scholarly journals Introduction: Private Wealth and Public Debt

Author(s):  
Carl Christian von Weizsäcker ◽  
Hagen M. Krämer

AbstractIn the economic area comprising the OECD countries plus China, almost half of private wealth consists of net public debt. Private wealth is nearly twice the size of private real assets. Due to the continuing rise in life expectancy, the share of public debt in private wealth is growing. As long as public debt does not become too great, real interest rates can be low, but positive in the twenty-first century. The main reason for this is private retirement planning in light of high life expectancy. Investment cannot keep up with increasing private saving. In the twenty-first century, public debt is a macroeconomic steering instrument. Fiscal policy uses it to ensure that a positive, but low real interest rate level continues to prevail.

Author(s):  
Carl Christian von Weizsäcker ◽  
Hagen M. Krämer

AbstractThe German debt brake is not compatible with the long-term stability of the euro. “New thinking” requires that public debt and price stability are no longer opponents, but rather allies in the Keynes world of persistently low interest rates. The proposed balanced account agreement is made more concrete here: An appropriate target (real) interest rate on the global capital market is between one and 1.5% per year lower than the growth rate of the OECD plus China region. If the actual interest rate is below the target rate, the countries with current account surpluses undertake to increase their public debt periodD gradually according to a definite formula. In symmetrical fashion, if the real interest rate is “too high,” countries with current account deficits have the duty to reduce their public debt period. The rules of the balanced account agreement replace the debt brake. They are the instruments of soundfiscal policy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. p89
Author(s):  
Alejandro Rodriguez-Arana

This paper analyzes the effect of a monetary policy that raises the reference interest rate in order to reduce inflation in a situation where the fiscal policy parameters remain constant. In an overlapping generation’s model and in the presence of an accelerationist Phillips curve and a Taylor rule of interest rates, it is observed that increasing the independent component of said rule leads to a solution that at least in a large number of cases is unstable. In the case where the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, inflation falls temporarily, but then it can increase in an unstable manner. One way to achieve stability is to establish an interest rate rule where Taylor’s principle is not met. However, in this case many times the increase in the independent component of this rule will generate greater long-term inflation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-52
Author(s):  
Richard J. Cebula

This study empirically investigates the “relative tax gap hypothesis,” which posits that the greater the size of the relative tax gap, the greater the degree to which the U.S. Treasury must borrow from domestic and/or other credit markets and hence the higher the ex ante real interest rate yield on the Bellwether 30 year U.S. Treasury bond. The study uses the most current data available for computing what is referred to here as the “relative tax gap,” which is the ratio of the aggregate tax gap (the loss in federal income tax revenue resulting from personal income tax evasion) to the GDP level. For each year of the study period, the nominal value of the tax gap is scaled by the nominal GDP level and expressed as a percentage. The study period runs from 1982 through 2016, reflecting data availability for all of the variables. The estimation results provide strong support for the hypothesis. In addition, in separate estimations, evidence is provided that the relative tax gap also acts to elevate the ex ante real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated long-term corporate bonds. It logically follows, then, that to the extent that a greater relative tax gap leads to higher ex ante real interest rates, it may contribute to the crowding out of corporate investment in new plant equipment associated heretofore with government budget deficits per se.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (07) ◽  
pp. 2698-2716 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pompeo Della Posta

The application of exchange rate target zones modeling to interest rates allows interpreting the puzzles that emerged with the public debt euro area crisis, namely the nonlinear behavior of the interest rates and the fact that some stand-alone countries, not belonging to the euro area, have not been subject to speculative attacks in spite of equally large public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratios. As a matter of fact, this model shows that in the case of a noncredible upper threshold for the interest rate (that may be due to both the lack of room for increasing further the required government primary surplus and/or the absence of a monetary authority acting as a lender of last resort), the resulting public debt unsustainability determines an interest rate nonlinearity and makes the crisis possible for public debt levels that would be stable in the presence of a credible interest rate target.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 2060-2103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nao Sudo ◽  
Yasutaka Takizuka

Population aging, along with a secular decline in real interest rates, is an empirical regularity observed in developed countries over the last few decades. Under the premise that population aging will deepen in coming years, some studies predict that real interest rates will continue to be depressed further to a level below zero. In this paper, we address this issue and explore how changes in demographic structures have affected and will affect real interest rates, using an overlapping generations model calibrated to Japan’s economy. We find that the demographic changes over the last 50 years reduced the real interest rate. About 270 out of the 640 basis points decline in real interest rates during this period was due to declining labor inputs and higher saving, which themselves stemmed from the lower fertility rate and increased life expectancy. As for the next 50 years, we find that demographic changes alone will not substantially increase or decrease the real interest rate from the current level. These changes reflect the fact that the size of demographic changes in years ahead will be minimal, but that downward pressure arising from the past demographic changes will continue to bite. As Japan is not unique in terms of this broad picture of changes in demographic landscapes in the last and next 50 years, our results suggest that, sooner or later, a demography-induced decline in real interest rates may be contained in other developed countries as well.


2015 ◽  
Vol 234 ◽  
pp. R5-R14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles S. Kimball

As long as all interest rates move in tandem – including the rate of return on paper currency – economic theory suggests no important difference between interest rate changes in the positive region and interest rate changes in the negative region. Indeed, in standard models, only the real interest rate and spreads between real interest rates matter. Thus, in most respects, negative interest rate policy is conventional. It is only (a) what needs to be done with paper currency, (b) difficulties in understanding negative rates or (c) institutional features interacting with negative rates that make negative interest rate policy unconventional.


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