proportional representation tiers is linked (mixed-member proportional, or MMP) or unlinked (mixed-member majoritarian, or MMM). Across the universe of mixed-member systems, one finds additional differences in the number of ballots voters receive; the electoral formulas and thresholds used to determine winners; the proportion of seats allocated to each component; the ability of candidates to contest seats in both components during the same election; and other critical aspects of the rules. Scholarship classifying mixed-member systems has highlighted different aspects of the rules to sort them into categories. A substantial amount of scholarship on mixed-member systems has emphasized the debate about the incentives that the systems generate. The “controlled comparison” approach treats the components as if they are independent from one another and the “contamination effects” approach treats the components as if they are interdependent. These competing schools of thought generate different expectations, with the former generally anticipating compliance with Duverger’s propositions and the latter anticipating divergence. Subsequent scholarship has been split about which approach better explains observed behavior. However, many of the perceived differences between the approaches may be artificial, generated by extreme interpretations of the theoretical expectations that lack appropriate nuance. In other words, it may be inappropriate to treat this scholarship as strictly dichotomous. The extant literature on mixed-member systems evaluates data from surveys, interviews, personnel files, roll-call voting, and election returns to understand the behavior of voters, candidates, parties, and legislators. It assesses how the incentives of mixed-member systems contribute to outcomes such as the party system, descriptive representation, and policy decisions. It also explores the presence or absence of a “mandate divide”: the expectation that members of parliament (MPs) selected in the constituency component might behave differently than their counterparts in the party list component. The research is often cross-national, but studies of certain countries with mixed-member systems predominate: Germany, Japan, and New Zealand among established democracies, and central or east European countries among transitional societies. The literature presents many opportunities to generate more nuanced theory, explore different research methodologies (e.g., experimental work), and extend spatial coverage to under-studied countries.

scholarly journals The impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in Algeria. Applied to the elections of the National People’s Assembly (1997–2017)

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.

A House Divided

2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 282-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank C. Thames
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Representation Election ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Limited Evidence ◽  
Roll Call Voting ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Empirical Results

Mixed-member electoral systems embrace two views of representation by electing some legislators in single-member district elections and others in a proportional representation election. This can potentially create a “mandate divide” in legislatures, because single-member district legislators have an incentive to embrace parochial issues and proportional representation legislators have an incentive to center on national issues. Previous studies of this question have only found limited evidence of its existence. The author argues that the level of party system institutionalization will fundamentally determine whether a mandate divide will exist in a mixed-member legislature. Using roll-call voting data from the Hungarian National Assembly, the Russian Duma, and the Ukrainian Rada, the author analyzes patterns of party discipline in each legislature. The empirical results show that a mandate divide only existed in the legislature with the most weakly institutionalized party system, the Russian Duma.

The Electoral System of Israel

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Shugart
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Product Model ◽  
Political Factors ◽  
Proportional Systems ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Over Time

The electoral system of Israel is an “extreme” example of proportional representation because of its use of a single nationwide district. This feature has been a constant since 1949, while secondary features, such as legal thresholds and the proportional seat-allocation formula, have changed and had an impact on degrees of proportionality. The party system is highly fragmented, as expected in extreme proportional systems. By applying the Seat Product Model to indices of election outcomes, it is possible to determine whether Israel’s system is more or less fragmented and proportional than expected for its institutional design. This chapter reports that the long-term average outputs are about as expected, but they have fluctuated over time. Some of these fluctuations reflect changes in the secondary features of the system, while others are the results of political factors independent of the institutions.

