scholarly journals Normative View of Natural Resources—Global Redistribution or Human Rights–Based Approach?

Author(s):  
Petra Gümplová

AbstractThis paper contrasts conceptions of global distributive justice focused on natural resources with human rights–based approach. To emphasize the advantages of the latter, the paper analyzes three areas: (1) the methodology of normative theorizing about natural resources, (2) the category of natural resources, and (3) the view of the system of sovereignty over natural resources. Concerning the first, I argue that global justice conceptions misconstrue the claims made to natural resources and offer conceptions which are practically unfeasible. Concerning the second, I show that contemporary philosophy of justice downplays the plurality of meanings resources have for collectives and argue that conflicts over natural resources can best be accounted for using human rights. Finally, the paper looks at sovereignty over natural resources and argues that rather than dismissing it as unjustifiable on moral grounds, it should be reformed in line with valid principles of international law, most importantly with human rights.

This volume asks a question that is deceptive in its simplicity: Could international law have been otherwise? In other words, what were the past possibilities, if any, for a different law? The search for contingency in international law is often motivated, including in the present volume, by the refusal to accept the present state of affairs and by the hope that recovering possibilities of the past will facilitate a different future. The volume situates the search for contingency theoretically and within many fields of international law, such as human rights and armed conflict, migrants and refugees, the sea and natural resources, and foreign investment and trade. Today there is hardly a serious account that would consider the path of international law to be necessary and that would deny the possibility of a different law altogether. At the same time, however, behind every possibility of the past stands a reason – or reasons – why the law developed as it did. Those who embark in search of contingency soon encounter tensions when they want to recover past possibilities without downplaying patterns of determination and domination. Nevertheless, while warring critical sensibilities may point in different directions, only a keen sense of why things turned out the way they did makes it possible to argue about how they could plausibly have turned out differently.


Author(s):  
Chetail Vincent

This chapter highlights the interface between human rights law and refugee law. The broader evolution of international law reflects the changing pattern of refugee protection as initially grounded in the Refugee Convention and subsequently informed by human rights treaties. As a result of a gradual process of pollination, human rights law has shaped, updated, and enlarged refugee law. While revamping the basic tenets of the Refugee Convention, it has become the normative frame of reference. Refugee law and human rights law are now so interdependent that they are bound to work in tandem. Their intermingling paves the way for a human rights-based approach to refugee protection. Instead of regarding the two branches of international law as silos, this new perspective offers a broader vision of refugee protection. This comprehensive design acknowledges that refugee law and human rights law complement and reinforce each other within one single continuum of protection.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-408
Author(s):  
M. Ya’kub Aiyub Kadir

This article investigates the problem of defining ‘people’ and ‘indigenous people’ under the International Human Rights Covenants and their application in the Indonesian context. Using analyses based on the Third World Approach to International Law (twail), this article shows the problems facing Indonesia in identifying indigenous peoples as traditional peoples, in terms of being isolated peoples (Masyarakat Hukum Adat, hereafter mha), and the non-isolated indigenous peoples who were sovereign before the independence of Indonesia. This interpretation has been confusing in relation to the entitlement to natural resources. Therefore, this article proposes a new understanding of indigenous peoples, in order to arrive at better treatment and recognition and in terms of sharing power and the benefits of natural resources in the Indonesian system.


Author(s):  
Michael Blake

This chapter examines how philosophical concepts of distributive justice ought to be applied at the global level. There has been a great deal of philosophical interest in this topic in recent years, and the field has quickly grown to include some sophisticated analyses of how we might think about global distributive justice. This chapter examines this field, and argues that it must become more sophisticated still in order to adequately deal with the complexities of the global arena. In particular, the article argues that we have reason to examine more precisely the nature of global institutions—what powers they actually have, and what it is that they might plausibly hope to become—as a key focus of our philosophical analysis. The relationship between political and distributive justice, in particular, ought to be made a particular focus in our efforts to understand the nature of global justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-629
Author(s):  
Peter Sutch

AbstractThis article explores the practical approach to global justice advocated by the cosmopolitan political theorists Pogge, Beitz and Buchanan. Using a comparative exposition it outlines their reliance on international law and on human rights law in particular. The essay explores the neo-Kantian influence on the practical approach and offers an original critique of this trend in contemporary international political theory.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Alexandru Volacu ◽  
Iris-Patricia Golopenta

In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Filipa Vrdoljak

Abstract:Indigenous peoples’ emphasis on protecting their cultural heritage (including land) through a human rights-based approach reveals the synergies and conflicts between the World Heritage Convention and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). This article focuses on how their insistence on the right to participate effectively in decision-making and centrality of free, prior, and informed consent as defined in the UNDRIP exposes the limitations of existing United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and World Heritage Convention processes effecting Indigenous peoples, cultures, and territories and how these shortcomings can be addressed. By tracking the evolution of the UNDRIP and the World Heritage Convention from their drafting and adoption to their implementation, it examines how the realization of Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination concerning cultural heritage is challenging international law to become more internally consistent in its interpretation and application and international organizations to operate in accordance with their constitutive instruments.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 169-181
Author(s):  
William A. Edmundson ◽  
Matthew R. Schrepfer

AbstractDebates about global distributive justice focus on the gulf between the wealthy North and the impoverished South, rather than on issues arising between liberal democracies. A review of John Rawls’s approach to international justice discloses a step Rawls skipped in his extension of his original-position procedure. The skipped step is where a need for the distributional autonomy of sovereign liberal states reveals itself. Neoliberalism denies the possibility and the desirability of distributional autonomy. A complete Rawlsian account of global justice shows the necessity and possibility of a charter between liberal states, assuring each a proper minimum degree of distributional autonomy


2005 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 139-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Fabre

A good deal of political theory over the last fifteen years or so has been shaped by the realization that one cannot, and ought not, consider the distribution of resources within a country in isolation from the distribution of resources between countries. Thus, thinkers such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge advocate extensive global distributive policies; others, such as Charles Jones and David Miller, explicitly reject the view that egalitarian principles of justice should apply globally and claim that national communities have only duties to help other countries be viable economically and meet the basic needs of their members. In the global justice debate, pretty much all parties acknowledge that we have obligations of distributive justice to for-eigners. The question is how strong those obligations are, and in particular whether national boundaries can make any difference to the distribution of resources between members of different countries.


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