scholarly journals The problem of no hands: responsibility voids in collective decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hein Duijf ◽  
Frederik Van De Putte
Keyword(s):  
Decision Procedures ◽  
Decision Function ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Individual Member ◽  
Decision Criteria ◽  
Discursive Dilemma ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Philosophical Debates

AbstractThe problem of no hands concerns the existence of so-called responsibility voids: cases where a group makes a certain decision, yet no individual member of the group can be held responsible for this decision. Criteria-based collective decision procedures play a central role in philosophical debates on responsibility voids. In particular, the well-known discursive dilemma has been used to argue for the existence of these voids. But there is no consensus: others argue that no such voids exist in the discursive dilemma under the assumption that casting an untruthful opinion is eligible. We argue that, under this assumption, the procedure used in the discursive dilemma is indeed immune to responsibility voids, yet such voids can still arise for other criteria-based procedures. We provide two general characterizations of the conditions under which criteria-based collective decision procedures are immune to these voids. Our general characterizations are used to prove that responsibility voids are ruled out by criteria-based procedures involving an atomistic or monotonic decision function. In addition, we show that our results imply various other insights concerning the logic of responsibility voids.

The Maze and the Masses

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hélène Landemore
Keyword(s):  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Collective Intelligence ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
The People ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Masses

This chapter argues that collective intelligence offers an attractive solution to the problem of the average citizen's ignorance and irrationality. It first illustrates this point by presenting the metaphor of the maze, inspired by Descartes' thought experiment in the Discourse on Method. Next, the chapter sets out the definition of “democracy,” which gains a certain meaning and relevance within the context of this book—as, primarily, an inclusive collective decision procedure, that is, a procedure for collective decisions characterized by the fact that it is inclusive, more or less directly, of all the members of the group for whom decisions need to be made. The chapter then considers the domain of democratic reason and politics, before turning to the concept of democratic reason as the collective intelligence of the people. Finally, the chapter closes with a brief overview of the following chapters.

scholarly journals How collective comparisons emerge without individual comparisons of the options

2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1787) ◽  
pp. 20140737 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elva J. H. Robinson ◽  
Ofer Feinerman ◽  
Nigel R. Franks
Keyword(s):  
Nest Site ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Automated System ◽  
Access To Information ◽  
Ant Colonies ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Cooperative Process

Collective decisions in animal groups emerge from the actions of individuals who are unlikely to have global information. Comparative assessment of options can be valuable in decision-making. Ant colonies are excellent collective decision-makers, for example when selecting a new nest-site. Here, we test the dependency of this cooperative process on comparisons conducted by individual ants. We presented ant colonies with a choice between new nests: one good and one poor. Using individually radio-tagged ants and an automated system of doors, we manipulated individual-level access to information: ants visiting the good nest were barred from visiting the poor one and vice versa. Thus, no ant could individually compare the available options. Despite this, colonies still emigrated quickly and accurately when comparisons were prevented. Individual-level rules facilitated this behavioural robustness: ants allowed to experience only the poor nest subsequently searched more. Intriguingly, some ants appeared particularly discriminating across emigrations under both treatments, suggesting they had stable, high nest acceptance thresholds. Overall, our results show how a colony of ants, as a cognitive entity, can compare two options that are not both accessible by any individual ant. Our findings illustrate a collective decision process that is robust to differences in individual access to information.

scholarly journals Individual-level personality influences social foraging and collective behaviour in wild birds

2014 ◽  
Vol 281 (1789) ◽  
pp. 20141016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy M. Aplin ◽  
Damien R. Farine ◽  
Richard P. Mann ◽  
Ben C. Sheldon
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Behaviour ◽  
Parus Major ◽  
Individual Variability ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
In The Wild ◽  
Simple Interaction

There is increasing evidence that animal groups can maintain coordinated behaviour and make collective decisions based on simple interaction rules. Effective collective action may be further facilitated by individual variation within groups, particularly through leader–follower polymorphisms. Recent studies have suggested that individual-level personality traits influence the degree to which individuals use social information, are attracted to conspecifics, or act as leaders/followers. However, evidence is equivocal and largely limited to laboratory studies. We use an automated data-collection system to conduct an experiment testing the relationship between personality and collective decision-making in the wild. First, we report that foraging flocks of great tits ( Parus major ) show strikingly synchronous behaviour. A predictive model of collective decision-making replicates patterns well, suggesting simple interaction rules are sufficient to explain the observed social behaviour. Second, within groups, individuals with more reactive personalities behave more collectively, moving to within-flock areas of higher density. By contrast, proactive individuals tend to move to and feed at spatial periphery of flocks. Finally, comparing alternative simulations of flocking with empirical data, we demonstrate that variation in personality promotes within-patch movement while maintaining group cohesion. Our results illustrate the importance of incorporating individual variability in models of social behaviour.

