scholarly journals Tax collection in the Roman Empire: a new institutional economics approach

Author(s):  
Óscar Gutiérrez ◽  
Marco Martínez-Esteller

AbstractThis paper reviews the Roman tax collection system since the Late Republic to the Principality, focusing on the transition from the tax-farming system to a more centralized, census-based administration. We attempt to justify this transition according to New Institutional Economic theories (Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory). The paper argues that, during the Republic, the auction-based system of tax farming ended up giving place to opportunistic behaviors and abusing practices due to information asymmetries and contract incompleteness, enhanced by the collusion of tax farmers and governors. The Principality improved the efficiency of the tax collection system through the introduction of a bureaucratic and census-based administration, which allowed imperial employees to monitor the tax-farming activities.

2021 ◽  
pp. 026010792110368
Author(s):  
Joe Wallis ◽  
Syed Rizvi

The ‘new institutional economics’ (NIE) can go a long way towards comprehending the emerging complexities of local government. As local bodies seek to forge collaborative partnerships with other organisations, they have to decide whether to solve horizontal co-ordination problems through market, hierarchy or network mechanisms. NIE can show that where other governance mechanisms are incomplete or subject to high transaction costs, trust and co-operation can informally develop through the process by which network interactions become embedded within each other. We show how this approach can be revised to take into account the expressive dimension of behaviour in hope-based networks whose members are bound together not so much by structures of resource dependence as by the hope and trust they place in the advancement of common goals. JEL: L38


Author(s):  
Yasushi Suzuki ◽  
Mohammad Dulal Miah

Purpose This paper argues how Islamic altruism and reciprocity can enhance or drain the supply of Islamic equity finance. The paper also analyzes the feasibility of Islamic equity finance through the lens of new institutional economics (NIE) and transaction cost economics (TCE). Design/methodology/approach One of the salient contributions by NIE is to support the proposition that effective contracting depends greatly on institutions in terms of “rules that constrain economic behavior”, including informal or intangible institutions, such as religion, culture and customary practices. This paper draws on the theoretical contributions of the NIE and TCE and applies some of these contributions to an analysis of general altruism and reciprocity in Islamic economies. Findings It is said that solutions based on the Islamic injunctions (collectively termed as spiritual quotient) could serve to mitigate agency risks. However, in theory, the Muslim principal (particularly fund providers) is exposed to higher agency risk unless appropriate rules of protecting the right of the principal (or of punishing the agent when its opportunistic behavior is revealed) are devised, because the Muslim fund providers have the divine obligation to share risks in enterprise under the profit-loss sharing (PLS) scheme as well as to share a portion of income with the poor or those entrepreneurs who face difficulties in fund-raising. Originality/value Many scholars refer to the lack of the “formal” institutions that hinder the sound development of Islamic venture capital (VC). This paper contributes to shedding an analytical light on the unique feature of the Muslims’ “informal” constraints which make them hesitate to invest in Islamic VC. To develop the Islamic VC market, this paper provides a theoretical background to suggest how important it would be for the national financial system to devise some tangible provisions by installing enterprise-friendly regulations as well as adequate incentive and protection mechanisms consistent with Islamic principles.


Author(s):  
Andrew B. Whitford

This chapter comments on Oliver Williamson’s 1975 book,Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, a critical analysis of how firms operate in markets. Williamson describes a new way of understanding markets and hierarchies by using the term “New Institutional Economics” for the first time. This chapter examines Williamson’s approach and the impact of his book, first by discussing his arguments about markets and hierarchies in relation to what policy analysts sometimes call “the politics of ideas”. It then considers Williamson’s particular interest in antitrust policy as well as his thesis about transaction cost economics. Finally, it evaluates the implications of Williamson’s research for the long-term development of a politics of ideas about firms in markets.


2012 ◽  
Vol 67 (04) ◽  
pp. 599-627 ◽  
Author(s):  
Koenraad Verboven

Over the past decade, the New Institutional Economics have become a popular model for analyzing ancient economic history. However, the notion of cultural beliefs, which plays a central role in Douglass North’s recent work and Avner Greif’s analysis of institutional change, has been largely ignored. This article argues that a neo-institutional approach taking this notion into account offers a better means of understanding how ideology and moral values influenced the ancient economy than the Finleyan model. Rather than acting as a deterministic constraint on human behavior, cultural beliefs help to orient decision making and allow one to anticipate the (re)actions of others. This article explores two key sets of norms and values in Roman culture that profoundly marked the economy’s institutional framework. The first focused on reciprocity, which supported social networks beyond the confines of the familia-freedmen group and underlay the development of contract and agency law. The second was based on citizenship, which shaped political culture by creating individual rights and obligations that the political elite was given the authority to enforce in order to secure and stimulate both private and common interests. This resulted in Roman law and the distribution of justice. Ideologically, the Roman Empire presented itself as a meta-city that incorporated local communities, which were in turn gradually transformed to fit the civitas model. Both sets of beliefs lowered transaction costs without threatening the preeminent position of local and imperial aristocracies. Toward the end of the second century CE, local communities weakened as the imperial administration grew stronger, causing local and regional aristocracies to turn to the imperial court and army for status, influence, and power. The ideology of citizenship as the guiding principle of political culture gave way to that of the sacred emperor, who guaranteed divine justice and order.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yue Wang ◽  
Karen Yuan Wang ◽  
Xufei Ma

