Learning and recall in a dynamic theory of coordination patterns

1989 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Schöner
Author(s):  
B. R. Ahn ◽  
N. J. Kim

High energy approximation in dynamic theory of electron diffraction involves some intrinsic problems. First, the loss of theoretical strictness makes it difficult to comprehend the phenomena of electron diffraction. Secondly, it is difficult to believe that the approximation is reasonable especially in the following cases: 1) when accelerating voltage is not sufficiently high, 2) when the specimen is thick, 3) when the angle between the surface normal of the specimen and zone axis is large, and 4) when diffracted beam with large diffraction angle is included in the calculation. However, until now the method to calculate the many beam dynamic electron diffraction without the high energy approximation has not been proposed. For this reason, the authors propose a method to eliminate the high energy approximation in the calculation of many beam dynamic electron diffraction. In this method, a perfect crystal with flat surface was assumed. The method was applied to the calculation of [111] zone axis CBED patterns of Si.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271
Author(s):  
Tamás Demeter

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism.


Author(s):  
Peter Ludlow ◽  
Bradley Armour-Garb

This chapter follows recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology, which rejects the standard, static picture of languages and highlights its context sensitivity—a dynamic theory of the nature of language. On the view advocated, human languages are things that we build on a conversation-by-conversation basis. The author calls such languages microlanguages. The chapter argues that thinking of languages in terms of microlanguages yields interesting consequences for how we should think about the liar paradox. In particular, we will see that microlanguages have admissible conditions that preclude liar-like sentences. On the view presented in the chapter, liar sentences are not even sentences of any microlanguage that we might construct (or assertorically utter). Accordingly, the proper approach to such a paradoxical sentence is to withhold the sentence—not permitting it to be admitted into our microlanguage unless, or until, certain sharpening occurs.


2021 ◽  
pp. 110550
Author(s):  
Antonia M. Zaferiou ◽  
Christopher B. Knowlton ◽  
Suk-Hwan Jang ◽  
Bryan M. Saltzman ◽  
Nikhil N. Verma ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Masamichi Okudaira ◽  
Steffen Willwacher ◽  
Raki Kawama ◽  
Kazuki Ota ◽  
Satoru Tanigawa

2021 ◽  
Vol 161 ◽  
pp. 107436
Author(s):  
Huguang He ◽  
Bei Zhang ◽  
Qing Zheng ◽  
Hualin Fan
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document