scholarly journals Financial Instability

2021 ◽  
pp. 67-78
Author(s):  
Ulrich Bindseil ◽  
Alessio Fotia
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Asset Prices ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Access To Credit ◽  
Bid Ask Spread ◽  
Subsequent Chapter ◽  
Bank Funding ◽  
Dealer Market ◽  
The Stability

AbstractIn this chapter, the central bank is put aside and we review simple models of financial instability, which will be the basis for the subsequent chapter to explain the role of the central bank as lender of last resort. We first recall that financial instability is mostly triggered by a negative shock on asset prices, and thereby on the solvency of debtors, which in turn worsens access to credit and can set in motion a liquidity crisis with vicious circles. We develop the concepts of solvency “conditional” and “unconditional” on liquidity: a decline in asset prices can lead an unconditionally solvent debtor to become only conditionally solvent, such that sufficient liquidity becomes decisive for preventing its default. We then apply these concepts to the stability of bank funding and introduce the problem of bank runs. We subsequently show why asset liquidity in a dealer market deteriorates during a financial crisis (increased volatility and uncertainty increase the required bid-ask spread); how asymmetric information can lead to a freeze of credit markets in a simple adverse selection model; how declining and more volatile asset prices drive increases of haircut, and how these can force fire sales and defaults of borrowers. We finally discuss the interaction between these various crisis channels.

scholarly journals Money Decentralization under Direct Democracy Procedures. The Case of Classical Athens

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou ◽  
Nicholas C. Kyriazis ◽  
Nikolaos A. Kyriazis
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Hellenistic Period ◽  
International Currency ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Mediterranean World ◽  
The Stability ◽  
City State

By analyzing the case of Athens during the Classical period (508-323 BCE) the main thesis of this paper is that under direct democracy procedures and the related institutional setup, a monetary system without a Central Bank may function relatively well. We focus on the following issues: (i) Τhe procedures of currency issuing in the Athenian city-state, (ii) why the Athenian drachma become the leading international currency in the Mediterranean world (iii) how and towards which targets monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible (iv) defining the targets of monetary policy and the mechanisms for its implementation (v) the role of money in the economy (vi) the issue of deficit spending (vii) the reasons of the replacement of the Athenian drachma as a leading currency by others from the Hellenistic period onwards (viii) the correlation of our findings regarding the decentralized character of monetary policy in Classical Athens to today’s realities, such as the issue of cryptocurrencies. Our analysis shows that monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible, with its foremost aim being the stability of the currency (mainly, silver coins) in order to enhance trust in it and so, make it an international currency which could outcompete other currencies. Since there was no Central Bank like today, monetary policy decisions were taken by the popular assembly of citizens in combination with the market forces themselves.

The Position Of The Bank Indonesia As The Lender Of Last Resort After The Enactment Of Law No. 9 Of 2016 On Prevention And Mitigation Of Financial System Crisis

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 08-11
Author(s):  
Theresia Anita Christiani
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Paper Review

Objective - This paper explores the role of the Indonesian Central Bank as the Lender of the Last Resort. Methodology/Technique - This research uses normative juridical research and secondary data. Findings - The results indicate that the Bank of Indonesian, in coordination with the Financial Services Authority, still has the authority to grant short-term loans for banks with liquidity issues. Nevertheless, the Bank of Indonesia does not have authority to provide emergency finance facilities where the funding is granted at the government's expense. Novelty - This paper uses normative juridical research and qualitative data analysis. Type of Paper - Review. Keywords: Authority, Bank, Crises, Position, Prevention, Indonesia. JEL Classification: K10, K20.

scholarly journals ECB policy responses between 2007 and 2014: A chronological analysis and an assessment of their effects

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 455-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Rodríguez ◽  
Carlos Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Policy Responses ◽  
The One ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

The paper analyses the monetary policy responses of the European Central Bank (ECB) to the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Our goals are on the one hand to explain chronologically the main measures in conventional and unconventional policies adopted by the ECB and on the other hand to analyse their effects on key interest rates, monetary aggregates and the money multiplier. The assessment is that the ECB?s monetary policy responses to the crisis have been ?too little, too late?, constrained by the institutional framework, which prevents the ECB from acting as a true central bank with the role of lender of last resort.

