scholarly journals Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 750-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai A. Konrad ◽  
Florian Morath
Keyword(s):  
Simple Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Experimental Setup ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Social Projection ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Self Selection ◽  
Multi Stage

AbstractWe study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.

scholarly journals Outsourcing under incomplete information

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarun Kabiraj ◽  
Uday Bhanu Sinha
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Plant Level

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to show that outsourcing can occur as outcome of a separating or pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium although it is not profitable under complete information. Therefore, asymmetric information can itself be a reason for outsourcing. Design/methodology/approach The present paper constructs a model of two firms interacting in the product market under asymmetric information where one firm has private information about its technological capability, and it has the option to produce inputs in-house or buy inputs from an input market. However, using outsourced inputs involves a fixed cost at the plant level. The model solves for perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Findings There are situations when under complete information, outsourcing of the input will not occur, but, under incomplete information, either only the low-cost type or both high and low-cost types will go for outsourcing, and there always exist reasonable beliefs supporting these equilibria. In particular, when the fixed cost is neither too small not too large, a separating equilibrium occurs in which the low-cost type outsources inputs from the input market but the high-cost type produces in-house; hence, outsourcing signals the firm’s type. Outsourcing by only the high-cost type firm will never occur in equilibrium. Originality/value That incomplete or asymmetric information can itself be a reason for strategic outsourcing is never identified in the literature. The present paper is an attempt to fill this gap and raise the issue of outsourcing in an incomplete information environment.

scholarly journals Dynamic Contracting under Positive Commitment

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 2101-2108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilan Lobel ◽  
Renato Paes Leme
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Bayesian Equilibrium ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Future ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Sequential Rationality

We consider a firm that sells products that arrive over time to a buyer. We study this problem under a notion we call positive commitment, where the seller is allowed to make binding positive promises to the buyer about items arriving in the future, but is not allowed to commit not to make further offers to the buyer in the future. We model this problem as a dynamic game where the seller chooses a mechanism at each period subject to a sequential rationality constraint, and characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game. We prove the equilibrium is efficient and that the seller’s revenue is a function of the buyer’s ex ante utility under a no commitment model. In particular, all goods are sold in advance to the buyer at what we call the positive commitment price.

Competitive Spectrum Pricing under Centralized Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

2015 ◽  
pp. 884-908
Author(s):  
Hailing Zhu ◽  
Andre Nel ◽  
Hendrik Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Pricing ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum ◽  
Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Dynamic Spectrum Allocation ◽  
Allocation Mechanism ◽  
Economic Framework ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Pricing Schemes

Dynamic Spectrum Allocation (DSA) has been viewed as a promising approach to improving spectrum efficiency. With DSA, Wireless Service Providers (WSPs) that operate in fixed spectrum bands allocated through static allocation can solve their short-term spectrum shortage problems resulting from the bursty nature of wireless traffic. Such DSA mechanisms should be coupled with dynamic pricing schemes to achieve the most efficient allocation. This chapter models the DSA problem where a centralized spectrum broker manages “white space” in the spectrum of TV broadcasters and sells the vacant spectrum bands to multiple WSPs, as a multi-stage non-cooperative dynamic game. Furthermore, an economic framework for DSA is presented and a centralized spectrum allocation mechanism is proposed. The simulation results show that the centralized spectrum allocation mechanism with dynamic pricing achieves a DSA implementation that is responsive to market conditions as well as enabling efficient utilization of the available spectrum.

scholarly journals Analysis of Economic Indicators of Complex Production Processes

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.5) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Korneev A.M ◽  
Abdullakh L.S
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Model ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Management Effectiveness ◽  
Technological Factors ◽  
Production Processes ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Spatially Distributed ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Production Resources

The article describes the methodology for describing the economic indicators of management effectiveness and decision-making under conditions of complex multi-stage productions. The algorithm and the forecast model of the need for production resources are presented, that allow providing more complete information on costs and help in pricing for various products, significantly reducing the response time to economic and technological situation changes. Characteristics of technology parameters are linked to a multi-stage production process. As the semi-finished product passes through the processing stages, the values of the technological factors are fixed. Methods for estimating the influence of parameters of complex spatially-distributed systems on costs are presented. Important elements of costs that affect the product value are determined. Detailing the cost elements for the technological operations under study is carried out, the boundaries, where the largest amount of resources is spent, are determined. 

Scheduling Multi-Workflows Over Heterogeneous Virtual Machines With a Multi-Stage Dynamic Game-Theoretic Approach

2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 82-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Wu ◽  
Yuandou Wang
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Scientific Workflow ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Heterogeneous Cloud ◽  
Cloud Infrastructures

Cloud computing, with dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to geographically distributed computational capabilities, is becoming an increasingly popular platform for the execution of scientific applications such as scientific workflows. Scheduling multiple workflows over cloud infrastructures and resources is well recognized to be NP-hard and thus critical to meeting various types of Quality-of-Service (QoS) requirements. In this work, the authors consider a multi-objective scientific workflow scheduling framework based on the dynamic game-theoretic model. It aims at reducing make-spans, cloud cost, while maximizing system fairness in terms of workload distribution among heterogeneous cloud virtual machines (VMs). The authors consider randomly-generated scientific workflow templates as test cases and carry out extensive real-world tests based on third-party commercial clouds. Experimental results show that their proposed framework outperforms traditional ones by achieving lower make-spans, lower cost, and better system fairness.

The Dynamic Game of Complete Information for Developing Cyclic Economy of Highway Projects Construction

2011 ◽  
Vol 71-78 ◽  
pp. 2707-2711
Author(s):  
Chi Yuan ◽  
Biao Ma
Keyword(s):  
Energy Saving ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Technology Spillover ◽  
Highway Projects ◽  
Primary Obstacle ◽  
Energy Saving Technology ◽  
The Government ◽  
Huge Investment

Both the government and the firms are concerning about the development of cyclic economy for highway projects construction. However, the huge investment risks and technology spillover are primary obstacle for developing and research of energy saving and emission reduction. This paper introduces the theory of the dynamic game of complete information to analyze how the government provide sufficient subsidy and make preferential policy to promote the firms to do it for their own interests. According to the establishment of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under non-corporative conditions, it indicates clearly that the most effective measures to make sure the firms to develop cyclic economy is that the government should maintain the highest rate of subsidies to the first firm who is willing to developing the energy saving technology.

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