scholarly journals Conventional Monetary Policy

Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia

AbstractThis chapter introduces conventional monetary policy, i.e. monetary policy during periods of economic and financial stability and when short-term interest rates are not constrained by the zero lower bound. We introduce the concept of an operational target of monetary policy and explain why central banks normally give this role to the short-term interbank rate. We briefly touch macroeconomics by outlining how central banks should set interest rates across time to achieve their ultimate target, e.g. price stability, and we acknowledge the complications in doing so. We then zoom further into monetary policy operations and central bank balance sheets by developing the concepts of autonomous factor, monetary policy instruments, and liquidity-absorbing and liquidity providing balance sheet items. Subsequently we explain how these quantities relate to short-term interest rates, and how the central bank can rely on this relation to steer its operational target, and thereby the starting point of monetary policy transmission. Finally, we explain the importance of the collateral framework and related risk control measures (e.g. haircuts) for the liquidity of banks and for the conduct of central bank credit operations.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 9229
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Nocoń

It has been more than a decade since central banks, in the face of the global financial crisis, implemented a set of unconventional initiatives that included a rapid and significant decrease in their main interest rates and an unprecedented balance sheet policy. Thus far, they still have not returned their monetary policy to the pre-crisis framework and have not implemented a normalization process. Currently, a trend of using econometric models in monetary policy for forecasting purposes has been observed. Among these models, Bayesian vector autoregression models (BVAR models) are increasingly being used by central banks. The main aim of this study was to conduct an empirical verification of the BVAR model’s usage for short-term prediction which could then be used for a sustainable (ordered) normalization process for the UK’s monetary policy. This study verifies a research hypothesis which states that the BVAR model might be a useful tool in the Bank of England’s decision-making process regarding the normalization of its monetary policy. Additionally, the cause and effect analysis, observation method, document analysis method, and synthesis method were also considered. The conducted research indicates that a large BVAR model has a significant predictive value for short-term forecasting.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil

Abstract Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short-term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so-called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under-’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentina Ivanović

Abstract The main reason for central bank independence lies in the fact that it is necessary to clearly distinguish spending money from the ability of making money. Independence of central banks is now a characteristic of almost all developed and highly industrialized countries. In this respect, it represents an essential part of the overall economic reality of these countries. Over the past decade or somewhat earlier, the issue of importance of central bank independence has been raised in developing countries, making the institutional, functional, personal and financial independence of central banks current topics for consideration. The key reason for the growing attention to financial independence of central banks is due to the effects of the global financial crisis on their balance sheets and therefore the challenges related to achieving the basic goals of the functioning of central banks - financial stability and price stability. Financial strength and independence of central banks must be developed relative to the policy and tasks that are carried out and risks they face in carrying out of these tasks. Financial independence represents a key base for credibility of a central bank. On one hand, the degree of credibility is associated with the ability of central banks to carry out their tasks without external financial assistance. In order to enhance the credibility of central bank in this regard, it must have sufficient financial strength to absorb potential losses and that power must be continuously strengthened by increasing capital and rearranging profit allocation arrangements. This is particularly important in times of crisis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radoje Žugić ◽  
Nikola Fabris

Abstract The global financial crisis has challenged the traditional monetary policy framework of one instrument (short-term interest rates) - one objective (price stability). More and more central banks nowadays consider financial stability as a monetary policy objective, whereas the Central Bank of Montenegro is the only one that has identified financial stability as its primary objective. As this is a relatively new objective, all central banks endeavouring to attain this objective have been facing numerous difficulties. Therefore, the article analyzes some of these difficulties such as defining financial (in)stability, the selection of indicators, macroeconomic environment for preserving financial stability, and the like. The main objective of the paper is to analyse the framework for preserving financial stability in Montenegro and the challenges that the Central Bank of Montenegro has been facing in accomplishing this objective


Author(s):  
Pierre L. Siklos

Crises come in various forms, and their impact is not predicable with much accuracy. Crises in emerging markets are not the same as those in advanced economies. By 2007, the idea that monetary policy ought to be rules-based was widely accepted and copied around the world. Policymakers believed that inflation and macroeconomic slack were all that mattered. Demographic and structural factors were underappreciated. The wrong conclusions are now being drawn: rules should not be abandoned, but monetary policy can be improved. Monetary policy now relies more on words. An expansion of central bank balance sheets has taken place and central bank independence is a quaint idea. Central banks no longer influence just prices; they also change financial system quantities. This leads to rising policy uncertainty. Central banks stand accused of hubris, with little clear idea of the “new normal” and how this will redefine a future monetary policy strategy.