Macroeconomic Policy in Cuba

2014 ◽  
pp. 326-338
Author(s):  
Ernesto Hernández-Catá
Keyword(s):  
Resource Allocation ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Fiscal Deficit ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Macroeconomic Policies ◽  
Rate System ◽  
Multiple Exchange ◽  
Exchange Rate System ◽  
Harmful Effects

This chapter examines the evolution of macroeconomic policies in Cuba during the past 25 years. It analyzes the changes in fiscal policy from its wild gyrations in the early 1990s to the period of stability from 1994 to 2004, and to the crisis of 2008 and its sequel. It then examines the strategy of the Central Bank of Cuba and the tension between its anti-inflationary objective and its obligation to finance a substantial part of the fiscal deficit. It also emphasizes the need for new, modern instruments of monetary control, and the need to equip the central bank to become a lender of last resort. Finally, the chapter discusses the current multiple exchange rate system, its discriminatory nature, and its harmful effects on resource allocation, equity, and the interpretation of statistics.

Qard-al-Hasan-based monetary policy and the role of the central bank as the lender of last resort

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Selim ◽  
M. Kabir Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Real Gdp

Purpose This paper aims to examine how a central bank (CB) can act as a lender of last resort (LOLR) for both Islamic and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a Qard-al-Hasan (QH)-based monetary policy (MP). Design/methodology/approach The role of the CB as LOLR under QH-based MP and its effects on major macroeconomic variables, including deposits, loan creation and aggregate expenditures, are examined on theoretical grounds by using the aggregate output and aggregate expenditure model under the framework of Islamic MP. Findings When the CB acts as LOLR by pursuing QH-based MP, it automatically empowers Islamic banks (IBs) by providing access to borrowing funds from the CB on a QH basis. As a result, IBs will not be required to hold billions of dollars as liquid assets against liquidity risks. Thus, the lending capacity of IBs will increase and deposit expansion, loan creation and aggregate expenditures in the economy will all expand. This will in turn increase real GDP and employment while reducing the unemployment rate. Originality/value This is the first paper to analyze CBs acting as LOLR for both IBs and conventional interest-based banks by pursuing a QH-based MP, thus providing equal opportunities and equal access to borrowing facilities from the CB, along with equal partnership and fair competition for all and absolutely no discrimination to anyone. The LOLR service to all banks under QH-based MP will unveil a new horizon of opportunities where all financial institutions are expected to thrive. IBs will escape the constraints of the constant fear of liquidity risks and find a level-playing field.

scholarly journals Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 87 (5) ◽  
pp. 2049-2086 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Andolfatto ◽  
Aleksander Berentsen ◽  
Fernando M Martin
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Free Banking ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Fractional Reserve ◽  
Deposit Contracts ◽  
Liquidity Insurance ◽  
Meaningful Role

Abstract The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

scholarly journals Ready to Do Whatever it Takes? The Legal Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Economic Crisis

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 503-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Wilsher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Default ◽  
Lender Of Last Resort ◽  
Liability Rule ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Public Deficit ◽  
European Central

AbstractTo complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits, the Maastricht Treaty gave the European Central Bank (ECB) a narrow remit to focus on price stability. Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was unclear that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. The neoliberal orthodoxy at the heart of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) held that moral hazard and inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary financing’. Following monetary union, markets under-priced risks and encouraged bubbles, but, with the onset of the crisis, sentiment overshot the other way, starving credit from banks and later sovereigns. With bailout funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns became illiquid. ECB officials reluctantly concluded that an uncontrolled sovereign default would threaten the continuation of monetary union. The ECB was thus forced de facto to expand its mandate, first to help banks and, later, to help sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. Ultimately this was successful in restoring confidence, but the ECB remained uncomfortable with its role. It has continued to stress its legal limitations and has pressed for reformed governance to enforce fiscal discipline. The economic case for a lender of last resort in a crisis was always strong, but brings with it a worsening moral hazard problem that may invite leaders to avoid the deeper political changes necessary to rebalance the Eurozone.

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