I see into your mind too well: Working memory adjusts the probability judgment of others' mental states

2011 ◽  
Vol 138 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yukio Maehara ◽  
Satoru Saito
2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.


Author(s):  
Edith Theresa Gabriel ◽  
Raphaela Oberger ◽  
Michaela Schmoeger ◽  
Matthias Deckert ◽  
Stefanie Vockh ◽  
...  

Abstract Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to represent and attribute mental states to oneself and others. So far, research regarding ToM processing across adolescence is scarce. Existing studies either yield inconsistent results or did not or not thoroughly investigate aspects like higher order ToM and associated neuropsychological variables which the current study tried to address. 643 typically developing early, middle, and late adolescents (age groups 13–14; 15–16; 17–18) performed cognitive and affective ToM tasks as well as neuropsychological tasks tapping the cognitive or affective domain. Regarding both ToM types, 15- to 16-year-olds and 17- to 18-year-olds outperformed 13- to 14-year-olds, whereas females were superior regarding cognitive ToM. Across adolescence, cognitive and affective ToM correlated with attention and affective intelligence, whereas working memory, language comprehension, and figural intelligence additionally correlated with cognitive ToM. In early adolescence, attention correlated with both ToM types, whereas cognitive ToM further correlated with language comprehension and affective ToM with verbal intelligence, verbal fluency, and verbal flexibility. In middle and late adolescence, affective intelligence correlated with both ToM types, whereas cognitive ToM additionally correlated with working memory, language comprehension, and figural intelligence. The current study shows a developmental step regarding cognitive and affective ToM in middle adolescence as well as gender differences in cognitive ToM processing. Associations between neuropsychological variables and ToM processing were shown across adolescence and within age groups. Results give new insights into social cognition in adolescence and are well supported by neuroscientific and neurobiological studies regarding ToM and the integration of cognitive and affective processes. Graphic abstract


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. J. Wolff ◽  
J. Jochim ◽  
E. G. Akyürek ◽  
T. J. Buschman ◽  
M. G. Stokes

AbstractWorking memory (WM) is important to maintain information over short time periods to provide some stability in a constantly changing environment. However, brain activity is inherently dynamic, raising a challenge for maintaining stable mental states. To investigate the relationship between WM stability and neural dynamics, we used electroencephalography to measure the neural response to impulse stimuli during a WM delay. Multivariate pattern analysis revealed representations were both stable and dynamic: there was a clear difference in neural states between time-specific impulse responses, reflecting dynamic changes, yet the coding scheme for memorized orientations was stable. This suggests that a stable subcomponent in WM enables stable maintenance within a dynamic system. A stable coding scheme simplifies readout for WM-guided behaviour, whereas the low-dimensional dynamic component could provide additional temporal information. Despite having a stable subspace, WM is clearly not perfect – memory performance still degrades over time. Indeed, we find that even within the stable coding scheme, memories drift during maintenance. When averaged across trials, such drift contributes to the width of the error distribution.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meghan L. Meyer ◽  
Eleanor Collier

AbstractWe often interact with multiple people at a time and consider their various points-of-view to facilitate smooth social interaction. Yet, how our brains track multiple mental states at once, and whether skill in this domain links to navigating real-world social interactions, remains underspecified. To fill this gap, we developed a novel social working memory paradigm in which participants manage two- or four-people’s mental states in working memory, as well as control trials in which they alphabetize two- or four-people’s names in working memory. In Study 1, we found that the dorsomedial subsystem of the default network shows relative increases in activity with more mental states managed in working memory. In contrast, this subsystem shows relative decreases in activity with more non-mental state information (the number of names alphabetized) managed in working memory. In Study 2, only individual differences in managing mental states in working memory, specifically on trials that posed the greatest mental state load to working memory, correlated with social network integration. Collectively, these findings add further support to the hypothesis that social working memory relies on partially distinct brain systems and may be a key ingredient to success in a social world.


2019 ◽  
pp. 29-51
Author(s):  
Peter Carruthers

If animals lack mental states altogether then of course they can’t be capable of phenomenal consciousness, either. And even assuming that they have mental states, it would be natural to think that much might turn on just how sophisticated the minds of various species of animal are, and on the extent of the discontinuities between human and animal minds. The present chapter argues against strong discontinuity views. It also considers evidence of working memory, planning, self-control, metacognition, and language in animals, which are especially relevant to later discussions. I argue that there is significant and widespread support for the first three, but little evidence supporting metacognition or language.


Erkenntnis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephens ◽  
Trond A. Tjøstheim

Abstract Hilary Kornblith argues that many traditional philosophical accounts involve problematic views of reflection (understood as second-order mental states). According to Kornblith, reflection does not add reliability, which makes it unfit to underlie a separate form of knowledge. We show that a broader understanding of reflection, encompassing Type 2 processes, working memory, and episodic long-term memory, can provide philosophy with elucidating input that a restricted view misses. We further argue that reflection in fact often does add reliability, through generalizability, flexibility, and creativity that is helpful in newly encountered situations, even if the restricted sense of both reflection and knowledge is accepted. And so, a division of knowledge into one reflexive (animal) form and one reflective form remains a plausible, and possibly fruitful, option.


Author(s):  
Rocío Lavigne ◽  
Antonia González-Cuenca ◽  
Marta Romero-González ◽  
Marta Sánchez

The aim of this study was to investigate the relationships between Theory of Mind (ToM), Working Memory (WM), and Verbal Comprehension (VC). Performance of these variables was evaluated in 44 elementary students (6–12 years) diagnosed with ADHD. Their performance in all variables was collected through the Neuropsychological Battery (NEPSY-II) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children IV. The results showed that fifty percent of the participants were below the 25th percentile in ToM and that this low performance was not related to age. In addition, analyses showed statistically significant relationships between WM, VC, and ToM. Analysis of the effect of WM and VC on ToM showed that only WM explained the variance in participant performance in ToM. These results led us to raise the need to include ToM among the skills to be stimulated in programs for the treatment of ADHD, accompanying other skills related to social adaptation that are usually included in such programs. Likewise, considering that ToM implies putting into practice skills such as considering different points of view, attending to relevant aspects of the context, making decisions, inferring mental states, and predicting behaviors, we believe that through the stimulation of ToM, WM would also be stimulated.


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