How More Severe Punishment Generates Less Norm Enforcement. Further Evidence of Paradoxical Effects of Norm Enforcement in Inspection Games

2021 ◽  
pp. 149-173
Author(s):  
Heiko Rauhut ◽  
Fabian Winter
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Dayle Herrmann ◽  
Jessica Bodford ◽  
Robert Adelman ◽  
Oliver Graudejus ◽  
Morris Okun ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cindel White ◽  
John Michael Kelly ◽  
Azim Shariff ◽  
Ara Norenzayan

Four experiments (total N = 3591) examined how thinking about Karma and God increases adherence to social norms that prescribe fairness in anonymous dictator games. We found that (1) thinking about Karma decreased selfishness among karmic believers across religious affiliations, including Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and non-religious Americans; (2) thinking about God also decreased selfishness among believers in God (but not among non-believers), replicating previous findings; and (3) thinking about both karma and God shifted participants’ initially selfish offers towards fairness (the normatively prosocial response), but had no effect on already fair offers. These supernatural framing effects were obtained and replicated in high-powered, pre-registered experiments and remained robust to several methodological checks, including hypothesis guessing, game familiarity, demographic variables, between- and within-subjects designs, and variation in data exclusion criteria. These results support the role of culturally-elaborated beliefs about supernatural justice as a motivator of believer’s adherence to prosocial norms.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316802095678
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee ◽  
Lauren Prather

International law enforcement is an understudied but indispensable factor for maintaining the international order. We study the effectiveness of elite justifications in building coalitions supporting the enforcement of violations of the law against territorial seizures. Using survey experiments fielded in the USA and Australia, we find that the effectiveness of two common justifications for enforcement—the illegality of a country’s actions, and the consequences of those actions for international order—increase support for enforcement and do so independently of two key public values: ideology and interpersonal norm enforcement. These results imply elites can build a broad coalition of support by using multiple justifications. Our results, however, highlight the tepidness of public support, suggesting limits to elite rhetoric. This study contributes to the scholarship on international law by showing how the public, typically considered a mechanism for generating compliance within states, can impede or facilitate third-party enforcement of the law between states.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maciej A. Górecki

Abstract In a recent article published in Politics & Gender, Michael Jankowski and Kamil Marcinkiewicz (2019) study the effects of gender quotas on the electoral performance of female candidates in open-list proportional representation (OLPR) systems. On the empirical side, their study is a critical reanalysis of the Polish case, in particular the regularities demonstrated in a 2014 study that I coauthored. We argued there that at the micro level (candidate level), the effects of quotas were somewhat “paradoxical”: following the installation of quotas, women candidates tend to perform worse relative to their male counterparts than they did during the pre-quota period. Jankowski and Marcinkiewicz claim to demonstrate that those “paradoxical” effects are minor and thus practically negligible. In this note, I argue that their conclusion is largely a result of the particular methodological choices made by these authors. These choices seem unobvious, debatable, and potentially controversial. The note concludes that we need more reflection and debate on the methodological aspects of analyzing candidates’ electoral success in complex electoral systems, such as multidistrict OLPR. This would greatly facilitate future efforts aimed at an unequivocal examination of the contentious concepts such as the notion of “paradox of gender quotas.”


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimmo Eriksson ◽  
Pontus Strimling ◽  
Michele Gelfand ◽  
Junhui Wu ◽  
Jered Abernathy ◽  
...  

AbstractNorm enforcement may be important for resolving conflicts and promoting cooperation. However, little is known about how preferred responses to norm violations vary across cultures and across domains. In a preregistered study of 57 countries (using convenience samples of 22,863 students and non-students), we measured perceptions of the appropriateness of various responses to a violation of a cooperative norm and to atypical social behaviors. Our findings highlight both cultural universals and cultural variation. We find a universal negative relation between appropriateness ratings of norm violations and appropriateness ratings of responses in the form of confrontation, social ostracism and gossip. Moreover, we find the country variation in the appropriateness of sanctions to be consistent across different norm violations but not across different sanctions. Specifically, in those countries where use of physical confrontation and social ostracism is rated as less appropriate, gossip is rated as more appropriate.


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