scholarly journals How Can Semantics Avoid the Troubles with the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction?

2021 ◽  
pp. 103-120
Author(s):  
Roberto G. de Almeida ◽  
Caitlyn Antal
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Troubles ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Dead End ◽  
Logical Point

AbstractAt least since Quine (From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1953) it has been suspected that a semantic theory that rests on defining features, or on what are taken to be “analytic” properties bearing on the content of lexical items, rests on a fault line. Simply put, there is no criterion for determining which features or propertiesFeatures are to be analytic and which ones are to be synthetic or contingent on experience. Deep down, our concern is what cognitive science and its several competing semantic theories have to offer in terms of solution. We analyze a few cases, which run into trouble by appealing to analyticity, and propose our own solution to this problem: a version of atomism cum inferences, which we think it is the only way out of the dead-end of analyticity. We start off by discussing several guiding assumptions regarding cognitive architecture and on what we take to be methodological imperatives for doing semantics within cognitive science—that is a semantics that is concerned with accounting for mental states. We then discuss theoretical perspectives on lexical causatives and the so-called “coercion” phenomenon or, in our preferred terminology, indeterminacy. And we advance, even if briefly, a proposal for the representation and processing of conceptual content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction. We argue that the only account of mental content that does away with the analytic/synthetic distinction is atomism. The version of atomism that we sketch accounts for the purported effects of analyticity with a system of inferences that are in essence synthetic and, thus, not content constitutive.

scholarly journals Anti-Luminous Mental States: Logical, Psychological and Epistemic Problems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Óscar L. González-Castán
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Logical Point

AbstractIn this paper I shall argue that Tim Williamson’s argument for the anti-luminosity of many mental states faces difficult logical, psychological and epistemological problems. From a logical point of view, his argument is correct. However, the contrary argument that says that the anti-luminosity thesis does not necessarily follow from it is also correct. This opens a sceptical scenario. Hence, if Williamson wants to convince us that we should rationally prefer his argument rather than the other, he needs to add considerations that are not merely logical. These are psychological and epistemological in nature. However, none of these considerations is convincing.

Précis ofUnified theories of cognition

1992 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen Newell
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Convincing Evidence ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Unified Theories

AbstractThe book presents the case that cognitive science should turn its attention to developing theories of human cognition that cover the full range of human perceptual, cognitive, and action phenomena. Cognitive science has now produced a massive number of high-quality regularities with many microtheories that reveal important mechanisms. The need for integration is pressing and will continue to increase. Equally important, cognitive science now has the theoretical concepts and tools to support serious attempts at unified theories. The argument is made entirely by presenting an exemplar unified theory of cognition both to show what a real unified theory would be like and to provide convincing evidence that such theories are feasible. The exemplar is SOAR, a cognitive architecture, which is realized as a software system. After a detailed discussion of the architecture and its properties, with its relation to the constraints on cognition in the real world and to existing ideas in cognitive science, SOAR is used as theory for a wide range of cognitive phenomena: immediate responses (stimulus-response compatibility and the Sternberg phenomena); discrete motor skills (transcription typing); memory and learning (episodic memory and the acquisition of skill through practice); problem solving (cryptarithmetic puzzles and syllogistic reasoning); language (sentence verification and taking instructions); and development (transitions in the balance beam task). The treatments vary in depth and adequacy, but they clearly reveal a single, highly specific, operational theory that works over the entire range of human cognition, SOAR is presented as an exemplar unified theory, not as the sole candidate. Cognitive science is not ready yet for a single theory – there must be multiple attempts. But cognitive science must begin to work toward such unified theories.

La logique de la preuve dans la littérature bartoliste Quelques explications à partir de la Summa circa testes et examinationem eorum (Ms. Bruxelles, B.R., II 1442, fol. 101 ra – 103 rb)

2008 ◽  
Vol 76 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 249-271
Author(s):  
Yves Mausen
Keyword(s):  
Sensory Perception ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Minor Premise ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Logical Point ◽  
The One

Abstract The logic of evidence in Bartolistic literature, A reading of the Summa circa testes et examinationem eorum (Ms. Bruxelles, B.R., II 1442, fol.101 ra – 103 rb). – Bartolus teaches how to read testimonies from a logical point of view. On the one hand, the facts that the witness recounts constitute the minor premise of a syllogism, its conclusion being their legal characterization; therefore he is prohibited from pronouncing directly on any legal matter. On the other hand, given that the witness' knowledge of the facts has to stem from sensory perception, the information he provides has at least to constitute the minor premise of another syllogism, making for establishing the causa of his testimony.

