Mark R. Wicclair: Conscientious objection in health care

2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-161
Author(s):  
Azgad Gold
Bioethics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (5) ◽  
pp. 625-632 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doug McConnell ◽  
Robert F. Card

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 639-650
Author(s):  
Rabbi Jason Weiner

AbstractConscientious objection remains a very heated topic with strong opinions arguing for and against its utilization in contemporary health care. This paper summarizes and analyzes various arguments in the bioethical literature, favoring and opposing conscientious objection, as well as some of the proposed solutions and compromises. I then present a paradigm shifting compromise approach that arises out of very recent Jewish bioethical thought that refocuses the discussion and can minimize the frequency with which conscientious objection is required.


2012 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 231-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Zampas ◽  
Ximena Andión-Ibañez

Abstract The practice of conscientious objection often arises in the area of individuals refusing to fulfil compulsory military service requirements and is based on the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as protected by national, international and regional human rights law. The practice of conscientious objection also arises in the field of health care, when individual health care providers or institutions refuse to provide certain health services based on religious, moral or philosophical objections. The use of conscientious objection by health care providers to reproductive health care services, including abortion, contraceptive prescriptions, and prenatal tests, among other services is a growing phenomena throughout Europe. However, despite recent progress from the European Court of Human Rights on this issue (RR v. Poland, 2011), countries and international and regional bodies generally have failed to comprehensively and effectively regulate this practice, denying many women reproductive health care services they are legally entitled to receive. The Italian Ministry of Health reported that in 2008 nearly 70% of gynaecologists in Italy refuse to perform abortions on moral grounds. It found that between 2003 and 2007 the number of gynaecologists invoking conscientious objection in their refusal to perform an abortion rose from 58.7 percent to 69.2 percent. Italy is not alone in Europe, for example, the practice is prevalent in Poland, Slovakia, and is growing in the United Kingdom. This article outlines the international and regional human rights obligations and medical standards on this issue, and highlights some of the main gaps in these standards. It illustrates how European countries regulate or fail to regulate conscientious objection and how these regulations are working in practice, including examples of jurisprudence from national level courts and cases before the European Court of Human Rights. Finally, the article will provide recommendations to national governments as well as to international and regional bodies on how to regulate conscientious objection so as to both respect the practice of conscientious objection while protecting individual’s right to reproductive health care.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 284-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Campbell

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides protection for freedom of thought, conscience and religion. From one perspective, it may be said that Article 9 guarantees a right to conscientious objection in health care, whereas from another perspective, a Strasbourg case, such as Pichon and Sajous v France, effectively means that Article 9 provides little or no protection in that context. In this article it is argued that the matter is more complex than either of these two positions would suggest. Moreover, given the nature of the subject matter, national authorities should be afforded a significant margin of appreciation in the way that they protect and regulate conscientious objection. By way of illustration, there is a discussion of the ways in which Article 9 might affect conscientious objection in health care under English law. The final part of the article considers the conceptual limitations of Article 9 in thinking about conscientious objection in health care; in particular, the claim that the extent to which Article 9 of the Convention provides protection for a conscientious objection in the health care context is a different question from whether conscientious objection by doctors and other health care practitioners is justified in principle.


2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adriana Lamačková

AbstractThis article explores the issue of conscientious objection invoked by health professionals in the reproductive and sexual health care context and its impact on women's ability to access health services. The right to exercise conscientious objection has been recognized by many international and European scholars as being derived from the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It is not, however, an absolute right. When the exercise of conscientious objection conflicts with other human rights and fundamental freedoms, a balance must be struck between the right to conscientious objection and other affected rights such as the right to respect for private life, the right to equality and non-discrimination, and the right to receive and impart information. Particularly in the reproductive health care context, states that allow health professionals to exercise conscientious objection must accommodate this in such a way that its exercise does not compromise women's access to health services. This article analyses the European Court of Human Rights' decision on admissibility in Pichon and Sajous v. France (2001) and argues that a balancing approach should be applied in cases of conscientious objection in the sexual and reproductive health care context.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuela Ceva ◽  
Maria Paola Ferretti

This article contributes to the debate concerning the identification of politically relevant cases of corruption in a democracy by sketching the basic traits of an original liberal theory of institutional corruption. We define this form of corruption as a deviation with respect to the role entrusted to people occupying certain institutional positions, which are crucial for the implementation of public rules, for private gain. In order to illustrate the damages that corrupt behaviour makes to liberal democratic institutions, we discuss the case of health care professionals’ abuse of their right to conscientious objection to abortion services. We show that the conscience clause can be instrumentally abused to sabotage democratically established public rules and thus exert undue private influence on their implementation. In this sense, from a liberal democratic perspective, institutional corruption is problematic because it is disruptive of such fundamental liberal ideals as the impartiality of public institutions and citizens’ political equality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chung Mee Ko ◽  
Chin Kang Koh ◽  
Ye Sol Lee

Abstract Background The Constitutional Court of South Korea declared that an abortion ban was unconstitutional on April 11, 2019. The National Health Care System will provide abortion care across the country as a formal medical service. Conscientious objection is an issue raised during the construction of legal reforms. Methods One hundred sixty-seven perioperative nurses responded to the survey questionnaire. Nurses’ perception about conscientious objection, support of legislation regarding conscientious objection, and intention to object were measured. Logistic regression was used to explore the factors associated with support of the legislation and the intention to conscientiously object. Results Only 28.8% of the responding nurses were aware of health care professionals’ conscientious objection. The majority (68.7%) felt that patients’ rights should be prioritized over health care professionals’ conscientious objection. On the other hand, 45.8% supported the legislation on conscientious objection to abortion, and 42.5% indicated a willingness to refuse to participate in an abortion case if conscientious objection was permitted. Religion, awareness of conscientious objection, and prioritizing of nurses’ right to conscientious objection were significantly associated with supporting the legislation. Moreover, religion and prioritizing nurses' rights were significantly associated with the intention to conscientiously object. Conclusions This study provides information necessary for further discussion of nurses’ conscientious objection. Nursing leaders, researchers, and educators should appeal to nurses and involve them in making policies that balance a women's right to non-discrimination and to receiving appropriate care with nurses' rights to maintain their moral integrity without compromising their professional obligation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 120-126
Author(s):  
Eileen K. Fry-Bowers

Conscientious objection refers to refusal by a health care provider (HCP) to provide certain treatments, including the standard of care, to a patient based upon the provider’s personal, ethical, or religious beliefs. Federal and state rules regarding conscientious objection have expanded the scope of legal protections that HCPs and institutions can invoke in support of refusal. Opponents of these rules argue that allowing refusal of care deprives patients of care that conforms to professionally established guidelines, contradicts long-standing principles related to informed consent, interferes with the ability of health care facilities to provide safe and efficient care, and leaves the patient without means of redress for injury. Proponents respond that such rules are necessary to preserve the moral integrity of providers, including institutions. Although refusal rules are most often associated with abortion, some HCPs have cited moral concerns regarding contraception, sterilization, prevention/treatment of sexually transmitted infections, transition-related care for transgender individuals, medication-assisted treatment of substance use disorders, the use of artificial reproductive technologies, and patient preferences for end-of-life care. Evidence suggests that the burden of conscientious refusal falls disproportionately on vulnerable populations, and legitimate concern exists that moral disagreement is merely pretext for discrimination. A careful balance must be struck between the defending the conscience rights of HCPs and the civil rights of patients.


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