How strong is the argument from inductive risk?

Tobias Henschen

doi:10.1007/s13194-021-00409-x

How strong is the argument from inductive risk?

European Journal for Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1007/s13194-021-00409-x ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (3) ◽

Author(s):

Tobias Henschen

Keyword(s):

Value Judgments ◽

Inductive Risk

AbstractThe argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its conclusion (especially Douglas and Wilholt) fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to (and not to accept or reject) hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe.

Download Full-text

Exploring Inductive Risk

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467715.003.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Kevin C. Elliott ◽

Ted Richards

Keyword(s):

Scientific Practice ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Fourth Section ◽

Inductive Risk ◽

The Third ◽

Decision Points ◽

Broad Array ◽

History Of

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the book Exploring Inductive Risk. It introduces the concept of inductive risk, briefly traces the history of the argument from inductive risk, and sets out the book’s chapters in terms of four themes. The first part, “Weighing Inductive Risk,” illustrates the concept of inductive risk and the judgments involved in weighing different sorts of errors. The chapters in the second part, “Evading Inductive Risk,” examine proposals by critics who argue that the value judgments associated with inductive risk should be made by citizens and policymakers, not by scientists. The third section, “The Breadth of Inductive Risk,” illustrates the wide variety of decision points throughout scientific practice where considerations of inductive risk are relevant. The book’s fourth section, “Exploring the Limits of Inductive Risk,” considers whether it still makes sense to apply the label of inductive risk to such a broad array of phenomena.

Download Full-text

Simulation models and probabilities: a Bayesian defense of the value-free ideal

SIMULATION ◽

10.1177/00375497211028815 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 003754972110288

Author(s):

Alejandro Cassini

Keyword(s):

Bayesian Methods ◽

Climate Models ◽

Social Values ◽

Simulation Models ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Inductive Risk ◽

Complex Simulation ◽

Epistemic Opacity ◽

Value Free Ideal

Some philosophers of science have recently argued that the epistemic assessment of complex simulation models, such as climate models, cannot be free of the influence of social values. In their view, the assignment of probabilities to the different hypotheses or predictions that result from simulations presupposes some methodological decisions that rest on value judgments. In this article, I criticize this claim and put forward a Bayesian response to the arguments from inductive risk according to which the influence of social values on the calculation of probabilities is negligible. I conclude that the epistemic opacity of complex simulations, such as climate models, does not preclude the application of Bayesian methods.

Download Full-text

Values and inductive risk in machine learning modelling: the case of binary classification models

European Journal for Philosophy of Science ◽

10.1007/s13194-021-00405-1 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 11 (4) ◽

Author(s):

Koray Karaca

Keyword(s):

Machine Learning ◽

Social Values ◽

Binary Classification ◽

Social Value ◽

Classification Models ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Philosophical Debate ◽

Inductive Risk ◽

The Social ◽

Error Costs

AbstractI examine the construction and evaluation of machine learning (ML) binary classification models. These models are increasingly used for societal applications such as classifying patients into two categories according to the presence or absence of a certain disease like cancer and heart disease. I argue that the construction of ML (binary) classification models involves an optimisation process aiming at the minimization of the inductive risk associated with the intended uses of these models. I also argue that the construction of these models is underdetermined by the available data, and that this makes it necessary for ML modellers to make social value judgments in determining the error costs (associated with misclassifications) used in ML optimization. I thus suggest that the assessment of the inductive risk with respect to the social values of the intended users is an integral part of the construction and evaluation of ML classification models. I also discuss the implications of this conclusion for the philosophical debate concerning inductive risk.

Download Full-text

Decisions, Decisions

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190467715.003.0003 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Kent W. Staley

Keyword(s):

Higgs Boson ◽

Scientific Inquiry ◽

High Energy Physics ◽

High Energy ◽

Decision Problems ◽

Pragmatic Approach ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Inductive Risk ◽

Energy Physics

Much of the discussion of the argument from inductive risk (AIR) centers on scientific research that has relevance to policymaking. To emphasize that inductive risk pervades science, this chapter discusses the AIR in the context of high energy physics: specifically, the discovery of the Higgs boson, a scientific finding that is irrelevant to policy. The applicability of the AIR for the case of the Higgs boson is established through a pragmatic approach to scientific inquiry, emphasizing the centrality of practical decision problems to the production of scientific knowledge. This approach, drawing on debates among pragmatists over the interpretation of statistical inference, eschews the classification of value judgments into epistemic and non-epistemic.

