scholarly journals To discriminate or not to discriminate? Personalised pricing in online markets as exploitative abuse of dominance

2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Botta ◽  
Klaus Wiedemann
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Big Data Analytics ◽  
Burden Of Proof ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
User Profiling ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Mixed Effect ◽  
Online Platforms

AbstractThe advent of big data analytics has favoured the emergence of forms of price discrimination based on consumers’ profiles and their online behaviour (i.e. personalised pricing). The paper analyses this practice as a possible exploitative abuse by dominant online platforms. The paper argues that, in view of its “mixed” effect on consumers’ welfare, personalised pricing requires a case-by-case assessment under EU competition law and thus it should not be banned a priori. However, in view of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice on price discrimination, the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission would face a high burden of proof to sanction this conduct under Art. 102(c) TFEU. Finally, the paper argues that, due to its case-by-case approach, competition law seems more suitable than omnibus regulation to tackle the negative effects that personalised pricing could have on consumers’ welfare. In particular, an NCA/the European Commission could negotiate with online platforms different kinds of behavioural commitments: transparency requirements, limits on data collection/user profiling, rights to opt out of personalised pricing and the obligation to share customers’ data with competitors could significantly tame the risks of personalised pricing.

scholarly journals Are there competition issues associated with fake news during COVID-19?

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 698-719
Author(s):  
Ivana Rakić
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
European Union ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The Internet ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Fake News ◽  
Online Platforms ◽  
Union Competition

Fake news is getting more attention because of the Internet and the rise of the online platforms and social networks, particularly in the age of COVID-19. Its sudden popularization creates important issues regarding how this phenomenon affects the society and democracy, as well as the consumers, competition and market. The question is what happens when fake news are spread (online) and misused during pandemic - whether to apply the European Union competition law in such cases? The author considers that European Commission should not deal with fake news challenges in the context of potential anticompetitive conducts. It is pointed out that fake news problem is not a competitive problem because the struggle against fake news is about the content not the competition and market power.

Digital Markets and Online Platforms: New Perspectives on Regulation and Competition Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Kraemer ◽  
Marc Bourreau ◽  
Sally Broughton Micova ◽  
Alexandre de Streel ◽  
Richard Feasey ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Online Platforms

THE INFLUENCE OF FAIR COMPETITION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS

2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-54
Author(s):  
Camille Carbonnaux
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Legal Aspects ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Fair Competition ◽  
Management Perspective ◽  
The Common ◽  
European Competition Law

Since the 1990s, European judicial and normative institutions have paid particular attention to the competitive practices of public undertakings. Consequently, their regime is governed by a significant number of rules pursuing objectives appearing, a priori, contradictory. In fact, public undertakings may experience difficulties in their management. In this context, an approach of public competition law through the prism of fair competition can be very useful. Regarding the uniformity of its judgment, fair competition appears as an objective capable of coordinating rules and overcoming their contradictions. It thereby offers a global and coherent reading plan of all the legal translations of the European competitive order being of some practical importance. In illuminating the common features of the different legal aspects of competition, we can easily switch from one to the other. It therefore makes the European approach to competition more accessible and understandable. Furthermore, and most importantly, it leads to identifying legal opportunities and threats in a cross-disciplinary way. So, from a “Law & Management” perspective, it appears to be a precious tool for the management of public undertakings. Key words: European competition law, public undertakings, fair competition, “Management & law”.

Economic analysis of the firm’s boundaries and the limits of competition: The case of Nord Stream 2 AG

2021 ◽  
pp. 134-151
Author(s):  
S. B. Avdasheva ◽  
G. F. Yusupova
Keyword(s):  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
Gas Market ◽  
Infrastructure Investments ◽  
Nord Stream ◽  
Economic Concentration ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Available Information

Using publicly available information, the article examines the economic concepts, which underlie the arguments of the decision of Polish competition authority UOKiK in relation to the participants of the Nord Stream 2. It explains the interrelation between economic and legal concepts, which are to be applied to interpret the competitive impact of joint venture and probable theory of harm for infrastructure investments under competition law of European Union, including in comparison with Russian competition law. It has been demonstrated that the resolution of a consortium case should be based on the proof of two statements. The first statement implies that the joint venture is a firm (and therefore the creation of a joint venture is a deal leading to economic concentration). The second statement means that despite Gazprom adopted the commitments about decision of the European Commission and trends in the development of the European gas market, the possibility of price discrimination is retained. Discussion and contestation of the decision against PJSC Gazprom testify in favor of maintaining the relevance of institutional studies and studies of industry markets for resolving legal disputes arising from the application of competition law.

scholarly journals Distribution of new cars – no longer an issue for EU competition law?

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-383
Author(s):  
Václav Šmejkal
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
National Level ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Automotive Sector ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Car Sales ◽  
Year 2000 ◽  
Block Exemption ◽  
The Eu

Abstract Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the distribution of new cars really ceased to be a competition problem as the European Commission declared when it removed this part of the automotive business from the specific Block Exemption Regulation for the automotive sector in 2010? The purpose of the present analysis is first to inspect the car distribution cases that emerged in the EU after the year 2000 and, second, to speculate somewhat whether new forms of distribution, brought by the digitalization of marketing and sales, cannot bring about also new risks to cartel agreements and other types of distortions of competition in car sales.

scholarly journals Local nexus in merger control regimes

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-160
Author(s):  
Daniela Lukáčová
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Potential Effect ◽  
The State ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
National Legislation ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Economic Size ◽  
The Eu

Merger control is one of the competition law tools. While competition authorities in EU act primarily on the basis of national legislation, European Commission controls mergers with EU dimension. The jurisdictional tests relate only to the economic size of the parties and do not depend on the market shares of the parties or substantive impact of the transaction, or on whether the concentration will have any effects within the state. Globalization increases the number of multijurisdictional mergers that are subject to control of several competition authorities within or outside the EU. Differences in merger control proceedings in such cases with regard to the timeframe, or the result of the proceeding, could have a negative impact on the economy in another country. Parties to the concentration could decide to neglect the merger notification due to the timeframe, or complications connected with approving of multijurisdictional merger in other countries with jurisdiction. Therefore, the national authorities’ effort to set in their legislation turnover criteria with local nexus could help to control concentrations with potential effect on competition in their country.

18. Abuse of dominance (2): pricing practices

2021 ◽  
pp. 753-806
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Price Discrimination ◽  
Single Market ◽  
High Price ◽  
Parallel Imports ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

This chapter considers abusive pricing practices under Article 102 TFEU and the Chapter II prohibition in the Competition Act 1998. It first discusses various cost concepts used in determining whether a price is abusive. It then deals in turn with excessive pricing; conditional rebates; bundling; predatory pricing; margin squeeze; price discrimination; and practices that are harmful to the single market. This taxonomy is over-schematic, in that the categories overlap with one another: for example price discrimination may be both exploitative and exclusionary, and an excessively high price may in reality be a way of preventing parallel imports or of excluding a competitor from the market; nevertheless this division may provide helpful insights into the way in which the law is applied in practice. In each section the application of Article 102 by the European Commission and by the EU Courts will be considered first, followed by cases in the UK. Reference will be made where appropriate to the Commission’s Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings.

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

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