Can Luck Egalitarianism Serve as a Basis for Distributive Justice? A Critique of Kok-Chor Tan’s Institutional Luck Egalitarianism

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 391-414
Author(s):  
Akira Inoue
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractualism, and Equality

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Quong
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

This chapter advances two main claims. First, that the distinction between consequentialism and deontology, although widely adopted, is illusory and only serves to obscure some of the genuine disputes underlying central debates in distributive justice. Second, that although luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism are often presented as rival conceptions of justice—in particular, as offering competing accounts of the grounds of distributive justice—this may be a mistake, since this construal makes each view less plausible than it otherwise might be. Instead, the chapter proposes an alternative view where luck egalitarianism and democratic egalitarianism can be understood as complementary answers to different questions. Luck egalitarianism identifies one of the fundamental grounds of justice and injustice, whereas democratic egalitarianism is better conceptualized as offering a contractualist account of what it is for something to be just or unjust.

LUCK-EGALITARIANISM: FAULTS AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE

2011 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Collective Choice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Standard Formulation ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

A standard formulation of luck-egalitarianism says that ‘it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others [through no fault or choice of their own]’, where ‘fault or choice’ means substantive responsibility-generating fault or choice. This formulation is ambiguous: one ambiguity concerns the possible existence of a gap between what is true of each worse-off individual and what is true of the group of worse-off individuals, fault or choice-wise, the other concerns the notion of fault. I show that certain ways of resolving these ambiguities lead to counterintuitive results; and that the most plausible way of resolving them leads to a theory of distributive justice in which responsibility plays a role significantly different from that in standard luck-egalitarian thinking. My main conclusion here is that luck-egalitarianism is best formulated as the view that it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for an individual to be worse off than others if, and only if, her being worse off does not fit the degree to which she is at fault in a not purely prudential sense.

Personal Responsibility in Health and Health Care: Luck Egalitarianism as a Plausible and Flexible Approach to Health

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 583-595 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Albertsen
Keyword(s):  
Health Care ◽  
Oral Health ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Transplant Recipients ◽  
Flexible Approach ◽  
Lower Priority ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

Allocating health care resources based on personal responsibility is a prominent and controversial idea. This article assesses the plausibility of such measures through the lens of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This article presents a framework of luck egalitarianism in health, which integrates other concerns of justice than health, is pluralist, and is compatible with a wide range of measures for giving lower priority to those deemed responsible. Applying this framework to oral health, the allocation of livers among potential transplant recipients and travel insurance demonstrates that this version of luck egalitarianism is a much more attractive and flexible theory than much of the contemporary discussion allows. This also pertains to its ability to provide plausible answers to two prominent critiques of harshness and intrusiveness. The discussion also shows that the luck egalitarian commitment to eliminating the influence of luck on people’s lives is likely to require substantial redistribution.

scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism, Responsibility, and Political Liberalism

Dialogue ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
RYAN LONG
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Novel Reading ◽  
Luck Egalitarians

Luck egalitarians argue that distributive justice should be understood in terms of our capacity to be responsible for our choices. Both proponents and critics assume that the theory must rely on a comprehensive conception of responsibility. I respond to luck egalitarianism’s critics by developing a political conception of responsibility that remains agnostic on the metaphysics of free choice. I construct this political conception by developing a novel reading of John Rawls’ distinction between the political and the comprehensive. A surprising consequence is that many responsibility-based objections to luck egalitarianism turn out to be objections to Rawls’ political liberalism as well.

scholarly journals Luck Egalitarianism: Two Lines of Critique

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Dmitry Sereda
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Her Family ◽  
The Status ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Option Luck