Did a Little Birdie Really Tell Odin? Applying Theory of Mind to Old Norse Religion

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 280-308
Author(s):  
Declan Taggart
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Old Norse ◽  
Viking Age ◽  
Cognitive Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Science Of Religion ◽  
Religious Theory ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Theory of mind, the theory that humans attribute mental states to others, has become increasingly influential in the Cognitive Science of Religion in recent years, due to several papers which posit that supernatural agents, like gods, demons, and the dead, are accredited greater than normal knowledge and awareness. Using Old Norse mythology and literary accounts of Old Norse religion, supported by archaeological evidence, I examine the extent to which this modern perspective on religious theory of mind is reflected in religious traditions from the Viking Age. I focus especially on the extent to which superperception and superknowledge were attributed to Old Norse supernatural agents and the impact of this on expressions of religion; how the attribution of theory of mind varied with circumstances and the agents to which it was being attributed; and the extent to which features of religious theory of mind common in other societies were present in the historical North. On this basis, I also evaluate the usefulness of Old Norse historiography to Cognitive Science of Religion and vice versa.

scholarly journals Theoretical perspectives upon the return to work of cancer patients: The difficult path of integration in the organization

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radu-Ioan Popa
Keyword(s):  
Return To Work ◽  
Cancer Patients ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Organizational Life ◽  
Theoretical Perspectives ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Returning To Work

Abstract The present article follows an in-depth analysis of several relevant articles and major findings concerning the return to work of cancer patients, in various situations, from a manager and patient point of view, putting into discussion the effects and consequences of different factors that may influence the well-being of the patient at work and impact the organizational life. The concepts of returning to work and integration are scarcely analysed throughout the scholarly literature in the case of employees diagnosed with cancer, due to several reasons presented in the paper: from the complex topic of investigation that many studies fail to approach in terms of confidentiality, technical, ethical and moral grounds to the specific and difficult apparatus for research in the case of an even more complex, multiple instances and personalized manifestation long-term illness. In conclusion, the general framework solicits for a more integrated model of research and future multi-facet schemes for interventions, considering that there is a general consensus focusing on the need for connecting the health services with the employee and employer level, alongside stakeholders’ active participation.

Problem solving methods and knowledge systems: A personal journey to perceptual images as knowledge

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 331-338
Author(s):  
B. Chandrasekaran
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Cognitive Architecture ◽  
Mental Image ◽  
Spatial Relations ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Design Strategies ◽  
Symbolic Form ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
High Level ◽  
Use Of Knowledge

AbstractI was among those who proposed problem solving methods (PSMs) in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a knowledge-level description of strategies useful in building knowledge-based systems. This paper summarizes the evolution of my ideas in the last two decades. I start with a review of the original ideas. From an artificial intelligence (AI) point of view, it is not PSMs as such, which are essentially high-level design strategies for computation, that are interesting, but PSMs associated with tasks that have a relation to AI and cognition. They are also interesting with respect to cognitive architecture proposals such as Soar and ACT-R: PSMs are observed regularities in the use of knowledge that an exclusive focus on the architecture level might miss, the latter providing no vocabulary to talk about these regularities. PSMs in the original conception are closely connected to a specific view of knowledge: symbolic expressions represented in a repository and retrieved as needed. I join critics of this view, and maintain with them that most often knowledge is not retrieved from a base as much as constructed as needed. This criticism, however, raises the question of what is in memory that is not knowledge as traditionally conceived in AI, but can support theconstructionof knowledge in predicate–symbolic form. My recent proposal about cognition and multimodality offers a possible answer. In this view, much of memory consists of perceptual and kinesthetic images, which can be recalled during deliberation and from which internal perception can generate linguistic–symbolic knowledge. For example, from a mental image of a configuration of objects, numerous sentences can be constructed describing spatial relations between the objects. My work on diagrammatic reasoning is an implemented example of how this might work. These internal perceptions on imagistic representations are a new kind of PSM.

Mind and Chance

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 533-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gauker
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Physical Structure ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Physical Similarity ◽  
Sensory Inputs ◽  
Structural History ◽  
The Subject

Much discussed but still unresolved is whether a subject's internal physical structure is a sufficient condition for his beliefs and desires. The question has sometimes been expressed as a question about microstructurally identical Doppelgänger. Imagine two subjects who are identical right down to the ions traversing the synapses. Their senses are stimulated in all the same ways, their bodies execute the same motions, and identical physical events mediate between the sensory inputs and the behavioral outputs. Must they have the very same beliefs and desires? Let us call the thesis that they must, internalism. The internalist may hold that a physical similarity less complete than this will also guarantee identity in beliefs and desires, but certainly, he holds, perfect identity of internal physical histories will suffice.Internalism will be opposed by those who sense that the nature of mentality is closely tied to the nature of explanation in terms of mental states and that in explaining a subject's behavior we cannot abstract, even in principle, from the character of the environment in which the subject is embedded. This essay offers a partial articulation of this point of view and shows how it conflicts with internalism. A consequence of the view to be described is that our attributions of belief must reflect the probabilistic regularities in the subject's environment. As we shall see, this consequence conflicts with internalism in two ways. The first conflict turns on the fact that there is no limit on the possible variety of such regularities. The second conflict turns on the fact that two subjects might by chance have the same micro-structural history though different probabilistic regularities obtain in their respective environments.

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