scholarly journals Sociological game theory: agency, social structures and interaction processes

Author(s):  
Tom R. Burns ◽  
Ewa Roszkowska ◽  
Nora Machado ◽  
Ugo Corte

This article presents two sociological theories, alternatives to classical game theory. These social science-based game theories discussed here present reformulations of classical game theory in applied mathematics (CGT). These theories offer an important advance to classical game theory, thanks to the application of central concepts in sociology and social psychology, as well as the results of empirical analyses of individual and collective behaviour. These two theories emerging in the social sciences are, the first, based on systems theory, is social science game theory (SGT); the other is Erwing Goffman’s interactionist theory (IGT) based on social psychology. Each of these theories, both focused on the analysis of social games, are presented and contrasted with classical game theory, highlighting the centrality of social rules in structuring and regulating human behaviour, and the need to include them in any analysis.

Author(s):  
John A. Hughes

Within social science the experiment has an ambiguous place. With the possible exception of social psychology, there are few examples of strictly experimental studies. The classic study still often cited is the Hawthorne experiments, which began in 1927, and is used mainly to illustrate what became known as the ‘Hawthorne Effect’, that is, the unintended influence of the research itself on the results of the study. Yet, experimental design is often taken within social research as the embodiment of the scientific method which, if the social sciences are to reach the maturity of the natural sciences, social research should seek to emulate. Meeting this challenge meant trying to devise ways of applying the logic of the experiment to ‘non-experimental’ situations where it was not possible directly to manipulate the experimental conditions. Criticisms have come from two main sources: first, from researchers who claim that the techniques used to control factors within non-experimental situations are unrealizable with current statistical methods and, second, those who reject the very idea of hypothesis-testing as an ambition for social research.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 22-35
Author(s):  
Mubarak S. Al-Mutairi

In game theory, two or more parties need to make decisions with fully or partially conflicting objectives. In situations where reaching a more favourable outcome depends upon cooperation between the two conflicting parties, some of the mental and subjective attitudes of the decision makers must be considered. While the decision to cooperate with others bears some risks due to uncertainty and loss of control, not cooperating means giving up potential benefits. In practice, decisions must be made under risk, uncertainty, and incomplete or fuzzy information. Because it is able to work well with vague, ambiguous, imprecise, noisy or missing information, the fuzzy approach is effective for modeling such multicriteria conflicting situations. The well-known game of Prisoner's Dilemma, which reflects a basic situation in which one must decide whether to cooperate or not with a competitor, is systematically solved using a fuzzy approach. The fuzzy procedure is used to incorporate some of the subjective attitudes of the decision makers that are difficult to model using classical game theory. Furthermore, it permits researchers to consider the subjective attitudes of the decision makers and make better decisions in subjective, uncertain, and risky situations.


1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Akin

A symmetric game consists of a set of pure strategies indexed by {0, …, n} and a real payoff matrix (aij). When two players choose strategies i and j the payoffs are aij and aji to the i-player and j-player respectively. In classical game theory of Von Neumann and Morgenstern [16] the payoffs are measured in units of utility, i.e., desirability, or in units of some desirable good, e.g. money. The problem of game theory is that of a rational player who seeks to choose a strategy or mixture of strategies which will maximize his return. In evolutionary game theory of Maynard Smith and Price [13] we look at large populations of game players. Each player's opponents are selected randomly from the population, and no information about the opponent is available to the player. For each one the choice of strategy is a fixed inherited characteristic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 543-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Wayne Leach ◽  
Aerielle M. Allen

Since the 2012 killing of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin, a string of publicized police killings of unarmed Black men and women has brought sustained attention to the issue of racial bias in the United States. Recent Department of Justice investigations and an expanding set of social science research have added to the empirical evidence that these publicized incidents are emblematic of systemic racism in the application of the law. The Black Lives Matter meme and movement are prominent responses to racism that have animated intense interest and support, especially among African Americans. We summarize recent social science research on Black Lives Matter. As a first step toward understanding the social psychology of the meme and the movement, we apply the dynamic dual-pathway model of protest to Black Lives Matter. Examinations of the dynamics of real-world movements such as Black Lives Matter may enrich psychology conceptually, methodologically, and practically.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 2635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantinos Giannakis ◽  
Georgia Theocharopoulou ◽  
Christos Papalitsas ◽  
Sofia Fanarioti ◽  
Theodore Andronikos

Classical game theory is an important field with a long tradition of useful results. Recently, the quantum versions of classical games, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), have attracted a lot of attention. This game variant can be considered as a specific type of game where the player’s actions and strategies are formed using notions from quantum computation. Similarly, state machines, and specifically finite automata, have also been under constant and thorough study for plenty of reasons. The quantum analogues of these abstract machines, like the quantum finite automata, have been studied extensively. In this work, we examine well-known conditional strategies that have been studied within the framework of the classical repeated PD game. Then, we try to associate these strategies to proper quantum finite automata that receive them as inputs and recognize them with a probability of 1, achieving some interesting results. We also study the quantum version of PD under the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein scheme, proposing a novel conditional strategy for the repeated version of this game.


2017 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Jussim

AbstractIn my Précis of Social Perception and Social Reality (Jussim 2012, henceforth abbreviated as SPSR), I argued that the social science scholarship on social perception and interpersonal expectancies was characterized by a tripartite pattern: (1) Errors, biases, and self-fulfilling prophecies in person perception were generally weak, fragile, and fleeting; (2) Social perceptions were often quite accurate; and (3) Conclusions appearing throughout the social psychology scientific literature routinely overstated the power and pervasiveness of expectancy effects, and ignored evidence of accuracy. Most commentators concurred with the validity of these conclusions. Two, however, strongly disagreed with the conclusion that the evidence consistently has shown that stereotypes are moderately to highly accurate. Several others, while agreeing with most of the specifics, also suggested that those arguments did not necessarily apply to contexts outside of those covered in SPSR. In this response, I consider all these aspects: the limitations to the tripartite pattern, the role of politics and confirmation biases in distorting scientific conclusions, common obstructions to effective scientific self-correction, and how to limit them.


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