This article is devoted to the stream in political philosophy which came to be known as “luck egalitarianism”. Luck egalitarians are concerned with the questions of distributive justice; their main idea is that no person should be worse-off due to factors which they are unable to influence. Luck egalitarians express this idea via the dichotomy of brute and option luck. The goal of the article is to describe two main lines of critique which luck egalitarianism encounters, and to assess which one is the most dangerous for this movement. Some authors criticize luck egalitarianism from a moral standpoint. They believe that it is overly cruel towards those who suffer due to unfortunate but free choices, humiliating towards those whom it deems to be worthy of help, and that it contradicts our moral intuitions concerning the question of what do people who engage in socially necessary, yet risky professions, deserve. Another important problem for this trend of political thought has to do with metaphysical criticism. Luck egalitarians claim that a person is not responsible not only for the status of her family, her gender, ethnicity, etc., but also for her talents and abilities. The question arises; is there anything for what a person can be genuinely responsible for? Thus, luck egalitarianism encounters the problem of determinism and free will. This problem threatens the identity of luck egalitarianism: if free will does not exist or if it cannot be identified, then the key dichotomy of brute and option luck is meaningless. The article demonstrates that it is the criticism of the second kind which currently poses the greatest problem for luck egalitarianism.

The Global Fund: A Reply to Casal

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 328-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hillel Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Natural Resources ◽  
Natural Resource ◽  
Global Fund ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Equal Share ◽  
Human Effort

AbstractThe Global Fund is a mechanism for the global application of the Left Libertarian conception of distributive justice. As a form of luck egalitarianism, this conception confers upon each person an entitlement to an equal share of all natural resource values, since natural resources – broadly, geographical sites – are objects for the production of which no person is responsible. Owners of these sites, i.e. states, are liable to a 100% Global Fund tax on their unimproved value: that is, their gross market value minus the value of the improvements added to them by human effort. It is argued that the revenue yielded by this tax would be correspondingly reduced by a further tax on the use of natural resources.

scholarly journals On the Usefulness of Luck Egalitarian Arguments for Global Justice

1970 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Schemmel
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Global Inequality ◽  
Philosophical Literature ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Egalitarian Principle ◽  
Luck Egalitarians ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

Much of the recent philosophical literature about distributive justice and equality in the domestic context has been dominated by a family of theories now often called ‘luck egalitarianism’, according to which it is unfair if some people are worse off than others through no choice or fault of their own. This principle has also found its way into the literature about global justice. This paper explores some difficulties that this principle faces: it is largely insensitive to the causes of global inequality, and it is so demanding that it can only give rise to weak moral claims. I go on to argue that a) understanding justice claims as merely weak claims rests on an implausible and impractical concept of justice, and b) using the global luck egalitarian argument in practical discourse is likely to lead to misunderstanding, and to be counterproductive if the aim is to tackle global inequality. While these considerations do not suffice to make a conclusive case against the luck egalitarian principle, they should be acknowledged by global luck egalitarians – as some similar problems have indeed been by domestic luck egalitarians – and need to be addressed.

scholarly journals Does luck egalitarianism lose its appeal in the face of genetic engineering?

Bioethica ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Areti Theophilopoulou (Αρετή Θεοφιλοπούλου)
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Genetic Engineering ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Liberal Societies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Genetic Interventions ◽  
Death Knell ◽  
Crucial Assumption

It has been suggested that the era of genetic interventions will sound the death knell for luck egalitarianism, as it will blur the line between chance and choice, on which theories of distributive justice often rest. By examining the threats posed to these theories, a crucial assumption is exposed; it is assumed that a commitment to the neutralisation of the effects of luck implies the endorsement of even the most morally controversial enhancements. In antithesis, I argue that an attractive theory of luck egalitarianism, Dworkinian liberal equality, enables us to deduce plausible implications for genetic engineering. By focusing on the abstract moral commitments at the heart of Dworkin’s theory, a twofold purpose is served. First, they reveal in what ways the criticisms misfire, thereby safeguarding luck egalitarianism. Second, Dworkinian luck egalitarianism is further strengthened, as it produces plausible guidelines for public policy on genetic engineering in liberal societies.

scholarly journals Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nir Eyal
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Standard Formulation ◽  
Egalitarian Justice ◽  
Shed Light

In its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. Disadvantages that result from free choice to take a risk can constitute egalitarian injusticeóso long as that free choice is morally praiseworthy or at least neutral. A modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism avoids these problems. The formulation offered here focuses on the notion of innocence: lack of free and morally wrong choice to take a risk. Innocent disadvantage negates justice in both punitive and distributive contexts, suggesting that it may negate justice ìitself.î The modified formulation of luck-egalitarianism may thus shed light on distributive justice and perhaps on the essence of justice itself; applying it to the punitive context can also illuminate some of the discussion of moral luck.

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