scholarly journals A Systematic Reconstruction of Brentano’s Theory of Consciousness

Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Marchesi
Keyword(s):  
Mental Phenomenon ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Identity Reconstruction ◽  
Intentional Structure

AbstractIn recent years, Brentano’s theory of consciousness has been systematically reassessed. The reconstruction that has received the most attention is the so-called identity reconstruction. It says that secondary consciousness and the mental phenomenon it is about are one and the same. Crucially, it has been claimed that this thesis is the only one which can make Brentano’s theory immune to what he considers the main threat to it, namely, the duplication of the primary object. In this paper, I argue that the identity reconstruction is untenable, and I defend an alternative, which I name the unity reconstruction. According to the unity reconstruction, secondary consciousness is a real part of the mental phenomenon it is about, and hence is distinct from it. I contend that this thesis does not in itself lead to the duplication of the primary object, and that what should be blamed is rather a controversial thesis about the intentional structure of secondary consciousness—a thesis which Brentano ultimately abandoned.

Brentano on Awareness and Observation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Textor
Keyword(s):  
Mental Life ◽  
Mental Phenomenon ◽  
Distinctive Character ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Shed Light

When we are aware of our perceiving, we cannot attend to (observe) our perceiving, only the object which we (seem to) perceive. The perceiving is therefore the secondary, the object perceived the primary object. The chapter develops and evaluates Brentano’s grounds for the distinction between the primary and the secondary object. This project is of independent philosophical interest because Brentano’s view promises to shed light on the distinctive character of awareness. Awareness cannot become observation, because mere awareness of a mental phenomenon cannot contrast it with others. I argue further that Brentano’s account of noticing and observation has room for an ‘anatomy of the soul’ that proceeds by noticing the elements of our mental life.

Treatment for Progressive Impairments of Language

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maya Henry
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Treatment ◽  
Primary Progressive Aphasia ◽  
Sentence Production ◽  
Lexical Retrieval ◽  
Functional Communication ◽  
Language Performance ◽  
Communication Techniques ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Behavioral Treatments ◽  
Treatment Research

Abstract Primary progressive aphasia (PPA) is a relatively new diagnostic entity, for which few behavioral treatments have been investigated. Recent work has helped to clarify the nature of distinct PPA variants, including a nonfluent variant (NFV-PPA), a logopenic variant (LV-PPA), and a semantic variant (SV-PPA). This paper reviews treatment research to date in each subtype of PPA, including restitutive, augmentative, and functional approaches. The evidence suggests that restitutive behavioral treatment can result in improved or stabilized language performance within treated domains. Specifically, sentence production and lexical retrieval have been addressed in NFV-PPA, whereas lexical retrieval has been the primary object of treatment in LV and SV-PPA. Use of augmentative communication techniques, as well as implementation of functional communication approaches, also may result in improved communication skills in individuals with PPA. The ideal treatment approach may be one that combines restitutive, augmentative, and functional approaches to treatment, in order to maximize residual cognitive-linguistic skills in patients. Additional research is warranted to determine which modes of treatment are most beneficial in each type of PPA at various stages of severity.

Erfahrung ohne Erfahrenden

2009 ◽  
Vol 2009 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Petr Kouba
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenological Approach ◽  
Work Of Art ◽  
New Beginning ◽  
Individual Structure ◽  
The World ◽  
Il Y A ◽  
Individual Existence ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Intentional Structure

This article examines the limits of Heidegger’s ontological description of emotionality from the period of Sein und Zeit and Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik along the lines outlined by Lévinas in his early work De l’existence à l’existant. On the basis of the Lévinassian concept of “il y a”, we attempt to map the sphere of the impersonal existence situated out of the structured context of the world. However the worldless facticity without individuality marks the limits of the phenomenological approach to human existence and its emotionality, it also opens a new view on the beginning and ending of the individual existence. The whole structure of the individual existence in its contingency and finitude appears here in a new light, which applies also to the temporal conditions of existence. Yet, this is not to say that Heidegger should be simply replaced by Lévinas. As shows an examination of the work of art, to which brings us our reading of Moravia’s literary exposition of boredom (the phenomenon closely examined in Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik), the view on the work of art that is entirely based on the anonymous and worldless facticity of il y a must be extended and complemented by the moment in which a new world and a new individual structure of experience are being born. To comprehend the dynamism of the work of art in its fullness, it is necessary to see it not only as an ending of the world and the correlative intentional structure of the individual existence, but also as their new beginning.

Documenting Contact and Thinking with Skin: A Dermatological Approach to the Study of Police Street Checks

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Anita Lam ◽  
Timothy Bryan
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Racial Disparities ◽  
Lived Experience ◽  
Police Officers ◽  
Qualitative Methodology ◽  
Numerical Data ◽  
Quantitative Studies ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Practice Projects

Abstract In contrast to quantitative studies that rely on numerical data to highlight racial disparities in police street checks, this article offers a qualitative methodology for examining how histories of anti-Blackness configure civilians’ experiences of present-day policing. Taking the Halifax Street Checks Report as our primary object of analysis, we apply an innovative dermatological approach, demonstrating how skin itself becomes meaningful when police officers and civilians make contact in the process of a street check. We explore how street checks become an occasion for epidermalization, whereby a law enforcement practice projects onto the skins of civilians locally specific histories and emotions. To think with skin, we focus on the narratives shared by African Nova Scotians, a group that has been street checked at higher rates than their white counterparts. By doing so, we argue that current debates about police street checks in Halifax must attend to the emotional stakes of police-initiated encounters in order to fully appreciate the lived experience of street checks for Black civilians.

Considerations of Development Issues in Choosing Interventions for Resistance in Music Therapy

1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janice M. Dvorkin
Keyword(s):  
Music Therapy ◽  
Music Therapist ◽  
Primary Object ◽  
Object Experience

It is the focus of this paper to look at the idea of resistance as providing information on the primary object experience. Using this information, the music therapist needs to assess his or her role in playing music during the session, in the same way that he or she assesses verbal interventions.

scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Existential Crisis ◽  
Third Stage ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Pathological Development ◽  
Sense Of Reality ◽  
Intentional Structure

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

scholarly journals Hate: toward a Four-Types Model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Affective States ◽  
Developmental History ◽  
Intentional Structure

AbstractDrawing on insights found in both philosophy and psychology, this paper offers an analysis of hate and distinguishes between its main types. I argue that hate is a sentiment, i.e., a form to regard the other as evil which on certain occasions can be acutely felt. On the basis of this definition, I develop a typology which, unlike the main typologies in philosophy and psychology, does not explain hate in terms of patterns of other affective states. By examining the developmental history and intentional structure of hate, I obtain two variables: the replaceability/irreplaceability of the target and the determinacy/indeterminacy of the focus of concern. The combination of these variables generates the four-types model of hate, according to which hate comes in the following kinds: normative, ideological, retributive, and malicious.

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