Logical and Epistemological Norms in Scientific Theory Construction

2015 ◽  
pp. 25-63
Author(s):  
Amitabha Gupta
Author(s):  
Dominic Murphy

I suggest there are three ways to see the role of folk psychology in a mature cognitive neuroscience. First, integration says that folk psychology plays a decisive role in defining the objects of scientific inquiry and guiding that inquiry. Second, autonomy is the view that folk psychology deals in personal rather than subpersonal explanations and as such has aims that are incompatible with science. Third is eliminativism, which argues that folk psychology will be replaced by a scientific theory of the mind. I argue that the integrationist perspective is an unstable position because folk psychology cannot play the role that integrationists have in mind for it. Any psychology that plays this role must be heavily revised enough to count as a successor theory, and that is a vindication of eliminativism from the point of view of scientific theory-construction.


Dialogue ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-448
Author(s):  
Bernard Elevitch

Gaston Bachelard began his academic career as a teacher of physics and chemistry, turning eventually to the history and philosophy of science: a personal evolution not uncommon in France, which since the turn of the century has also offered the examples of Duhem, Poincaré and Meyerson. Unlike these older contemporaries, however, Bachelard took as his special province not the logical structure of scientific theory, or the norms of theory construction, but the inventive spontaneity or “dynamism” of scientific thought. While celebrating science as the ultimate expression of reason, he paid as much attention to its imaginative false starts as to the rational explanations it adopts. By 1938, moreover, he had turned explicitly to the activity of imagination: this became the general theme of a number of works that revolve freely about the four elements of an earlier and more poetic “science,” and the philosopher's field eventually was to become nothing less than his total experience, whether reasoned, lived or dreamed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 108-120
Author(s):  
Herner Sæverot ◽  
Glenn-Egil Torgersen

This essay initiates a fundamental discussion about education’s nature and character, and raises the questions: Is education reliant on other disciplines as, for example, psychology, sociology and philosophy? Or may education be thought of independently, without being reliant on other disciplines? These questions are discussed in the light of Theodor Litt’s educational reading of Hegel’s understanding of dialectics, as it appears in the book Phenomenology of Spirit, in order to support that education has a relational and dialectic nature. In the second part, we connect the concept of ‘Hegelian dialectic structure’ with scientific theory. More specifically, we introduce a theoretically oriented concept, based on semantic theory construction; namely, ‘relational parameter bundles’. This concept clarifies the difference between education and other ‘scientific,’ often more empirically based disciplines, such as psychology, on which education, or rather, educational researchers, traditionally rely. Through our theoretical approach we aim to uncover fundamental differences within different disciplines’ scientific thinking, and their use of theories and models, which then manifest themselves in the discipline’s scientific assessments and practical actions. An uncritical integration of other disciplines in education may destroy the ‘true’ nature of education, and thus pose a danger to education’s character, problem areas and ways of conducting research. That does not mean that education shall be isolated from other disciplines, it is rather a question of when perspectives from other disciplines should be included in educational matters. Not before the educational questions are raised and worked through will it be appropriate to obtain knowledge from other disciplines, if, that is, it is deemed necessary based on educational judgment.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-359
Author(s):  
Aoife Lynch

This essay views science as a creative mask for the poetry and philosophy of W.B. Yeats. It explores the changing worldview which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century with the discovery of wave-particle duality by Max Planck in 1900. It considers the new concepts of reality which arose at this time in relation to modernism and Yeats's response to the paradigmatic change of era he was a part of. Accordingly, the poet's understanding of universal history in A Vision (1925, 1937) is used alongside close readings of his poetry to evince an argument which unites that poetry with philosophy, scientific theory, and modernism as aspects of one universe of knowledge which refracts different aspects of itself through the prism of time.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document