Download Full-text

Determinants of Abuse of the Bodies of the Dead

Rossijskoe Pravo. Obrazovanie, Praktika, Nauka ◽

10.34076/2410-2709-2019-4-71-77 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 71-77

Author(s):

Margarita Khomyakova

Keyword(s):

Low Income ◽

Criminal Code ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Legal Norms ◽

Low Level ◽

Medical Institutions ◽

Specific Object ◽

The Subject ◽

The Dead ◽

High Level

The author analyzes definitions of the concepts of determinants of crime given by various scientists and offers her definition. In this study, determinants of crime are understood as a set of its causes, the circumstances that contribute committing them, as well as the dynamics of crime. It is noted that the Russian legislator in Article 244 of the Criminal Code defines the object of this criminal assault as public morality. Despite the use of evaluative concepts both in the disposition of this norm and in determining the specific object of a given crime, the position of criminologists is unequivocal: crimes of this kind are immoral and are in irreconcilable conflict with generally accepted moral and legal norms. In the paper, some views are considered with regard to making value judgments which could hardly apply to legal norms. According to the author, the reasons for abuse of the bodies of the dead include economic problems of the subject of a crime, a low level of culture and legal awareness; this list is not exhaustive. The main circumstances that contribute committing abuse of the bodies of the dead and their burial places are the following: low income and unemployment, low level of criminological prevention, poor maintenance and protection of medical institutions and cemeteries due to underperformance of state and municipal bodies. The list of circumstances is also open-ended. Due to some factors, including a high level of latency, it is not possible to reflect the dynamics of such crimes objectively. At the same time, identification of the determinants of abuse of the bodies of the dead will reduce the number of such crimes.

Download Full-text

Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions

10.1093/oso/9780190683450.003.0006 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Dana Kay Nelkin ◽

Samuel C. Rickless

Keyword(s):

Moral Responsibility ◽

Common Sense ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Moral Significance ◽

Common Sense Morality ◽

And Control

Unwitting omissions pose a challenge for theories of moral responsibility. For common-sense morality holds many unwitting omitters morally responsible for their omissions, even though they appear to lack both awareness and control. People who leave dogs in their car on a hot day or forget to pick something up from the store as they promised seem to be blameworthy. If moral responsibility requires awareness of one’s omission and its moral significance, it appears that the protagonists of these cases are not morally responsible. This chapter considers and rejects a number of influential views on this problem, including a view that grounds responsibility for such omissions in previous exercises of conscious agency, and “Attributionist” views that ground responsibility for such omissions in the value judgments or other aspects of the agents’ selves. The chapter proposes a new tracing view that grounds responsibility for unwitting omissions in past opportunities to avoid them.

Download Full-text

Cultural Imperialism and the Assessment of Creative Work

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical and Qualitative Assessment in Music Education ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190265182.013.13 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 275-297

Author(s):

Juniper Hill

Keyword(s):

Culturally Diverse ◽

Social Inequalities ◽

Music Educators ◽

Cultural Imperialism ◽

Creative Work ◽

Value Judgments ◽

Creative Development ◽

Cultural Importance ◽

Diverse Learning ◽

Work Strategies

Assessing creative work is often challenging, even more so in culturally diverse learning environments, in which students and educators may not hold the same musical values. An instructor aiming to teach proficiency within a specific style may unintentionally give feedback that devalues a student’s personal creative expressions, which in many cases reflect diverse musical heritages. Such devaluing feedback can inhibit individual creative development, stifle innovation, and perpetuate sociocultural power imbalances. In this chapter examples from jazz, classical, and traditional musicians in Cape Town and Helsinki illustrate how and why idiomatic boundaries are enforced, how musical value judgments can perpetuate social inequalities, and how negative feedback can inhibit individual creative development. The chapter emphasizes the personal, social, and cultural importance of embracing musical diversity and the value of permitting and supporting developing musicians to go beyond idiomatic conventions in their creative work. Strategies are discussed for how music educators might better support individual creative development and social justice.

Download Full-text