To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 182-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ BLAIS ◽  
AGNIESKA DOBRZYNSKA ◽  
INDRIDI H. INDRIDASON
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Party System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Institutional Choice ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
History Of ◽  
General Movement ◽  
General Demand

In September 1864, the Association Internationale pour le Progrès des Sciences Sociales met in Amsterdam to examine the system of proportional representation (PR) which had just been proposed by Thomas Hare. The meeting signalled a growing interest in systems of PR across the more democratic nations of the world – some of which had already begun experimenting with it. Sixty years later, the majority of existing democracies, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, had adopted PR for the election of their national legislatures.Why did so many countries decide to shift to PR? Why did the shift occur at a given point in time, not earlier or later? Why did some countries never move to PR? These are the questions that we address in this Note.We are interested in exploring the factors that influenced the decision to adopt PR at the turn of the twentieth century. We argue that two factors of considerable theoretical relevance were particularly important in facilitating the shift to PR: the spread of democratic ideas and the presence of a majority (usually two-round) system and, as a consequence, a multi-party system.Carstairs's classic history of electoral systems shows that at the turn of the twentieth century there was a strong demand for PR, which was linked to a more general demand for democratization. As Carstairs notes,there was a general movement in the direction of more democratic political institutions which took several different forms … There was a movement for the establishment or strengthening of parliamentary institutions … Extensions of the franchise for parliamentary elections enabled an increasingly large proportion of the population to gain representation in parliament … With these developments it became a matter of increasing concern that the elected members of parliament and the parties they supported should fairly represent the various interests and opinions of the electorate.

Greece's Experiment with Proportional Representation

1927 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adamantios Th. Polyzoides
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Party System ◽  
The United States ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
General Election ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Press ◽  
The Military

On November 7 Greece held its first general election under the system of proportional representation, using a modified form of the Belgian system. This innovation was imposed on the country despite the most strenuous opposition by all of the old parties, the majority of the press, and the bulk of public opinion, and its adoption was a clear victory of the minority parties, assisted by the Military League and the then dictator General Kondylis.The arguments of the established parties in favor of the old plurality system ran on lines too familiar to require extensive statement here. The former system, according to its supporters, usually assures the election of large majorities, one way or the other, and enables Parliament to give the country what we call a strong government, such as Greece needed at the time of the election. Great Britain and the United States were offered as the outstanding examples of the efficiency of the two-party system, which is best served by the old-fashioned electoral method of absolute plurality. Naturally enough, Belgium was cited as the worst exponent of the evils of proportional representation.

Electoral Systems and Policy Congruence

2020 ◽  
pp. 003232171989542
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ferland
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Social Survey ◽  
Use Of Data ◽  
International Social Survey Programme ◽  
Citizen Preferences ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
International Social

Many studies examined the state of citizen-elite congruence at the party system, legislative and government stages of representation. Few scholars examined, however, whether citizen preferences are adequately represented in enacted policies. The article addresses this gap in the literature and examines the role of electoral systems in fostering citizens-policy congruence. Building on studies of government congruence and responsiveness, we expect levels of policy congruence to be greater under majoritarian electoral systems than under proportional representation electoral systems and as the number of parties in government decreases. In order to test these expectations, we make use of data from the International Social Survey Programme and examine the proportions of respondents whose preferences are congruent with government levels of spending in eight major policy domains. Overall, the results do not support our expectations and indicate that levels of policy congruence are similar across electoral systems and government types. In line with recent works on electoral systems and representation, our findings support the claim that majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems both have mechanisms which allow governments to represent their citizens similarly.

Two and a Half Crises: Serbian Institutional Design as the Cause of Democratic Declines

2021 ◽  
pp. 147892992110561
Author(s):  
Dušan Spasojević
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Old Regime ◽  
Competitive Authoritarianism

This article investigates the effects of Serbian semi-presidentialism and the proportional representation electoral system on democratic performances. Both electoral and political systems provide incentives for power-sharing mechanisms and the pluralistic character of the party system. However, in situations when one party becomes much stronger and predominant, there is a growing probability for the presidentialization of politics and excessive centralization of power that might lead to competitive authoritarianism. I am analysing three such cases from different periods – Milošević regime (1990–2000), the first transitional decade (2000–2012) and the return of the old regime (2012–2020) in order to identify causes of democratic crises that are embedded in institutional design.

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