2011 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. A. E. Goodhart

Although central banks have pursued the same objectives throughout their existence, primarily price and financial stability, the interpretation of their role in doing so has varied. We identify three stable epochs, when such interpretations had stabilised, i.e. the Victorian era, 1840s–1914; the decades of government control, 1930s–60s; the triumph of the markets, 1980s–2007. Each epoch was followed by a confused interregnum, searching for a new consensual blueprint. The final such epoch concluded with a crisis, when it became apparent that macro-economic stability, the Great Moderation, plus (efficient) markets could not guarantee financial stability. So the search is now on for additional macro-prudential (counter-cyclical) instruments. The use of such instruments will need to be associated with controlled variations in systemic liquidity, and in the balance sheet of the central bank. Such control over its own balance sheet is the core, central function of any central bank, even more so than its role in setting short-term interest rates, which latter could be delegated. We end by surveying how relationships between central banks and governments may change over the next period.


2013 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippine Cour-Thimann

AbstractThe exceptional measures by central banks during the financial crisis have led to renewed interest in the redistributive effects of monetary policy. This paper adopts the perspective of central bank balance sheets to assess such effects. It uses information from the euro area National Central Banks and the US Federal Reserve Banks to analyse the regional and sectoral effects of monetary policy. Central bank balance sheets capture sustained imbalances in payment flows across the euro area countries that peaked at 10% of GDP in the so-called Target balances, and across the US districts that reached 5% of GDP in the equivalent Interdistrict Settlement Accounts. These imbalances, combined with accommodative central bank liquidity, shifted risks from the private financial sector to the public sector and among taxpayers - yet, mechanisms are in place to mitigate such risks and the associated redistributive effects. The liquidity injection, while directly channelled at the stressed regions or sectors, has indirectly supported the financial sector at large. In different institutional contexts, the financial centres in Germany and in the New York district have been strengthened. They have been net recipients of payment inflows from the rest of the respective currency areas, equivalent in amounts to a third of the liquidity injection during the crisis.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-258
Author(s):  
Nathan Audu

The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of e-banking, which are distinct from conventional banking systems, on central banks’ monetary policy. E-banking poses a challenge to central banks’ ability to control interest rates and it may also increase endogenous financial instability. The challenge to interest rate control stems from the possibility that e-banking may diminish the financial system’s demand for central bank liability, rendering central banks unable to conduct meaningful open market operations. Increased financial instability could emerge from the increased elasticity of private money production and from the periodic runs out of e-banking into central bank money that generates liquidity crises. Similarly, the future of e-banking is dependent on its growth, regulation and increased technological advancements that would boost the security of the new instrument. It will directly impact the central bank’s control of monetary policy unless it is included in its measurements of monetary aggregates. We therefore recommend that since the impact of e-banking on monetary policy depends solely on how fast it will spread and the extent to which it will substitute for cash, it is vital that Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) considers taking steps to compensate the resulting decrease in its balance sheet. Also, CBN must have to impose special obligations with the money reserve on the e-banking issuer in case of any large increase in e-banking creativity that will affect the monetary policy at the end. The government must keep the rate of prices stable and with this condition, where e-banking will be equal to other forms of money which maintain by apportion percentage as a reserve ratio to the central bank. Similarly, if e-banking spreads moderately, there will be a decrease in the seigniorage income and thus, the decrease in the balance sheet of CBN will be limited. Hence, it must include e-banking in monetary aggregates that the spread of e-banking may lead to a change in the velocity of money. Keywords: monetary policy, e-banking, technology, velocity of money


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (172) ◽  
Author(s):  
Manmohan Singh ◽  
Haobin Wang

We develop a theoretical model that shows that in the near future, the monetary policies of some key central banks in advanced economies (AEs) will have two dimensions—changes in short-term policy rates and balance sheet adjustments. This will affect emerging market economies (EMs), especially those with a pegged exchange rate, as these EMs primarily use a single monetary policy tool, i.e., the short-term policy rate. We show that changes in policy rates and balance sheet adjustments in AEs may differ in their respective financial spillovers to pegged EMs. Thus, it will be difficult for EMs to mitigate different types of spillovers with a single monetary policy tool. In that context, we use the model to show how EMs might use additional tools—capital controls and/or macro-prudential policy—to complement their monetary policy and financial stability toolkit. We also discuss how balance sheet adjustments that affect long-term interest rates may percolate to influence short-term interest rates via financial plumbing.


Author(s):  
Ilona Skibińska-Fabrowska

Faced with the financial crisis in 2008, the central banks used conventional monetary policy instruments. However, the problem of zero lower bond forced them to use unconventional monetary policy instruments - quantitative easing carried out as part of the so-called central bank balance sheet politics and relying on the buying by the central bank of di&erent kinds of financial assets - resulting in stabilization of the situation on financial markets in conditions of low long-term interest rates. Balance sheet totals of the central banks rose repeatedly. Their structure also changed. At present possible effects for the stability of the financial system of the return to the pre-crisis monetary policy are the topic of debate. The exit strategy is giving rise to a significant risks and the coordination of economic policy and the transparency of action taken by monetary authorities can only minimize possible negative effects


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