scholarly journals Capital Abundance and Its Consequences for Trade Policy

2019 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 275-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Christian von Weizsäcker

Abstract Protectionist moves may be countered by reference to the conundrum of capital scarcity. In a world in which unilateral imposition of trade barriers are a looming possibility, capital scarcity may nevertheless imply that free trade is a kind of Nash equilibrium.

Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella

This paper revisits the issue (dating back to the Brander and Spencer’s approach, 1985) of the well-known inefficiency of the activist regime where Governments set subsidies for their own exporter firms. It is shown that such policies may be efficient (i.e., national social welfares are higher than under free trade) when firms are unionized under the usual Right-to-Manage arrangement and the product is sufficiently differentiated. That is, the emerging Nash equilibrium regime implies a subsidy policy which is Pareto-efficient, removing the unpleasant Prisoner’s Dilemma structure of the standard Brander and Spencer’s result. As an alternative interpretation this result suggests that, in such cases, it is always convenient the unilateral public intervention because welfares will be superior to those under free trade, also in the case of “retaliation” by the rival Government.


2021 ◽  
pp. 713-727
Author(s):  
Diana Makayevna Madiyarova ◽  
Maxim Vladimirovich Terletskii

Today, within the framework of the functioning of foreign trade policy, there are two main opposing models: protectionism and free trade. Recently, the situation is developing towards the dominance of the policy of protectionism over the policy of conducting free trade, since there is a continuous increase in the number of non-tariff measures and the manifestation of trade wars. This situation leads to the need for a policy of trade liberalization. Implementing a foreign trade policy aimed at eliminating trade barriers is not a quick process and requires a thoughtful scientific assessment. To analyze the criticality of the situation of the absence of a free trade policy and to reflect its validity, a very wide methodological toolkit is used to study various kinds of trade barriers, ranging from the calculation of the simplest indicators to the construction of complex econometric models. This study provides a comprehensive review of the main methodological approaches to determining the impact of tariff and non-tariff barriers on the international trade activities of countries. In the scientific review work, 4 domestic and 24 foreign sources, formed on the basis of 21 resources, were involved in the search for literature. The results of the review analysis of research papers showed that in the study of tariff and non-tariff barriers, researchers mainly use three econometric models, namely gravity model, partial equilibrium model and general equilibrium model. In addition, the study of non-tariff barriers can be carried out in the context of two other methods besides the econometric one: the implementation of the "price gap" method and the derivation of "incidence indicators".


1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-50
Author(s):  
Gunnar Flфystad

This paper analyses whether the developing countries are pursuing an optimal foreign trade policy, given the theoretical and empirical evidence we have. The paper concludes that constraints in imposing other taxes than tariffs in many developing countries may justify having tariffs as part of an optimal taxation policy.


2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin O. Fordham ◽  
Katja B. Kleinberg

AbstractRecent research on the sources of individual attitudes toward trade policy comes to very different conclusions about the role of economic self-interest. The skeptical view suggests that long-standing symbolic predispositions and sociotropic perceptions shape trade policy opinions more than one's own material well-being. We believe this conclusion is premature for two reasons. First, the practice of using one attitude to predict another raises questions about direction of causation that cannot be answered with the data at hand. This problem is most obvious when questions about the expected impact of trade are used to predict opinions about trade policy. Second, the understanding of self-interest employed in most studies of trade policy attitudes is unrealistically narrow. In reality, the close relationship between individual economic interests and the interests of the groups in which individuals are embedded creates indirect pathways through which one's position in the economy can shape individual trade policy preferences. We use the data employed by Mansfield and Mutz to support our argument that a more complete account of trade attitude formation is needed and that in such an account economic interests may yet play an important role.1


Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).


2000 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Karol

Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Sun Yuhong ◽  
Mu Yifei ◽  
Jun Yang

Abstract On 5 October 2015, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) led by the U.S. was signed. Already, 12 countries1 have joined the agreement, but China has not. Thus, lots of research has focused on the negative effect of the TPP on China’s foreign trade. On the other hand, China is moving forward in its own efforts to establish bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and free trade zones. In June 2015, China-South Korea and China-Australia signed bilateral FTAs which went into effect in December 2015. Several questions were raised: Since South Korea and Australia are the major trade partners in the Pacific area and the bilateral FTAs will be effective before the TPP, will these FTAs’ positive effects on China’s foreign trade offset some of the negative effects of the TPP? If China and the U.S. adopted a competitive trade policy, which countries would benefit? If China and the U.S. adopted a cooperative trade policy, how would the trade value and economic welfare change? This paper simulates and analyses the mutual effects of China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs and the enlarging TPP using the computable general equilibrium model. The major conclusions drawn suggest that China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs will significantly offset the TPP’s negative effect on China’s foreign trade. If China is not included, the U.S. economic benefit from the TPP will be limited. The economic welfare for a country like Australia, which joined both the bilateral FTA and the TPP, will be increased the most. In the long run, China joining the TPP would be the most beneficial decision for its national interest. However, if the TPP cannot be approved by the US congress, the U.S.’s economic indicators and export would be decreasing sharply. China’s economy and export will benefit from FTAs.


2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Chaudoin

AbstractA key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and policy effects in the context of international agreements over trade policy. Respondents with expressed policy preferences, whether supporting or opposing free trade, have muted reactions to learning that their leader has broken an agreement. Only respondents with no opinion on trade policy are affected by learning that their leader's policy is inconsistent with prior commitments. This suggests that constituents' underlying preferences limit the degree to which audience costs influence policymakers' calculations.


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