Coordinating a Closed Loop Supply Chain with Fairness Concern by a Constant Wholesale Price Contract

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Sarkar ◽  
Shrey Bhala
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Fairness Concern

scholarly journals An Efficient Approach for Coordination of Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Management

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 3433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Arshad ◽  
Qazi Khalid ◽  
Jaime Lloret ◽  
Antonio Leon
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain composed of dual-channel retailers and manufacturers, a dynamic game model under the direct recovery, and an entrusted third-party recycling mode of the manufacturer is constructed. The impact of horizontal fairness concern behavior is introduced on the pricing strategies and utility of decision makers under different recycling models. The equilibrium strategy at fair neutrality is used as a reference to compare offline retails sales. Research shows that in the closed-loop supply chain of dual-channel sales, whether in the case of fair neutrality or horizontal fairness concerns, the manufacturer’s direct recycling model is superior to the entrusted third-party recycling, and the third-party recycling model is transferred by the manufacturer. In the direct recycling model, the horizontal fairness concern of offline retailers makes two retailers in the positive supply chain compete to lower the retail price in order to increase market share. Manufacturers will lower the wholesale price to encourage competition, and the price will be the horizontal fairness concern coefficient, which is negatively correlated. In the reverse supply chain, manufacturers increase the recycling rate of used products. This pricing strategy increases the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system compared to fair neutral conditions, while two retailers receive diminished returns. Manufacturers, as channel managers to encourage retailers to compete for price cuts, can be coordinated through a three-way revenue sharing contract to achieve Pareto optimality.

scholarly journals Game Analysis and Coordination of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Components Reuse Strategy

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (22) ◽  
pp. 9681
Author(s):  
Xiaomin Zhao ◽  
Xueli Bai ◽  
Zhihui Fan ◽  
Ting Liu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Elasticity ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Game Analysis

This paper studies a closed-loop supply chain that covers three key members: Manufacturer, new components supplier, and recycled-components supplier. Considering the power of each member in the chain, we use game theory to analyze the optimal decision and coordination, particularly investigating the economic value of components reuse strategy. The results show that, in a decentralized setting, the value of components reuse highly depends on the attributes of the products. For the products with low price elasticity, reuse strategy is only beneficial to the recycled-components suppliers. Further investigation shows the manufacturer can use wholesale price contracts to coordinate and improve the supply chain’s performance.

scholarly journals Emergency Strategies of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Single Retailer Recycling under Demand Disruptions

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Lingyuan Wang ◽  
Xihui Chen ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
Emergency Decision

The uncertainty caused by emergencies will influence the normal operation of the supply chain. Considering demand disruptions, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two competing retailers based on decentralized decision-making is considered. In the supply chain, one retailer recovers end-of-life products while the other does not. Analytic results show that, when the disturbance of demand occurs, the manufacturer and retailers adjust the wholesale price and retail prices of products according to the direction of the market demand disruptions. Under demand disruptions, the retailer who participates in recovering can gain more profits, especially in the case of the positive disruption. Theoretic and pragmatic references for the emergency decision-making of closed-loop supply chain enterprises are provided.

Price Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with and without Competition

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1710-1715
Author(s):  
Qiao Lun Gu ◽  
Tie Gang Gao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
The Difference

In this paper, we focus on the price decisions of the wholesale price, the retail price and the collecting price for the closed-loop supply chain with and without competition. We obtain the optimal decisions based on two models: Model I without competition and Model II with competition. By the analysis of a numerical example, we find that the competition between the manufacturers in model II will affect their prices decisions and their profits; in model II, the two manufacturers would like to halve the market while the retailer hope to increase the difference of their market shares, and the two manufacturers would not like to increase the substitute ratio of their products while the retailer can benefit from that. So, from the manufacturers’ point of view, they should avoid the competition risk by choosing the independent retailers.

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Collecting and Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmin Xiao ◽  
Zongsheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper investigates the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisted of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, in the presence of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concern of followers. We formulate the stochastic differential game-theoretic models and resolve the feedback Stackelberg equilibriums without and with fairness concern. We also derive the evolutionary paths of the stochastic return rate and the value functions of the supply chain members under the optimal control strategies. We find that the feedback equilibrium exists only under a specific condition, and the expectation and variance of the return rate both approach the stable state for a specific closed-loop supply chain system. We further discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the supply chain system. The manufacturer would shift profit to the retailer by lowering the wholesale price, and the stable expected return rate will be lower in the supply chain with fairness concerns, as the third party will have less incentive to collect used products, considering unfairness. The manufacturer should set a higher transfer subsidy to incentivize the third party to collect when the third party is concerned with fairness.

scholarly journals Production Decision and Coordination Mechanism of Socially Responsible Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Long ◽  
Jiali Ge ◽  
Tong Shu ◽  
Chunxia Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Socially Responsible ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has a significant impact on the operation of enterprises. This study analyzes the production and coordination decisions of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) by establishing two assumptions of endogenous and exogenous CSR. The results reveal that, for ordinary consumers, CSR is quantified as the parameter of consumer surplus, which has an impact on the patent licensing fee, revenue-sharing ratio, and so on, and which not only increases the sales quantity in CLSC but also creates more value for the manufacturer and the retailer. Considering endogenous CSR, the study found that the manufacturer’s CSR level and the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s profits both increase with the proportion of CSR-sensitive consumers. In the endogenous model, the manufacturer sets a higher wholesale price and lower patent licensing fee than in the exogenous model. Perfect coordination in the two models can be achieved by setting a revenue-sharing ratio related to wholesale price and patent licensing fee. In practice, improving the social responsibility consciousness of consumers and raising enterprises’ CSR level can achieve a win-win situation for revenues and social welfare.

PRICING DECISIONS FOR A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN IN A FUZZY ENVIRONMENT

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 1240003 ◽  
Author(s):  
JIE WEI ◽  
JING ZHAO ◽  
YONGJIAN LI
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Economic Behavior ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Fuzzy Environment

This paper studies pricing problem for a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer in a fuzzy environment. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the manufacturer makes his decisions about wholesale price and transfer price and how the retailer makes her decisions about retail price and collecting price in the expected value standard. Each firm's optimal pricing strategies are established by using game theory under the centralized and decentralized decision cases, respectively. Managerial insights into the economic behavior of firms are also investigated, which can serve as the basis for empirical study in the future. Moreover, we analyze numerically the results and give some insights on the influence of some parameters.

scholarly journals The value of information sharing in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanting Huang ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Zongjun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Value Of Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Model C

This paper considers a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector in which the retailer possesses private demand information and determines whether to share his private information with other chain members. Specifically, we develop four information sharing models, namely no information sharing (Model C-R), the retailer sharing information with the manufacturer (Model C-R-M), the retailer revealing information to the collector (Model C-R-C), and the retailer disclosing information to both the manufacturer and the collector (Model C-R-T). We adopt the Stackelberg game to acquire the equilibrium strategies and examine the value of information sharing on chain members’ decisions. We find that, chain members will set the largest wholesale price, retail prices of direct and indirect channels when the retailer only shares information with the manufacturer and the highest return rate can be obtained in the case of the retailer only revealing information to the collector. We can also find that, information sharing is profitable to the manufacturer and the collector, while is detrimental to the retailer. The manufacturer, the collector and the retailer can reach the largest profits in Model C-R-T, Model C-R-C and Model C-R-M, respectively.

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