scholarly journals When the World Breaks Down: A 3-Stage Existential Model of Nihilism in Schizophrenia

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Philipp Klar ◽  
Georg Northoff

The existential crisis of nihilism in schizophrenia has been reported since the early days of psychiatry. Taking first-person accounts concerning nihilistic experiences of both the self and the world as vantage point, we aim to develop a dynamic existential model of the pathological development of existential nihilism. Since the phenomenology of such a crisis is intrinsically subjective, we especially take the immediate and pre-reflective first-person perspective’s (FPP) experience (instead of objectified symptoms and diagnoses) of schizophrenia into consideration. The hereby developed existential model consists of 3 conceptualized stages that are nested into each other, which defines what we mean by existential. At the same time, the model intrinsically converges with the phenomenological concept of the self-world structure notable inside our existential framework. Regarding the 3 individual stages, we suggest that the onset or first stage of nihilistic pathogenesis is reflected by phenomenological solipsism, that is, a general disruption of the FPP experience. Paradigmatically, this initial disruption contains the well-known crisis of common sense in schizophrenia. The following second stage of epistemological solipsism negatively affects all possible perspectives of experience, that is, the first-, second-, and third-person perspectives of subjectivity. Therefore, within the second stage, solipsism expands from a disruption of immediate and pre-reflective experience (first stage) to a disruption of reflective experience and principal knowledge (second stage), as mirrored in abnormal epistemological limitations of principal knowledge. Finally, the experience of the annihilation of healthy self-consciousness into the ultimate collapse of the individual’s existence defines the third stage. The schizophrenic individual consequently loses her/his vital experience since the intentional structure of consciousness including any sense of reality breaks down. Such a descriptive-interpretative existential model of nihilism in schizophrenia may ultimately serve as input for future psychopathological investigations of nihilism in general, including, for instance, its manifestation in depression.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 167-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
A.P. Novgorodtseva ◽  
N. Yakovleva

The article discusses the problem of the basic factors of ASD: the deficit in the Theory of Mind (ToM) as the ability to represent Self-Other relationship, or violation of the ability to simulate, as the ability to transfer the perspective of Other’s action into the prospect of their own actions. It is hypothesized that the first-person video surveillance technique (with the instructor’s and the student's hands visible) will be more effective in teaching imitation of children with ASD than the third-person video surveillance method (where the instructor and the student are seen). The study involved 28 children attending classes with psychologists and speech pathologists (ages: 4, 10 up to 7, 4 years; 24 children were diagnosed with ASD, 4 – atypical autism). At the first stage, the level of motor simulation skills (ABLLS-R test) was evaluated-3 times with an interval of 1 week. On the second stage, three groups (9 people) were equalized at the level of development of imitation. One group was trained "third-person", the second – "first-person", the third – control was trained according to the standard program. All studied the same time. For each subject conducted 4 classes (2 times a week). At the third stage, the level of motor skills measured 3 times with an interval of 1 week. The processing took into account the parameters of the mean, median, mode and standard deviation. The results of the study showed significant effectiveness of third-person training. The shift of the average value in "third-person training" and "first-person training" was 3 and 8 units respectively.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.


Author(s):  
Lamis Elmy Abdelaaty

What explains state responses to the refugees they receive? This book identifies two puzzling patterns: states open their borders to some refugee groups while blocking others (discrimination), and a number of countries have given the United Nations (UN) control of asylum procedures and refugee camps on their territory (delegation). To explain this selective exercise of sovereignty, the book develops a two-part theoretical framework in which policymakers in refugee-receiving countries weigh international and domestic concerns. Internationally, leaders use refugees to reassure allies and exert pressure on rivals. Domestically, policymakers have incentives to favor those refugee groups with whom they share an ethnic identity. When these international and domestic incentives conflict, shifting responsibility to the UN allows policymakers to placate both refugee-sending countries and domestic constituencies. The book then carries out a “three-stage, multi-level” research design in which each successive step corroborates and elaborates the findings of the preceding stage. The first stage involves statistical analysis of asylum admissions worldwide. The second stage presents two country case studies: Egypt (a country that is broadly representative of most refugee recipients) and Turkey (an outlier that has limited the geographic application of the Refugee Convention). The third stage zooms in on sub- or within-country dynamics in Kenya (home to one of the largest refugee populations in the world) through content analysis of parliamentary proceedings. Studying state responses to refugees is instructive because it can help explain why states sometimes assert, and at other times cede, their sovereignty in the face of refugee rights.


Author(s):  
John H. Lienhard

We come at last to the forbidden first person, the I am. No story is right until the teller is part of it. Yet a peculiar mischief is abroad in the land of science and engineering. It is a mischief born out of the noblest of intentions. For decades it has spread like the flu, far beyond the technical journals that gave it birth. The intention is to let us stand like blindfolded Justice—pure, objective, and aloof. To do this, we write about our work without ever speaking in the first person. We try to let fact speak for itself. Instead of saying, “I solved the equation and got y = log x”, we write, “The solution of the equation is y = log x”. We turn our actions into facts that are untouched by human hands. To some extent we must do that. Our facts should be sufficiently solid that we do not need to prop them up with our desires. Third-person detachment has its place, but my own person is not so easy to erase. Suppose I think another engineer, whom I shall call Hoople, is wrong. I am not objective about Hoople, but I must appear to be. So I write, “It is believed that Hoople is incorrect.” That’s a cheap shot. I express my thoughts without taking responsibility for them. I seem to be reporting general disapproval of Hoople. In the unholy name of objectivity, I make it sound as though the whole profession thinks that Hoople is a fool. Now radio and TV journalists are doing it. I cringe every time I hear, “It is expected that Congress will pass the bill. “Who expects that? The announcer? The Democrats? A government official? Maybe the soy sauce lobby is the expectant source. So instead of objectivity we get obfuscation. If our work really occurred in objective isolation, we could write about it that way. But people are present. They think and they act. If we fail to represent human intervention accurately, we are dishonest, and objectivity becomes meaningless. The things we make tell the world what we are.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Bitbol

