First-mover advantage in an Internet-enabled market environment: conceptual framework and propositions

Numerous conceptual and empirical studies advance the notion that first movers achieve long-term competitive advantages. These studies purport to demonstrate the presence of a systematic direct relationship between order of entry for products, brands, or businesses and market share. However, an objective assessment of the literature suggests that this view must be qualified. A broadened perspective is presented that highlights the complexity of this phenomenon and suggests that first-mover status may or may not produce sustainable advantages because of a multiplicity of controllable and uncontrollable forces. A conceptual framework identifying factors that underlie first-mover advantage and product-market contingencies that moderate the order of entry-competitive advantage relationship is proffered. Several research propositions relevant for marketing theory and practice are presented.

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First-Mover Advantage: A Synthesis, Conceptual Framework, and Research Propositions

Journal of Marketing ◽

10.2307/1251985 ◽

1992 ◽

Vol 56 (4) ◽

pp. 33 ◽

Cited By ~ 355

Author(s):

Roger A. Kerin ◽

P. Rajan Varadarajan ◽

Robert A. Peterson

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Framework ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

Research Propositions ◽

First Mover

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First-Mover Advantage in the Internet-Enabled Market Environment

Progress in IS - Handbook of Strategic e-Business Management ◽

10.1007/978-3-642-39747-9_7 ◽

2013 ◽

pp. 157-185

Author(s):

Rajan Varadarajan ◽

Manjit S. Yadav ◽

Venkatesh Shankar

Keyword(s):

The Internet ◽

Market Environment ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

First Mover

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Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments

American Political Science Review ◽

10.1017/s000305542000115x ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-16

Author(s):

CHRISTINA M. KINANE

Keyword(s):

Policy Making ◽

Separation Of Powers ◽

Political Control ◽

Presidential Appointments ◽

Capacity To Act ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

First Mover ◽

Legislative Approval

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.

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Strategic Complements with First Mover Advantage

Metroeconomica ◽

10.1111/1467-999x.00053 ◽

1998 ◽

Vol 49 (3) ◽

pp. 284-299 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Reiko Aoki

Keyword(s):

Strategic Complements ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

First Mover

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Boeing and Airbus: Competitive Strategy in the Very-Large-Aircraft Market

Kellogg School of Management Cases ◽

10.1108/case.kellogg.2016.000045 ◽

2017 ◽

pp. 1-16

Author(s):

Nabil Al-Najjar ◽

Ichiro Aoyagi ◽

Guy Goldstein ◽

Ted Korupp ◽

Bin Liu ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Private Information ◽

Competitive Strategy ◽

Natural Monopoly ◽

Development Cost ◽

Strategic Issues ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

Strategic Issue ◽

Winner Takes All ◽

First Mover ◽

Large Aircraft

Boeing and Airbus are contemplating entry into very-large-aircraft (VLA) markets. Both firms are convinced the market cannot support two players due to the extremely high R&D costs and the limited (and highly uncertain) state of demand. The key strategic issue is the uncertainty surrounding Boeing's development cost: to what extent would Boeing's experience with the 747 help it reduce the R&D cost of a new VLA prototype? The main point is that Boeing's strategic moves signal its private information, and that this eliminates any first-mover advantage Boeing might have had in this market.To introduce some of the strategic issues arising in natural monopoly industries in which the winner takes all, and focus on the issues of credible preemption and signaling.

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Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.100.5.2548 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 100 (5) ◽

pp. 2548-2564 ◽

Cited By ~ 112

Author(s):

Jose Apesteguia ◽

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta

Keyword(s):

Natural Experiment ◽

Psychological Effects ◽

Control Groups ◽

Sequential Order ◽

Socioeconomic Outcomes ◽

Competitive Environments ◽

First Mover Advantage ◽

Psychological Pressure ◽

And Control ◽

First Mover

Emotions can have important effects on performance and socioeconomic outcomes. We study a natural experiment where two teams of professionals compete in a tournament taking turns in a sequence. As the sequential order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Hence, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning. Yet, we find a systematic first-mover advantage. Further, professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects and, when given the chance, they rationally react by systematically taking advantage of these effects. (JEL C93, D03, D82, L83)

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