THE ROLE OF PROBABILISTIC AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING IN COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL INFERENCE

Author(s):  
Robert S. Wyer
1988 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Fuchs ◽  
Thomas Goschke ◽  
Dietmar Gude

2002 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan A. García-Madruga ◽  
Francisco Gutiérrez ◽  
Nuria Carriedo ◽  
Sergio Moreno ◽  
Philip N. Johnson-Laird

We report research investigating the role of mental models in deduction. The first study deals with conjunctive inferences (from one conjunction and two conditional premises) and disjunctive inferences (from one disjunction and the same two conditionals). The second study examines reasoning from multiple conditionals such as: If e then b; If a then b; If b then c; What follows between a and c? The third study addresses reasoning from different sorts of conditional assertions, including conditionals based on if then, only if, and unless. The paper also presents research on figural effects in syllogistic reasoning, on the effects of structure and believability in reasoning from double conditionals, and on reasoning from factual, counterfactual, and semifactual conditionals. The findings of these studies support the model theory, pose some difficulties for rule theories, and show the influence on reasoning of the linguistic structure and the semantic content of problems.


Author(s):  
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans ◽  
Simon J. Handley ◽  
Alison M. Bacon

In this study, we examine the role of beliefs in conditional inference in two experiments, demonstrating a robust tendency for people to make fewer inferences from statements they disbelieve, regardless of logical validity. The main purpose of this study was to test whether participants are able to inhibit this belief effect where it constitutes a bias. This is the case when participants are specifically instructed to assume the truth of the premises. However, Experiment 1 showed that the effect is no less marked than when this instruction is given, than when it is not, although higher ability participants did show slightly less influence of belief (Experiment 2). Contrary to the findings with syllogistic reasoning, use of speeded tasks had no effect on the extent of the belief bias (both experiments), although it did considerably reduce the numbers of inferences that were drawn overall. These findings suggest that the belief bias in conditional inference is less open to volitional control than that associated with syllogistic reasoning.


Author(s):  
Αντωνία Χατζηευφραιμίδου ◽  
Δέσποινα Μωραΐτου ◽  
Γεωργία Παπαντωνίου ◽  
Έλενα Ναζλίδου ◽  
Κρυσταλλία Πάντσιου

Η παρούσα έρευνα αποσκοπούσε να εξετάσει τη σχέση ηλικίας - κοινωνικής νόησης.<br />Το δείγμα αποτελούνταν από 72 άτομα, ηλικίας 20 ως 82 ετών, κατανεμημένα σε<br />τρεις ομάδες ηλικίας: τους «Νέους Ενήλικες» (Μ.Ο. = 25 έτη, Τ.Α. = 3.7 έτη), τους<br />«Μεσήλικες» (Μ.Ο. = 51.2 έτη, Τ.Α. = 7.5 έτη) και τους «Ηλικιωμένους» (Μ.Ο. =<br />72.1 έτη, Τ.Α. = 4.9 έτη). Οι τρεις ομάδες ήταν εξισωμένες ως προς το φύλο και το<br />μορφωτικό επίπεδο. Στους συμμετέχοντες χορηγήθηκε η Δοκιμασία Κοινωνικού<br />Συμπερασμού (Απλός) [ΔΚΣ(Α). Social Inference (Minimal) – SI(M): Part 2 of the<br />ΤΑSIT, McDonald, Flanagan,Rollins &amp; Kinch, 2003], η οποία εξετάζει εάν ο<br />συμμετέχοντας κατανοεί το σαρκασμό και μπορεί να τον διακρίνει από την<br />ειλικρίνεια. Στην ομάδα των ηλικιωμένων χορηγήθηκαν επιπλέον η Δοκιμασία<br />Σύντομης Γνωστικής Εκτίμησης (ΔΣΓΕ, Mini Mental State Examination, MMSE,<br />Folstein, Folstein, &amp; McHugh, 1975, προσαρμογή στον ελληνικό πληθυσμό:<br />Fountoulakis, Tsolaki, Chatzi &amp; Kazis, 2000) και η Γηριατρική Κλίμακα<br />Κατάθλιψης-15 (ΓΚΚ-15, Geriatric Depression Scale–15, GDS-15, Yesavage, et al.,<br />1982-1983, προσαρμογή στον ελληνικό πληθυσμό: Fountoulakis, Tsolaki, Iacovides,<br />et al., 1999). Τα αποτελέσματα για τους ηλικιωμένους έδειξαν ότι όσο πιο χαμηλή η<br />βαθμολογία στη ΔΣΓΕ και όσο πιο υψηλή στη ΓΚΚ-15, τόσο χαμηλότερη η επίδοση<br />στη ΔΚΣ(Α). Για το σύνολο του δείγματος, τα αποτελέσματα έδειξαν πως η ηλικία<br />2<br />συνδέεται αρνητικά με την ικανότητα κατανόησης του σαρκασμού και η αυτο-<br />αναφερόμενη υπερχοληστεριναιμία αποτελεί επιβαρυντικό παράγοντα στην<br />παραπάνω σχέση.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Ziaei ◽  
Mohammad Reza Bonyadi ◽  
David C. Reutens

