Classical Game Theory, Socialization and the Rationalization of Conventions

Topoi ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 57-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Ross
2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-35
Author(s):  
Mubarak S. Al-Mutairi

In game theory, two or more parties need to make decisions with fully or partially conflicting objectives. In situations where reaching a more favourable outcome depends upon cooperation between the two conflicting parties, some of the mental and subjective attitudes of the decision makers must be considered. While the decision to cooperate with others bears some risks due to uncertainty and loss of control, not cooperating means giving up potential benefits. In practice, decisions must be made under risk, uncertainty, and incomplete or fuzzy information. Because it is able to work well with vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy or missing information, the fuzzy approach is effective for modeling such multicriteria conflicting situations. The well-known game of Prisoner's Dilemma, which reflects a basic situation in which one must decide whether to cooperate or not with a competitor, is systematically solved using a fuzzy approach. The fuzzy procedure is used to incorporate some of the subjective attitudes of the decision makers that are difficult to model using classical game theory. Furthermore, it permits researchers to consider the subjective attitudes of the decision makers and make better decisions in subjective, uncertain, and risky situations.


1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Akin

A symmetric game consists of a set of pure strategies indexed by {0, …, n} and a real payoff matrix (aij). When two players choose strategies i and j the payoffs are aij and aji to the i-player and j-player respectively. In classical game theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern [16] the payoffs are measured in units of utility, i.e., desirability, or in units of some desirable good, e.g. money. The problem of game theory is that of a rational player who seeks to choose a strategy or mixture of strategies which will maximize his return. In evolutionary game theory of Maynard Smith and Price [13] we look at large populations of game players. Each player's opponents are selected randomly from the population, and no information about the opponent is available to the player. For each one the choice of strategy is a fixed inherited characteristic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 2635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Giannakis ◽  
Georgia Theocharopoulou ◽  
Christos Papalitsas ◽  
Sofia Fanarioti ◽  
Theodore Andronikos

Classical game theory is an important field with a long tradition of useful results. Recently, the quantum versions of classical games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), have attracted a lot of attention. This game variant can be considered as a specific type of game where the player’s actions and strategies are formed using notions from quantum computation. Similarly, state machines, and specifically finite automata, have also been under constant and thorough study for plenty of reasons. The quantum analogues of these abstract machines, like the quantum finite automata, have been studied extensively. In this work, we examine well-known conditional strategies that have been studied within the framework of the classical repeated PD game. Then, we try to associate these strategies to proper quantum finite automata that receive them as inputs and recognize them with a probability of 1, achieving some interesting results. We also study the quantum version of PD under the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein scheme, proposing a novel conditional strategy for the repeated version of this game.


Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel J. Genot ◽  
Justine Jacot

AbstractWe examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 135481662092125
Author(s):  
Henri Kuokkanen ◽  
Frederic Bouchon

Competition between tourism destinations is intensifying, and collaboration between stakeholders can increase destination appeal. Until now, such collaboration has limited itself to governance and marketing. To advance an earlier proposal of destination revenue management (RM), we develop a conceptual framework of instigators and limiters to such cooperation between tourism operators. Next, we synthesize the framework with behavioral game theory (BGT), an extension of classical game theory that challenges the utility maximization-based outcomes of the classical version. BGT incorporates additional aspects, such as reciprocity and fairness, into bargaining and cooperation and supports the feasibility of forming a RM alliance. Based on BGT findings, our synthesis provides theoretical and practical insights into how destinations can improve their competitiveness through cooperation in two important RM areas, pricing and demand creation.


Author(s):  
Rocio E Ruelas ◽  
David G Rand ◽  
Richard H Rand

Nonlinear parametric excitation refers to the nonlinear analysis of a system of ordinary differential equations with periodic coefficients. In contrast to linear parametric excitation, which offers determinations of the stability of equilibria, nonlinear parametric excitation has as its goal the structure of the phase space, as given by a portrait of the Poincare map. In this article, perturbation methods and numerical integration are applied to the replicator equation with periodic coefficients, being a model from evolutionary game theory where evolutionary dynamics are added to classical game theory using differential equations. In particular, we study evolution in the Rock–Paper–Scissors game, which has biological and social applications. Here, periodic coefficients could represent seasonal variation.


Author(s):  
Tom R. Burns ◽  
Ewa Roszkowska ◽  
Nora Machado ◽  
Ugo Corte

This article presents two sociological theories, alternatives to classical game theory. These social science-based game theories discussed here present reformulations of classical game theory in applied mathematics (CGT). These theories offer an important advance to classical game theory, thanks to the application of central concepts in sociology and social psychology, as well as the results of empirical analyses of individual and collective behaviour. These two theories emerging in the social sciences are, the first, based on systems theory, is social science game theory (SGT); the other is Erwing Goffman’s interactionist theory (IGT) based on social psychology. Each of these theories, both focused on the analysis of social games, are presented and contrasted with classical game theory, highlighting the centrality of social rules in structuring and regulating human behaviour, and the need to include them in any analysis.


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