Latin American Populist Authoritarian Inclusion

This article discusses how scholars have analyzed left populist governments in Latin America that include the previously excluded on the condition of their loyalty to the leader. It shows how different normative understandings of democracy have allowed the classification of populism as democratizing, a risk to democracy that could lead to competitive authoritarianism, or a sui generis combination of inclusion and authoritarianism. The paper distinguishes inclusion from democratization, and populists seeking power, from populists in governments, and populist regimes. It argues that the notion of polarized populist democracies captures better their autocratic and inclusionary practices. Populists maintain a commitment to elections hence selectively preserving rights to pluralism, free expression, and association. At the same time, they are authoritarian because populist leaders assume that they embody the people and consider that a section of the population represents the people as a whole, and that their mission is to redeem the people.

Voided Ballots in the 2012 Parliamentary Election in Serbia

The “white ballots” campaign in the 2012 parliamentary election in Serbia‎was accompanied by a change in the portion of invalid ballots, but also in‎their correlation with socio-demographic variables. When the percentage of‎invalid votes in the three previous elections is analyzed using the generalized‎least squares (GLS) multiple regression analysis, the percentage of inhabitants‎with incomplete primary education represents the best predictor. The percentage‎of individuals with primary education is also statistically relevant, just in‎the opposite (negative) direction, and less predictive. When GLS is applied to‎invalid votes in the 2012 election, incomplete primary education is positively,‎and primary education is negatively correlated with the criterion. The percentage‎of illiterates, the share of people over 65 years of age and the degree‎of urbanization are significantly, but negatively related to the criterion. The‎consequences of the 2012 election outcome were considered in the light of the‎regression to competitive authoritarianism.‎

Two and a Half Crises: Serbian Institutional Design as the Cause of Democratic Declines

This article investigates the effects of Serbian semi-presidentialism and the proportional representation electoral system on democratic performances. Both electoral and political systems provide incentives for power-sharing mechanisms and the pluralistic character of the party system. However, in situations when one party becomes much stronger and predominant, there is a growing probability for the presidentialization of politics and excessive centralization of power that might lead to competitive authoritarianism. I am analysing three such cases from different periods – Milošević regime (1990–2000), the first transitional decade (2000–2012) and the return of the old regime (2012–2020) in order to identify causes of democratic crises that are embedded in institutional design.

The Agency of Journalists in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Ukraine During Yanukovich’s Presidency

On the example of Ukraine during the Yanukovich presidency (2010–2014) this article explores which factors support journalists’ agency in relation to censorship pressure in a competitive authoritarian regime. It shows that a critical mass of journalists existed who reacted to censorship pressure with rejection. Based, first of all, on 31 semi-structured interviews, we examine the working conditions of prominent national journalists and analyse how they describe their role and motivations. We argue that the nature of competitive authoritarianism offers journalists opportunities for critical reporting, but that it is individual characteristics of journalists—including professional ethics, networks, and job mobility—which define whether and how the respective opportunities are used.

Reflections on the Independent Mass Media of Post-Soviet Countries and Political Competitiveness

The aim of this paper is to analyse political activity in the mass media discourses of states with more democratic and more authoritative regimes respectively, so as to show a clear difference in the context of a formal analysis of mass media content. The current study examines political news on qualitative online media portals in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Thirty years ago, these states began their independent transition from a closed system to openness/democracy. However, at today’s transition point, only Lithuania is considered a democratic country. In different periods Ukraine has been considered an example of competitive authoritarianism, while Belarus deviated towards complete authoritarianism and dictatorship. All political news items between 2005–2020 (for delfi.lt – since 2007) were collected with the help of the Python program. To measure the indicators, several Python programs were designed. The results of the research confirmed that the intensity of political activity differs in the mass media discourses of states with more democratic (Lithuania, Ukraine) and more authoritative (Belarus) regimes. Furthermore, a clear difference was shown in terms of five indicators, average indicators and the dynamics thereof.

Advertising and Media Capture in Turkey: How Does the State Emerge as the Largest Advertiser with the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism?

This article examines the distribution of advertising in newspapers in Turkey and the impact of the government on the allocation, in particular, of official announcements and of advertising by partially state-owned enterprises and private companies loyal to the ruling party, as well as pressure on other commercial advertisers, during the rule of the Justice and Development Party between 2002 and 2020. It demonstrates that the government has, in the last decade, largely used the advertising sector as a “carrot and stick” tactic to control newspapers through the distribution of official announcements and advertising by state-owned enterprises. It further finds that the state has emerged in recent years as the largest advertiser financing the “captured media,” control of media ownership has proved to be not enough to ensure docile news media. Turkey has shifted to competitive authoritarianism in recent years, and this article demonstrates the selective allocation of advertising, which is a strong component of suppressing the independent media. The article uncovers the impact of government on advertising, using two data sets to show: (i) the total spend on official announcements received by each newspaper and (ii) how much advertising space in square centimeters state-owned enterprises have placed in each newspaper. Interviews with editors-in-chief of newspapers also expose the direct role of government in the distribution of advertising.