scholarly journals State aid control in the European Union— Rationale, stylised facts and determining factors

2001 ◽  
Vol 36 (6) ◽  
pp. 289-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Ganoulis ◽  
Reiner Martin
2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ugo Arrigo ◽  
Giacomo Di Foggia

This paper is aimed at analysing state aid to the railway sector in selected countries of the European Union. Although this is a preliminary exercise, literature lacks of specificity. From the analysis, a highly differentiated situation emerges: a group of countries with permanently lower subsidies (the Iberians, the Scandinavians and Austria); a group of countries with a medium level of subsidies (all of the major countries: Germany, France and the UK) and a group of countries with permanently high subsidies (Italy, Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands). This paper demonstrates that railways have so far benefited from weakened forms state aid control. This can be motivated (i) by the need for modal rebalance recognised by national transport policies, (ii) by the natural monopolistic character of the network whose duplication is not economically feasible and (iii) by the non-competitive traditional structure, from a legal point of view, of even the transport service. This situation, however, is set to change drastically with the opening up of services to competition, which has already been done in the European Union for the freight sector and in some countries, although only on a voluntary basis, even for the passenger sector. By focusing on Italy, this study finds that the elevated state aid to the rail sector consequently results in both a major public finance problem and a potential factor of competition distortion.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 145-157
Author(s):  
Virág Blazsek

The bank bailouts following the global financial crisis of 2008 have been subject to prior approval of the European Commission (EC), the competition authority of the European Union. The EC was reluctant to reject rescue efforts directed at failing banks and so it consistently approved all such requests submitted by Member States. Out of the top twenty European banks, the EC authorized State aid to at least twelve entities. In this context, the paper outlines the gradually changing interpretation of EU State aid rules, the “temporary and extraordinary rules” introduced starting from late 2008, and the extension of the “no-State aid” category. The above shifts show that the EC itself deflected from relevant EU laws in order to systemically rescue important banks in Europe and restore their financial stability. The paper argues that bank bailouts and bank rescue packages by the State have led to different effects on market structures and consumer welfare in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone areas, mostly the Eastern segments of the European Union. As such, it is argued that they are inconsistent with the European common market. Although the EC tried to minimize the distortion of competition created as a result of the aforementioned case law primarily through the application of the principle of exceptionality and different compensation measures, these efforts have been at least partially unsuccessful. Massive State aid packages, the preferential treatment of the largest, or systemically important, banks through EU State aid mechanisms – almost none of which are Central and Eastern European (CEE) – may have led to the distortion of competition on the common market. That is so mainly because of the prioritization of the stability of the financial sector and the Euro. The paper argues that State aid for failing banks may have had important positive effects in the short run, such as the promotion of the stability of the banking system and the Euro. In the longrun however, it has contributed to the unprecedented sovereign indebtedness in Europe, and contributed to an increased economic and political instability of the EU, particularly in its most vulnerable CEE segment.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter addresses access to justice in the context of centralized enforcement of EU State aid law and judicial review before the Union courts. The subject matter of litigation is State aid measures adopted in particular by the European Commission as the main supervisory body in this field pursuant to Article 108 TFEU. The term ‘access to justice’ is meant to comprise both the various conditions of standing for bringing direct actions against such measures before the General Court (GC), which essentially comprise actions for annulment (Article 263 TFEU), actions for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU), and actions for damages (Article 268 in combination with Article 340(2) TFEU). The chapter also looks at the nature and the types of acts that are possibly subject to judicial review before the GC.


Author(s):  
Kreuschitz Viktor ◽  
Nehl Hanns Peter

This chapter assesses the enforcement of EU State aid rules. The Commission is not the only authority involved in the monitoring of State aid. As regards the supervision of Member States' compliance with their obligations under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU, the national courts also have an important role to play. The implementation of that system of control is a matter for both the Commission and the national courts, their respective roles being complementary but separate. Whilst assessment of the compatibility of aid measures with the common market falls within the exclusive competence of the Commission, subject to review by the Courts of the European Union, it is for national courts to ensure the safeguarding, until the final decision of the Commission, of the rights of individuals faced with a possible breach by State authorities of the prohibition laid down by Article 108(3) TFEU.


Author(s):  
Ilan Sherr ◽  
Katrien Miclotte ◽  
Rebecca Fawcett-Feuillette

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in the economic development strategy of the European Union. However, while SMEs are important for job creation and economic development, the Commission has highlighted that they often encounter problems accessing finance and necessary information. In order to address certain market failures which impact SMEs most significantly, SMEs now have a favoured status under the state aid rules. The most important and recent changes are a consequence of the Commission’s state aid modernization (SAM) reform package. As part of the SAM package, the Commission has adopted ten guidelines and five regulations to render existing state aid control instruments and procedures more efficient. This chapter gives a brief but practical overview of those new guidelines and regulations and highlights the core principles that need to be taken into account when assessing aid possibilities for SMEs.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Boban Stojanović ◽  
Tanja Stanišić

Abstract State aid aimed to certain market participants, especially some of its categories, carries a risk of distortion of competition. Therefore, it is necessary to control allocation of state aid and its direction from the sectoral objectives towards more justified horizontal objectives of allocating. This paper examines the practice of assigning sectoral state aid in the European Union and in the selected Western Balkan countries by using the methods of comparative and correlation analysis. The aim is to identify deviations and point out to the preferred ways of state aid allocation.


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