Abstract A phenomenological view of contemplative disciplines is presented. However, studying mindfulness by phenomenology is at odds with both neurobiological and anthropological approaches. It involves the first-person standpoint, the openness of being-in-the-world, the umwelt of the meditator, instead of assessing her neural processes and behaviors from a neutral, distanced, third-person standpoint. It then turns out that phenomenology cannot produce a discourse about mindfulness. Phenomenology rather induces a cross-fertilization between the state of mindfulness and its own methods of mental cultivation. A comparison between the epochè, the phenomenological reduction, and the practice of mindfulness, is then undertaken.


2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-446
Author(s):  
Ayelet Even-Ezra

In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul writes: It is doubtless not profitable for me to boast. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord: I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago—whether in the body I do not know, or whether out of the body I do not know, God knows—such a one was caught up to the third heaven. And I know such a man—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows—how he was caught up into Paradise and heard inexpressible words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Of such a one I will boast; yet of myself I will not boast, except in my infirmities. (2 Cor 12:1–5 nkiv) This brief and enigmatic account is caught between multiple dialectics of power and infirmity, pride and humility, unveiling and secrecy. At this point in his letter Paul is turning to a new source of power in order to establish his authority against the crowd of boasting false apostles who populate the previous paragraphs. He wishes to divulge his intimate, occult knowledge of God, but at the same time keep his position as antihero that is prevalent throughout the epistle. These dialectics are enhanced by a sophisticated play of first and third person. The third person denotes the subject who experienced rapture fourteen years ago, while the first person denotes the narrator in the present. Only after several verses does the reader realize that these two are in fact the same person. This alienation allows Paul the intricate play of boasting, for “of such a one I will boast, yet of myself I will not boast.”


Examination of the behaviour of pollen on the style of Raphanus , following compatible and incompatible intraspecific pollinations, has revealed the self-incompatibility system in this species to be composed of at least three stages. The first, on which no information has been obtained in this study, involves the germination of the grain. The second stage concerns the ability of the pollen tube to penetrate the cuticle of the stigmatic papilla. It is possible that cutinase is deficient in incompatible pollen tubes but, in most instances, the outer layers of the stigmatic wall are penetrated. The third stage involves the interaction of substances secreted by the pollen tube with products of the stigmatic cytoplasm. The interaction is swiftly followed by the deposition, in the stigma, of a layered callosic body. This is formed immediately under the point of penetration and takes about 6 h to develop fully. Development of the pollen tube ceases as the first layers of callose are laid down. It is possible that the substances in the pollen responsible for the initiation of the second two stages are held in the tapetally synthesized tryphine, thus accounting for the sporophytic control of pollen compatibility in this species. The mature stigma contains large numbers of crystalline protein bodies, but it is not known whether they play any role in the self-incompatibility system.


Author(s):  
Philippe Bédard

Used as much in extreme-sports videos and professional productions as in amateur and home videos, GoPro wearable cameras have become ubiquitous in contemporary moving image culture. During its swift and ongoing rise in popularity, GoPro has also enabled the creation of new and unusual points of view, among which are “third-person images”. This article introduces and defines this particular phenomenon through an approach that deals with both the aesthetic and technical characteristics of the images in question. An analysis is presented of the peculiar and unfamiliar appearance of third-person images, in which the head of the user remains fixed in space while the world around it moves independently. Technical descriptions are provided to explain why the perception of the world presented in third-person images differs so radically from our own “first-person” mode of perception. Throughout the article, descriptions and analyses of GoPro videos are supported by parallels to theories of movement and perception in the cinema, specifically Vivian Sobchack’s film phenomenology.


Author(s):  
J. P. Telotte

Abstract: Film, Francesco Casetti argues, provided a common “field of convergence for different dimensions” of the popular imagination in the early twentieth century. We can see evidence of the extent of that “convergence” in the sort of discourse that unfolded in various other internal features of the pulps. Editorials, readers’ letters, and film reviews converge to demonstrate a sense of enthusiasm about the ability of films to supplement the work of SF by visualizing or realizing the genre’s ideas for reshaping the world and the self. That enthusiasm would bring repeated calls for the film industry to produce more SF-themed films, even to adapt favorite stories from the pulps. But as reviews of SF films began to proliferate in the pulps, particularly in the late 1930s, they would increasingly attest to a frustration or dissatisfaction with the sense of reality that was being achieved by the SF film and point to a rift beginning between the films and the world of SF literature.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-452 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Verhaeghen ◽  
Shelley N. Aikman ◽  
Susann Doyle-Portillo ◽  
Christopher R. Bell ◽  
Nicole Simmons

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