Competition Law and Competition Policy in India: How the Competition Commission has Dealt with Anticompetitive Restraints by Government Entities

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-250 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aditya Bhattacharjea ◽  
Oindrila De ◽  
Geeta Gouri
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competition Commission

Toward a more robust competition policy regime for Hong Kong

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Lin ◽  
Thomas W Ross
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Best Practices ◽  
Market Economy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Competitive Markets ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Competition Commission ◽  
The Law

Abstract After years of debate, Hong Kong’s new competition law, the Competition Ordinance (CO), took effect in December 2015. Laying out rules to support competitive markets and creating the institutions to administer and enforce those rules, the CO is a modern competition law in many respects, following many best-practices and respecting recent learning in competition economics. This article argues, however, that—at least from an economist’s perspective—in its drafting a series of decisions were made that weaken the law. None is that unusual or critical on its own, however collectively they leave the law less powerful than competition enthusiasts might desire in a modern market economy. We discuss the implications of these decisions and go on to consider some other more unique aspects of the law that might need reconsideration at some point. Finally, we document and discuss the early activities of the Competition Commission of Hong Kong. We conclude that Hong Kong is off to a good start with its new law and its enforcement but that several reforms have the potential to bring a more robust competition policy regime.

Competition Policy and Price Fixing

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis Kaplow
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Direct Approach ◽  
Social Harm ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Oligopoly Theory ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Error Costs ◽  
Benefits And Costs ◽  
Desirable Behavior

Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. This book offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. The book elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, the book shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, the book explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior—and is also easier to apply.

Competition Policy for the New Era

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Emerging Economies ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
Collective Wisdom ◽  
Brics Countries ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The World

This book presents a new stage in the contributions of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to the development of Competition Law and policy. These countries have significant influence in their respective regions and in the world. The changing global environment means greater political and economic role for the BRICS and other emerging countries. BRICS countries are expected to contribute nearly half of all global gross domestic product growth by 2020. For more than a century, the path of Competition Law has been defined by the developed and industrialized countries of the world. Much later, developing countries and emerging economies came on the scene. They experience many of the old competition problems, but they also experience new problems, and experience even the old problems differently. Where are the fora to talk about Competition Law and policy fit for developing and emerging economies? The contributors in this book are well-known academic and practising economists and lawyers from both developed and developing countries. The chapters begin with a brief introduction of the topic, followed by a critical discussion and a conclusion. Accordingly, each chapter is organized around a central argument made by its author(s) in relation to the issue or case study discussed. These arguments are thoughtful, precise, and very different from each another. Each chapter is written to be a valuable freestanding contribution to our collective wisdom. The set of case studies as a whole helps to build a collection of different perspectives on competition policy.

scholarly journals The Influence of Economic Theories and Schools on Competition Law in terms of Vertical Agreements

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (18) ◽  
pp. 153-180
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Jurczyk
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Evaluation Criteria ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Chicago School ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Economic Theories ◽  
The Past ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Harvard School

The paper aims at showing the influence and the views espoused by economic theories and schools of economics on competition policy embedded in antitrust law and conducted by competition authorities in the field of vertical agreements. The scope of the paper demonstrates how substantially the economization of antitrust law has changed the assessment as to the harmfulness of vertical agreements. The analysis of economic aspects of vertical agreements in antitrust analysis allows one to reveal their pro-competitive effects and benefits, with the consumer being their beneficiary. The basic instrument of the said economization is that antitrust bodies draw on specific economic models and theories that can be employed in their practice. Within the scope of the paper, the author synthesizes the role and influence of those models and schools of economics on the application of competition law in the context of vertical agreements. In presenting, one after another, the theories and schools of economics which used to, or are still dealing with competition policy the author emphasises that in its nature this impact was more or less direct. Some of them remain at the level of general principals and axiology of competition policy, while others, in contrast, delineate concrete evaluation criteria and show how the application of those criteria changes the picture of anti-competitive practices; in other words, why vertical agreements, which in the past used to be considered to restrain competition, are no longer perceived as such. The paper presents the models and recommendations of neoclassical economics, the Harvard School, the Chicago and Post-Chicago School, the ordoliberal school, the Austrian and neoAustrian school as well as the transaction cost theory.

scholarly journals The Interaction Between Public and Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: a Case Study of the Swedish Booking Cases

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (21) ◽  
pp. 55-70
Author(s):  
Katharina Voss ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Standard Of Proof ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private Enforcement

This article studies the private enforcement conducted in Visita v Booking from the perspective of the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law. This case concerned the question whether the narrow MFN clauses maintained by Booking were contrary to Article 101 TFEU and could therefore be prohibited by a Swedish court. The focus of this article is placed on the assessment carried out by the Swedish courts to determine whether the MFN clauses were restrictive of competition by effect and on the standard of proof attached to the claimant in this regard. With regard to the interaction between public and private enforcement, Visita v. Booking is viewed as an illustration of the increased complexity of competition policy, in particular were novel practices are at issue

Better Laws for Africa

2019 ◽  
pp. 179-198
Author(s):  
Eleanor M. Fox ◽  
Mor Bakhoum
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Inclusive Development ◽  
Competition Authority ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
The World ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Good Policy

This chapter explores the core and limits of competition law and policy in terms of the values of inclusive development and poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa. A pro-outsider, pro-inclusive development antitrust policy would value a free and open marketplace without privilege or favor. This perspective is especially critical for African nations and market players without economic power and especially for those populations in societies ruled by a few privileged families or firms, or by autocrats. Pro-outsider competition policy may be implemented not only through competition law enforcement of manageable rules and standards but also through advocacy by the competition authority with partners such as the World Bank, and collaboration with neighbors. The elements of good policy form an interdependent virtuous circle.

Choices and Consequences: Internationalizing Competition Policy After TPP

2019 ◽  
pp. 413-440 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Francis
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Government Procurement ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Real Progress ◽  
Shared Goals ◽  
International Systems

The development of international systems for the coordination and constraint of competition law and policy offers a complex blend of rewards and costs. In this chapter, I evaluate the promises and problems of this endeavor in the realms of government procurement, antitrust, and the regulation of state-owned enterprises, and outline some options for internationalization in this area and some of their respective implications. I argue that, in a field dominated by deep conflicts of value and interest, real progress will require creativity and pluralism in the forms and tools of internationalization. I emphasize the importance of regionalism as a complement to multilateralism and bilateralism; frameworks of contingent cooperation as a complement to traditional treaties and networks; and a mixed strategy of linkage to, and separation from, international trade to ensure that jurisdictions are able to pursue their shared goals.

Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Enforcement

2021 ◽  
pp. 313-386
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Enforcement

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

10. An Introduction to EU Competition Policy and Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
State Aid ◽  
Merger Control ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Eu Merger Control ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

This chapter discusses EU competition law. It covers the basic outline of EU competition policy; Article 101 TFEU; Article 101(2) TFEU and the consequence of a breach; Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions; Article 102 TFEU and the abuse of a dominant position; the relationship between Arts 101 and 102 TFEU; the enforcement of EU competition law; conflict of EU and national law, state aid; and EU merger control.

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