AbstractReasoning requires initial encoding of the semantic association between premises or assumptions, retrieval of these semantic associations from memory, and recombination of information to draw a logical conclusion. Currently-held beliefs can interfere with the content of the assumptions if not congruent and inhibited. This study aimed to investigate the role of the hippocampus and hippocampal networks during logical reasoning tasks in which the congruence between currently-held beliefs and assumptions varies. Participants of younger and older age completed a series of syllogistic reasoning tasks in which two premises and one conclusion were presented and they were required to decide if the conclusion logically followed the premises. The belief load of premises was manipulated to be either congruent or incongruent with currently-held beliefs. Our whole-brain results showed that older adults recruited the hippocampus during the premise integration stage more than their younger counterparts. Functional connectivity using a hippocampal seed revealed that older, but not younger, adults recruited a hippocampal network that included anterior cingulate and inferior frontal regions when premises were believable. Importantly, this network contributed to better performance in believable inferences, only in older adults group. Further analyses suggested that, in older adults group, the integrity of the left cingulum bundle was associated with the higher correct rejection of believable premises more than unbelievable ones. Using multimodal imaging, this study highlights the importance of the hippocampus during premise integration and supports the compensatory role of the hippocampal network during a logical reasoning task among older adults.


Author(s):  
Mariana von Mohr ◽  
Aikaterini Fotopoulou

Pain and pleasant touch have been recently classified as interoceptive modalities. This reclassification lies at the heart of long-standing debates questioning whether these modalities should be defined as sensations on their basis of neurophysiological specificity at the periphery or as homeostatic emotions on the basis of top-down convergence and modulation at the spinal and brain levels. Here, we outline the literature on the peripheral and central neurophysiology of pain and pleasant touch. We next recast this literature within a recent Bayesian predictive coding framework, namely active inference. This recasting puts forward a unifying model of bottom-up and top-down determinants of pain and pleasant touch and the role of social factors in modulating the salience of peripheral signals reaching the brain.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 446-459
Author(s):  
Nicolas Riesterer ◽  
Daniel Brand ◽  
Hannah Dames ◽  
Marco Ragni

2010 ◽  
Vol 121 ◽  
pp. S224-S225
Author(s):  
T. Tsujii ◽  
S. Masuda ◽  
K. Sakatani ◽  
T. Akiyama ◽  
S. Watanabe

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (8) ◽  
pp. 1372-1382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy R. Koscik ◽  
Daniel Tranel

People tend to assume that outcomes are caused by dispositional factors, for example, a person's constitution or personality, even when the actual cause is due to situational factors, for example, luck or coincidence. This is known as the “correspondence bias.” This tendency can lead normal, intelligent persons to make suboptimal decisions. Here, we used a neuropsychological approach to investigate the neural basis of the correspondence bias, by studying economic decision-making in patients with damage to the ventromedial pFC (vmPFC). Given the role of the vmPFC in social cognition, we predicted that vmPFC is necessary for the normal correspondence bias. In our experiment, consistent with expectations, healthy (n = 46) and brain-damaged (n = 30) comparison participants displayed the correspondence bias during economic decision-making and invested no differently when given dispositional or situational information. By contrast, vmPFC patients (n = 17) displayed a lack of correspondence bias and invested more when given dispositional than situational information. The results support the conclusion that vmPFC is critical for normal social inference and the correspondence bias. The findings help clarify the important (and sometimes disadvantageous) role of social inference in economic decision-making.


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