A note on electoral competition and turnout in run-off electoral systems: Taking into account both endogeneity and attenuation bias

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 261-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Garmann
2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (05) ◽  
pp. 1550055
Author(s):  
SELIM JÜRGEN ERGUN

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which candidates’ need of credibility restricts their policy choice to a subset of the policy space, their ideology set. I focus on three party competition where candidates care about winning and their share of votes. I show that centrist parties are highly disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones losing the election under a wide range of parameters. I also show that centrist parties’ winning opportunities increase under a run-off system.


Author(s):  
Oleksandra Cholovska

The vast majority of party and electoral researches, including the countries of the Visegrad Group,  focuses on the impact of elections and electoral systems on the institutionalization of parties and party systems, predominantly at the national level. However, the proposed article broadened this analysis mainly at the national level, in particular by analyzing regional elections and regional party systems. This is due to the fact that party-electoral interconnection is not one-tier, but instead is determined territorially, including territorial or administrative heterogeneity during elections. In other words, the study aims to show how region and regional elections (in the format of party system regionalization) affect the national political process, and, conversely, how national elections (in the format of party system nationalization) influence the regional political process in the context of the countries of the Visegrad Group. In this regard, the indicators of voter turnout, electoral volatility, influence of regional parties and coalitions, peculiarities and consequences of electoral blocsʼ and coalitionsʼ formation, parameters of territorial and socio-political cleavages and constructions of electoral systems and formulas were the directories of this relationship, both at national and regional levels, in the proposed study. Their use at the example of the Visegrad countries has made it possible to argue that the relationship between regional and national level of electoral competition and the parameters of the structuring of party systems in the analyzed region is largely reflected in nationalization processes at both national and regional level. Although it is theoretically found that such a relationship is bilateral and counter-dependent on the processes of regionalization of national elections and national electoral systems, or instead on nationalization of regional elections and regional party systems. Keywords: national elections, regional elections, party systems, nationalization and regionalization of party systems, the countries of the Visegrad Group.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary W. Cox ◽  
Jon H. Fiva ◽  
Daniel M. Smith

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).


2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 209-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Callander

I analyze a model of electoral competition with entry under the run-off rule. I consider both two- and multiple-party systems. The principal result is that two-party systems may prove stable under the run-off rule: I show that a continuum of equilibria exists in which only two parties enter and subsequent entry is deterred. This finding conflicts with the accepted wisdom on the run-off rule encapsulated by Duverger's Hypothesis. The results of the model are then reconciled with Duverger's Hypothesis and a more precise formulation is proposed.


Author(s):  
Gianluca Passarelli

Este artículo examina los efectos del voto preferencial en la competencia electoral intrapartidaria y en el comportamiento del voto. Mediante los datos recogidos en 19 países y más de 200 elecciones, este estudio arroja luz en un aspecto ciertamente olvidado de los sistemas electorales. El autor demuestra que la capacidad de los votantes de influir en la selección y el descarte de parlamentarios en los sistemas de voto preferencial no es tan importante como se suele señalar. En cambio, su capacidad para dar forma a la elección de un determinado candidato depende enormemente del equilibrio entre poder de partido y poder del votante. De esta manera, este trabajo avanza en la compresión del efecto del voto preferencial en las dinámicas intrapartidarias, en la rotación parlamentaria y en el comportamiento del votante.This article examines the effects of preferential voting on intraparty electoral competition and voting behavior. Using data covering 19 countries and over 200 elections, this study sheds light on a somewhat neglected aspect of electoral systems. The author demonstrates that the ability of voters to influence the selection and deselection of MPs under preferential voting systems is not as important as is often assumed. Instead, their ability to shape the election of a given candidate depends heavily on the balance between party power and voter power. In this way, this work advances the understanding of the effect of preferential voting on intra-party dynamics, parliamentary turnover, and voter behavior. 


1962 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles E. Gilbert ◽  
Christopher Clague

2012 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy R. Poteete

ABSTRACTThe Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has maintained a super-majority in the National Assembly for over forty years despite increasingly competitive elections. Several factors contribute to the BDP's continued legislative dominance, including features of the electoral system, fragmentation of the party system, and obstacles to strategic voting behaviour. Factional competition has played a particularly important role. Botswana's political institutions encourage factional competition, and factionalism interacts with the electoral system to hinder consolidation of the party system. Botswana's experience underlines the importance of internal party dynamics and their interaction with features of the electoral and party system in enabling the persistence of legislative dominance in competitive electoral systems.


Author(s):  
Mark N. Franklin ◽  
Cees van der Eijk ◽  
Diana Evans ◽  
Michael Fotos ◽  
Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino ◽  
...  

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