Efficient Combinatorial Allocations: Individual Rationality versus Stability

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hitoshi Matsushima
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Decision Procedures ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Individual Rationality ◽  
Marginal Stability ◽  
Central Planner ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Second Procedure ◽  
Do So

Abstract We investigate combinatorial allocations with opt-out types and clarify the possibility of achieving efficiency under incomplete information. We introduce two distinct collective decision procedures. The first procedure assumes that the central planner designs a mechanism and players have the option to exit. The mechanism requires interim individual rationality. The second procedure assumes that players design a mechanism by committing themselves to participate. The mechanism requires marginal stability against blocking behavior by the largest proper coalitions. We show that the central planner can earn non-negative revenue in the first procedure, if and only if he cannot do so in the second.

scholarly journals Misinformed leaders lose influence over pigeon flocks

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (9) ◽  
pp. 20160544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isobel Watts ◽  
Máté Nagy ◽  
Theresa Burt de Perera ◽  
Dora Biro
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Columba Livia ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Homing Pigeons ◽  
Inaccurate Information ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Adaptive Consequences ◽  
Informed Group ◽  
Influential Individuals

In animal groups where certain individuals have disproportionate influence over collective decisions, the whole group's performance may suffer if these individuals possess inaccurate information. Whether in such situations leaders can be replaced in their roles by better-informed group mates represents an important question in understanding the adaptive consequences of collective decision-making. Here, we use a clock-shifting procedure to predictably manipulate the directional error in navigational information possessed by established leaders within hierarchically structured flocks of homing pigeons ( Columba livia ). We demonstrate that in the majority of cases when leaders hold inaccurate information they lose their influence over the flock. In these cases, inaccurate information is filtered out through the rearrangement of hierarchical positions, preventing errors by former leaders from propagating down the hierarchy. Our study demonstrates that flexible decision-making structures can be valuable in situations where ‘bad’ information is introduced by otherwise influential individuals.

scholarly journals ‘N REGSFILOSOFIESE SOEKE NA POLITIEKE GEOORLOOFDHEID: DIE SPANNING TUSSEN PROSEDURE EN SUBSTANSIE Jan-Harm de Villiers

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Harm de Villiers
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Positive Contribution ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Practical Effect

This article examines the conflict between procedure and substance. Substance should be favoured above procedure because where substance is at the heart of a legitimacy mechanism, collective decision-making can take place that makes a positive contribution and constructs an ethical society. Lawfulness and morality should be connected to give practical effect to such a model. Apartheid laws were collective decisions that were procedurally lawful, but were morally unsatisfactory. When a citizen faces a law that is immoral, and in terms of Aquinas irrational, it is not a law at all, and it should be resisted.

Nonmanipulable Collective Decision-Making for Games

2012 ◽  
pp. 67-81
Author(s):  
Rob LeGrand ◽  
Timothy Roden ◽  
Ron K. Cytron
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
The Other ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Game Development ◽  
New Approach ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Higher Dimensional ◽  
Game Players

This chapter explores a new approach that may be used in game development to help human players and/or non-player characters make collective decisions. The chapter describes how previous work can be applied to allow game players to form a consensus from a simple range of possible outcomes in such a way that no player can manipulate it at the expense of the other players. Then, the text extends that result and shows how nonmanipulable consensus can be found in higher-dimensional outcome spaces. The results may be useful when developing artificial intelligence for non-player characters or constructing frameworks to aid cooperation among human players.

scholarly journals From the first intention movement to the last joiner: macaques combine mimetic rules to optimize their collective decisions

2010 ◽  
Vol 278 (1712) ◽  
pp. 1697-1704 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Sueur ◽  
J. L. Deneubourg ◽  
O. Petit
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Complete Proof ◽  
Transition Mechanism ◽  
Collective Decisions ◽  
Collective Movements ◽  
Decision Making Processes ◽  
Almost All

Mechanisms related to collective decision making have recently been found in almost all animal reigns from amoebae to worms, insects and vertebrates, including human beings. Decision-making mechanisms related to collective movements—including pre-departure and joining—have already been studied at different steps of the movement process, but these studies were always carried out separately. We therefore have no understanding of how these different processes are related when they underlie the same collective decision-making event. Here, we consider the whole departure process of two groups of Tonkean macaques ( Macaca tonkeana ), using a stochastic model. When several exclusive choices are proposed, macaques vote and choose the majority. Individuals then join the movement according to a mimetism based on affiliative relationships. The pre-departure quorum and the joining mimetic mechanism are probably linked, but we have not yet identified which transition mechanism is used. This study shows that decision-making related to macaque group movements is governed by a quorum rule combined with a selective mimetism at departure. This is the first time that transition mechanisms have been described in mammals, which consequently helps understand how a voting process leads to social amplification. Our study also provides the first complete proof that there is continuity in the decision-making processes underlying collective movements in mammals from the first intention movement right through to the last joiner.

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