Developed mainly in the broad field of negotiation, the existing literature on international business negotiation has adopted theoretical perspectives that focus on differences between negotiating parties. In this article, we argue that opportunism is more fundamental than differences in our understanding of international business negotiation behavior. Parties’ concerns over how to mitigate opportunism are the fundamental force that drives such negotiation behavior, and the likelihood of opportunism is affected mostly by the economic nature of the asset parties committed to the business exchange. By synthesizing transaction cost economics and new institutional economics, this paper develops an alternative theoretical model that complements the existing negotiation literature to explain negotiation behavior. Our model theorizes relationships between parties’ ex-ante credible commitments and ex-post dispute resolution strategies and explores how institutions moderate such relationships in shaping international business negotiation behavior and process.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 68-77
Author(s):  
Imanina Eka Dalilah ◽  
Candra Fajri Ananda ◽  
Khusnul Ashar

Objective - Industrial development has a significant contribution on the welfare achievement of Mojokerto. However, these achievements have also brought about the negative impact such as environmental degradation. Nonetheless, new institutional economics have developed a theory for the purpose of solving such environmental conflicts and this is called institutional ecological economics. Since resolving environmental problems is dependent on the quality of institutional structures, this research aims to show the role of institutional economic environment in minimizing negative environmental externalities for example, water pollution, in the Mojokerto Regency. Methodology/Technique - This research is qualitative in nature. It uses interviews and observations to collect the data required. For the purpose of illustrating water quality, a table is depicted based on biological and chemical parameters used. The research site is set in Watesnegoro Village, a sub district of Ngoro, Mojokerto Regency, making this a case study. Findings - The findings extracted from this research suggest that (1) Environment governance in the Mojokerto Regency had not effectively reduced water pollution, (2) The internalization of externalities as described in the economic theory was unable to be implemented because of the high transaction cost, (3) There are rent-seeking behaviours in the waste water pollution policy where the corporation and government have a collusion to gain their own interest. Novelty - The outcome of this research indicates that negative externalities on the environment caused by the industry needs to be further studied so as to understand the relationship of industrial activities on the environment. Type of Paper: Empirical Keywords: Water Pollution, Institutional Ecological Economics, Rent-Seeking, Mojokerto Regency, Indonesia.


2000 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne de Bruin ◽  
Ann Dupuis

The intention of this paper is to extend critiques of rationality that have been developed across a range of disciplines and within a number of strands of feminism. Initially providing a brief review of rationality critiques, the paper then focuses on bounded rationality, the key behavioural assumption of transaction cost economics (TCE). It is shown that, to some extent, this notion of rationality erodes the atomistic model of economic activity central to the economic orthodoxy and is therefore an improvement on the neoclassical orthodox view of rationality. The paper then moves on to a more critical examination of bounded rationality through the development of the feminist slanted concept of ‘constrained entrepreneurship’. This new conceptualisation also provides a means of extending TCE through the incorporation of the Coasian insight that the development of TCE has tended to lose sight of the raison d’être of the firm, that of ‘running a business’ (Coase, 1988a). The concept of constrained entrepreneurship offers a useful, integrative, interdisciplinary framework in which to work and provides a focus for synthesising aspects of social network analysis (a central concern of the new economic sociology) and a feminist oriented perspective, with TCE, an important strand within new institutional economics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 97-104
Author(s):  
Marzena Lemanowicz

The article reviews Polish and foreign economic literature regarding new institutional economics (NIE) and various research approaches used in the framework of NIE. Particular attention was paid to the economic theory of contracts and the transaction costs, as the limitation of transaction costs is indeed the main stimulus for contract signing. Special attention was given to agricultural contracts and their specificity. The article discusses different theories applied in the analysis of contracts, characterizes contracts according to different criteria, and draws attention to the importance of transaction costs in the theory of contracts. In addition, factors which contribute to these costs have been identified, indicating the necessity of adapting the principles of transaction cost economics to the needs of the agricultural sector.


2020 ◽  
Vol 86 ◽  
pp. 01015
Author(s):  
P. Eko Prasetyo ◽  
Adryan Setyadharma ◽  
Nurjannah Rahayu Kistanti

Rural economic inequality is a fundamental problem which makes it important to seek its causes and find its policy solutions immediately. The new institutional economic potential development policy is the right choice. The purpose of this article is to explain more broadly the importance of new institutional economic potential in developing rural communities. Especially, to explain various economic dimensions of new institutions in a comprehensive manner in determining the level of community development. This research method used structured survey that has been well-designed and measured for data collection, variable measurement, and data analysis. Quantitative and qualitative data are gathered by using integrated methods between various disciplines; economics-sociology and economics-geography. Further, to interpretation the data, we used economic and cultural concepts; informal economy, new institutional economics, gravitational economics and cultural anthropology. Then, the method of analysis is path analysis using recrusive form of correlation model with multiple path equation systems. The main research results show that the new institutional economic potential is a key factor in developing rural communities and reducing inequality. Besides, the new institutional economics will encourage economic growth and public welfare


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