On the Influence of Emotion on Decision Making: The Case of Charitable Giving

2013 ◽  
pp. 57-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Kandrack ◽  
Gustav Lundberg
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Charitable Giving

scholarly journals Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 77-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas C Coffman
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Laboratory Experiments ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Separate Study ◽  
Moral Decision Making

This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)

Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field. Part II: Social Preferences and Nonstandard Beliefs

2011 ◽  
pp. 56-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. DellaVigna
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Previous Experience ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Psychology And Economics

The second part of a larger work devoted to the modern behavioral economics considers nonstandard preferences that are manifest in altruistic behavior and charitable giving. The author also deals with nonstandard beliefs and shows how overconfidence, incorrect estimation of probabilities and extrapolation of previous experience produce biases in the rational decision-making, including the behavior on financial markets.

scholarly journals The Ethics of Making Risky Decisions for Others

2019 ◽  
pp. 445-473
Author(s):  
Luc Bovens
Keyword(s):  
Breast Cancer ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Cancer Screening ◽  
Breast Cancer Screening ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Formal Modeling ◽  
Risky Decision Making ◽  
Risky Decision ◽  
Decisions For Others ◽  
Risky Decisions

Utilitarianism, it has been said, is not sensitive to the distribution of welfare. In making risky decisions for others there are multiple sensitivities at work. I present examples of risky decision-making involving drug allocations, charitable giving, breast-cancer screening and Caesarian sections. In each of these examples there is a different sensitivity at work that pulls away from the utilitarian prescription. Instances of saving fewer people at a greater risk to many is more complex because there are two distributional sensitivities at work that pull in opposite directions from the utilitarian calculus. I discuss objections to these sensitivities and conclude with some reflections on the value of formal modeling in thinking about societal risk.

scholarly journals Focal stimulation of the temporoparietal junction improves rationality in prosocial decision-making

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Flora Li ◽  
Sheryl Ball ◽  
Xiaomeng Zhang ◽  
Alec Smith
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
General Information ◽  
High Definition ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
Causal Function ◽  
Anodal Stimulation ◽  
Increased Sensitivity ◽  
Stimulation Of

AbstractWe tested the hypothesis that modulation of neurocomputational inputs to value-based decision-making affects the rationality of economic choices. The brain’s right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) has been functionally associated with both social behavior and with domain-general information processing and attention. To identify the causal function of rTPJ in prosocial decisions, we administered focal high definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) while participants allocated money between themselves and a charity in a modified dictator game. Anodal stimulation led to improved rationality as well as increased charitable giving and egalitarianism, resulting in more consistent and efficient choices and increased sensitivity to the price of giving. These results are consistent with the theory that anodal stimulation of the rTPJ increases the precision of value computations in social decision-making. Our results demonstrate that theories of rTPJ function should account for the multifaceted role of the rTPJ in the representation of social inputs into value-based decisions.

scholarly journals Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field

2009 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano DellaVigna
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Charitable Giving ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Market Interactions ◽  
Psychology And Economics ◽  
Projection Bias ◽  
The Impact

The research in Psychology and Economics (a.k.a. Behavioral Economics) suggests that individuals deviate from the standard model in three respects: (1) nonstandard preferences, (2) nonstandard beliefs, and (3) nonstandard decision making. In this paper, I survey the empirical evidence from the field on these three classes of deviations. The evidence covers a number of applications, from consumption to finance, from crime to voting, from charitable giving to labor supply. In the class of nonstandard preferences, I discuss time preferences (self-control problems), risk preferences (reference dependence), and social preferences. On nonstandard beliefs, I present evidence on overconfidence, on the law of small numbers, and on projection bias. Regarding nonstandard decision making, I cover framing, limited attention, menu effects, persuasion and social pressure, and emotions. I also present evidence on how rational actors—firms, employers, CEOs, investors, and politicians—respond to the nonstandard behavior described in the survey. Finally, I briefly discuss under what conditions experience and market interactions limit the impact of the nonstandard features.

Discarding optimality: Throwing out the baby with the bathwater?

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Simen ◽  
Fuat Balcı
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Reward Rate ◽  
Perceptual Decision ◽  
Standard Observer ◽  
Rate Maximization ◽  
Reward Rate Maximization ◽  
Descriptive Standard ◽  
Observer Model

AbstractRahnev & Denison (R&D) argue against normative theories and in favor of a more descriptive “standard observer model” of perceptual decision making. We agree with the authors in many respects, but we argue that optimality (specifically, reward-rate maximization) has proved demonstrably useful as a hypothesis, contrary to the authors’ claims.

LPCD framework: Analytical tool or psychological model?

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Danks
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
Mathematical Framework ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Perceptual Decision Making ◽  
Psychological Model ◽  
Psychological Reality ◽  
Psychological Theories ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Bayesian Decision Making

AbstractThe target article uses a mathematical framework derived from Bayesian decision making to demonstrate suboptimal decision making but then attributes psychological reality to the framework components. Rahnev & Denison's (R&D) positive proposal thus risks ignoring plausible psychological theories that could implement complex perceptual decision making. We must be careful not to slide from success with an analytical tool to the reality of the tool components.

Elaborating the role of reflection and individual differences in the study of folk-economic beliefs

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Behavioral Responses ◽  
History Of ◽  
Economic Beliefs

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.

The primacy of conscious decision making – ERRATUM

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (01) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
David R. Shanks ◽  
Ben R. Newell
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Conscious Decision
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