Sector-Specific Market Power Regulation versus General Competition Law

2006 ◽  
pp. 49-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Knieps
Author(s):  
Okeoghene Odudu

This chapter investigates how, within a number of European Union (EU) Member States, competition law has been used to address problems of market power in the healthcare services sector. It summarizes the relevant EU and national competition laws and considers the experience of applying those laws to providers of healthcare services. The chapter is chiefly concerned with healthcare services in England, although examples are drawn for other EU Member States. Examination of the English experience provides a view of the use of competition law to address market power problems in most elements of the health system matrix. The chapter then considers three challenges that emerge from that experience of using competition law to address problems of market power in healthcare service markets. The first challenges the applicability of competition law to healthcare service providers operating in each or every element of the healthcare system matrix. The second, accepting applicability, questions the appropriateness of the substantive rules to healthcare services. The third, a battle of authority and autonomy, considers whether decisions made by healthcare service providers should be subject to external review and the type of review that competition law offers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-67
Author(s):  
Hottua Manalu

This article discusses about corporation action notification on the competition law perspective. Corporation action notification is a notification obligations by the business actor to the Business Competition Supervisory Commision about corporation action in the form of incorporation, fusion, or company share acquition that caused asset value or sales value is ecxceed specific value. This article concluded that notification is an important instrument to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because a corporation action has an influence towards business competition, that can increase market concentration and this can make a product price more higher and business actor’s market power become bigger so that can threatening small business actor. However, the notification nowadays applied in Indonesia is notification to the commission after the corporation action has been done, or as known as post-notification, actually is not effective to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because of the notification is delivered after the corporation action has been done, so that in case the Commission assess that the corporation action is causing monopolistic practices and unfair competition then the revocation is complicated. Therefore, this article is encouraging notification to be done before corporation action is started, as known as pra-notification, so monopolistic  practices and unfair competition possibility can be detected earlier and can be prevented. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas notifikasi aksi korporasi dalam perspektif hukum persaingan usaha. Notifikasi aksi korporasi adalah kewajiban pemberitahuan oleh pelaku usaha kepada Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha atas aksi korporasi baik dalam bentuk penggabungan, peleburan, maupun pengambilalihan saham perseroan yang berakibat nilai aset dan atau nilai penjualannya melebihi jumlah tertentu. Artikel ini menyimpulkan, notifikasi merupakan instrumen penting dalam mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan aksi korporasi berpengaruh terhadap persaingan usaha, yaitu menyebabkan bertambahnya konsentrasi pasar yang dapat menyebabkan harga produk semakin tinggi dan kekuatan pasar pelaku usaha menjadi semakin besar sehingga dapat mengancam pebisnis kecil. Namun demikian, notifikasi yang saat ini berlaku di Indonesia, yaitu pemberitahuan kepada Komisi setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, atau yang dikenali dengan post-notifikasi, sesungguhnya tidak efektif mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan notifikasi disampaikan setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, sehingga dalam hal Komisi menilai aksi korporasi menyebabkan praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat maka pembatalan jelas mengalami kerumitan. Oleh karenanya, artikel ini mendorong notifikasi dilakukan sebelum aksi korporasi dilakukan, yang disebut dengan pra-notifikasi, agar kemungkinan terjadinya praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat diketahui sejak dini dan dapat dicegah.


Author(s):  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Layne-Farrar Anne ◽  
Petit Nicolas

This chapter describes the leading schools of thought in regards to competition economics as they have evolved over the years. Classical and neoclassical economists were the first to focus on competition issues. The classical economists saw competition as a behavioural process. Meanwhile, with the neoclassical economists came a structural interpretation of competition. Immediately after the Second World War, competition economics became more normative. The chapter then looks at the methodological aspects of competition economics or, more concretely, the instruments and concepts on which competition economics rely. The main focus of study of competition economics is ‘market power’. Indeed, EU competition rules today are based, if not wholly at least mainly, on the concept of market power. Market power can enable behaviours with pernicious effects on economic efficiency. Thus, economists have designed instruments to help authorities, courts, and undertakings to identify and measure market power and its possible abuses.


2021 ◽  
pp. 717-778
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter assesses the EU competition law on private undertakings. The relevant Treaty section is here built upon three pillars. The first pillar deals with anticompetitive cartels and can be found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The second pillar concerns situations where a dominant undertaking abuses its market power and is found in Article 102. The third pillar is unfortunately invisible, for when the Treaties were concluded, they did not mention the control of mergers. This constitutional gap has never been closed by later Treaty amendments, yet it has received a legislative filling in the form of the EU Merger Regulation.


Author(s):  
Muchlinski Peter T

This chapter studies competition law (antitrust law in US terminology), which protects competition to maximize consumer welfare. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) may use their market power to distort competitive conditions. Unlike purely domestic firms, MNEs can do this in a transnational context. Therefore, regulating MNE competition involves not only substantive rules but also jurisdictional questions which have led to extraterritoriality conflicts. The chapter then examines the competition issues arising from the market power of MNEs operating global networks of production and distribution in often concentrated markets. It also assesses whether competition law should control MNE entry and establishment to preserve the national economy from harmful foreign competition, involving issues of industrial policy and national security. Moreover, MNE operations challenge the hitherto predominantly national approach to competition regulation. To date, there has been little progress towards global competition rules, but it remains a worthwhile question, especially in the context of sustainable development, which has been introduced into competition policy debates in recent years.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.


EU Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1126-1162
Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter focuses on another principal provision concerned with competition policy: Article 102 TFEU. The essence of Article 102 is the control of market power, whether by a single firm or, subject to certain conditions, a number of firms. Monopoly power can lead to higher prices and lower output than would prevail under more normal competitive conditions, and this is the core rationale for legal regulation in this area. Article 102 does not, however, prohibit market power per se. It proscribes the abuse of market power. Firms are encouraged to compete, with the most efficient players being successful. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit. EU law


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 27-46
Author(s):  
Afroza Bilkis ◽  
Supravat Halder

When a dominant company exploits its market power and that harms fair competition in the marketplace, average consumers remain in the most vulnerable condition having vital influence on but no active participation in the functioning of the market. The actions of a business that has market power can have serious effects on the operation of a market. An undertaking in a dominant position may use its market power in several ways, the most common being exploiting consumers by artificial scarcity and increasing prices. Moreover, there may be diverse interpretation as to the nature of an undertaking while considering market power abuse cases for the purposes of European Union (EU) Competition law. It is significant to consider the status of consumers in a market to see if dominant entities are abusing their powers and therefore test the level of commercialization.Northern University Journal of Law Vol.IV 2013; p.27-46


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