A Bottom-Up Approach for Cognitive Control

Author(s):  
H. Cruse ◽  
V. Dürr ◽  
M. Schilling ◽  
J. Schmitz
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
Sonia Bansal ◽  
John M Gaspar ◽  
Benjamin M Robinson ◽  
Carly J Leonard ◽  
Britta Hahn ◽  
...  

Abstract The antisaccade task is considered a test of cognitive control because it creates a conflict between the strong bottom-up signal produced by the cue and the top-down goal of shifting gaze to the opposite side of the display. Antisaccade deficits in schizophrenia are thought to reflect impaired top-down inhibition of the prepotent bottom-up response to the cue. However, the cue is also a highly task-relevant stimulus that must be covertly attended to determine where to shift gaze. We tested the hypothesis that difficulty in overcoming the attentional relevance of the cue, rather than its bottom-up salience, is key in producing impaired performance in people with schizophrenia (PSZ). We implemented 3 versions of the antisaccade task in which we varied the bottom-up salience of the cue while holding its attentional relevance constant. We found that difficulty in performing a given antisaccade task—relative to a prosaccade version using the same stimuli—was largely independent of the cue’s bottom-up salience. The magnitude of impairment in PSZ relative to control subjects was also independent of bottom-up salience. The greatest impairment was observed in a version where the cue lacked bottom-up salience advantage over other locations. These results indicate that the antisaccade deficit in PSZ does not reflect an impairment in overcoming bottom-up salience of the cue, but PSZ are instead impaired at overcoming its attentional relevance. This deficit may still indicate an underlying inhibitory control impairment but could also reflect a hyperfocusing of attentional resources on the cue.


2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 96-96
Author(s):  
Angus W. MacDonald

AbstractThis commentary challenges the authors to use their computational modeling techniques to support one of their central claims: that schizophrenic deficits in bottom-up (Gestalt-type tasks) and top-down (cognitive control tasks) context processing tasks arise from the same dysfunction. Further clarification about the limits of cognitive coordination would also strengthen the hypothesis.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gina M. Grimshaw ◽  
Laura Kranz ◽  
David Carmel ◽  
Rosie Moody ◽  
Christel Devue

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In two experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, in order to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colleen M. Kelley ◽  
Larry L. Jacoby

Abstract Cognitive control constrains retrieval processing and so restricts what comes to mind as input to the attribution system. We review evidence that older adults, patients with Alzheimer's disease, and people with traumatic brain injury exert less cognitive control during retrieval, and so are susceptible to memory misattributions in the form of dramatic levels of false remembering.


2001 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tine Rousing ◽  
Marianne Bonde ◽  
Jan Tind Sørensen

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 125-134
Author(s):  
Bettina S. Wiese ◽  
Olivia Chaillié ◽  
Ruth Noppeney ◽  
Anna M. Stertz

Abstract. The study investigates how commuting strain affects daily self-control capacities at work and at home. Irritability (i.e., increased readiness to express negative emotions when facing frustration) and concentration (i.e., a cognitive control capacity that relies on attention) were used as indicators of (impaired) self-control. Based on 5-day diary data from N = 185 train commuters, we found that on days with a strenuous ride from home to work, commuters indicated higher irritability and lower concentration capacity at work. On days with higher strain during the work-to-home ride, commuters reported to be more irritable back home. Moreover, commuters with low emotional stability turned out to be more affected by commuting strain but only if considering self-control impairment at home.


Author(s):  
Solène Ambrosi ◽  
Patrick Lemaire ◽  
Agnès Blaye

Abstract. Dynamic, trial-by-trial modulations of inhibitory control are well documented in adults but rarely investigated in children. Here, we examined whether 5-to-7 year-old children, an age range when inhibitory control is still partially immature, achieve such modulations. Fifty three children took flanker, Simon, and Stroop tasks. Above and beyond classic congruency effects, the present results showed two crucial findings. First, we found evidence for sequential modulations of congruency effects in these young children in the three conflict tasks. Second, our results showed both task specificities and task commonalities. These findings in young children have important implications as they suggest that, to be modulated, inhibitory control does not require full maturation and that the precise pattern of trial-by-trial modulations may depend on the nature of conflict.


Author(s):  
Stefan Scherbaum ◽  
Simon Frisch ◽  
Maja Dshemuchadse

Abstract. Folk wisdom tells us that additional time to make a decision helps us to refrain from the first impulse to take the bird in the hand. However, the question why the time to decide plays an important role is still unanswered. Here we distinguish two explanations, one based on a bias in value accumulation that has to be overcome with time, the other based on cognitive control processes that need time to set in. In an intertemporal decision task, we use mouse tracking to study participants’ responses to options’ values and delays which were presented sequentially. We find that the information about options’ delays does indeed lead to an immediate bias that is controlled afterwards, matching the prediction of control processes needed to counter initial impulses. Hence, by using a dynamic measure, we provide insight into the processes underlying short-term oriented choices in intertemporal decision making.


2013 ◽  
Vol 221 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Jost ◽  
Wouter De Baene ◽  
Iring Koch ◽  
Marcel Brass

The role of cue processing has become a controversial topic in research on cognitive control using task-switching procedures. Some authors suggested a priming account to explain switch costs as a form of encoding benefit when the cue from the previous trial is repeated and hence challenged theories that attribute task-switch costs to task-set (re)configuration. A rich body of empirical evidence has evolved that indeed shows that cue-encoding repetition priming is an important component in task switching. However, these studies also demonstrate that there are usually substantial “true” task-switch costs. Here, we review this behavioral, electrophysiological, and brain imaging evidence. Moreover, we describe alternative approaches to the explicit task-cuing procedure, such as the usage of transition cues or the task-span procedure. In addition, we address issues related to the type of cue, such as cue transparency. We also discuss methodological and theoretical implications and argue that the explicit task-cuing procedure is suitable to address issues of cognitive control and task-set switching.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document