Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies since 1945

Author(s):  
Mark N. Franklin ◽  
Cees van der Eijk ◽  
Diana Evans ◽  
Michael Fotos ◽  
Wolfgang Hirczy de Mino ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
William D. Hicks ◽  
Daniel A. Smith

This chapter examines the literature on state campaigns and elections. Throughout the chapter the authors focus on a central question that frequently animates the study of campaigns and elections in the American states: do political institutions enhance or stymie voter turnout and electoral competition? They begin by considering studies that examine how electoral laws in general may affect voter turnout, electoral competition, and party and candidate strategies. They then assess whether more stringent campaign contribution limits and clean election laws might provide a greater incentive for potential candidates to challenge incumbents. In turn, they explore how primary systems, redistricting, term limits, and direct democracy may affect competition and turnout in the American states. They conclude with a discussion about lingering concerns over endogeneity when it comes to measuring the effect of political institutions on electoral competition and outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Vol 691 (1) ◽  
pp. 206-222
Author(s):  
Linda Voigt ◽  
Reimut Zohlnhöfer

Political parties and party competition have been important factors in the expansion and retrenchment of the fiscal welfare state, but researchers have argued that regulatory welfare is not part of political debate among parties. We explore this claim theoretically, and then empirically examine it in the case of employment protection legislation (EPL) in twenty-one established democracies since 1985. EPL is a mature and potentially salient instrument of the regulatory welfare state that has experienced substantial retrenchment. We test three prominent mechanisms of how electoral competition conditions partisan effects: the composition of Left parties’ electorates, the strength of pro-EPL parties, and the emphasis put on social justice by pro-EPL parties. We find that the partisan politics of EPL is conditioned by electoral competition under only very specific circumstances, namely when blame sharing becomes possible in coalitions between EPL supporters.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-214
Author(s):  
Candice J. Nelson

In an era when campaign finance reform is widely discussed by politicians, political scientists, and journalists, Money Matters provides a timely and thoughtful analysis of several reform proposals. The central focus is on the effect that spending limits, matching funds, full public funding, and partial public funding with spending limits would have on electoral competition, voter turnout, and voter involvement in elections to the House of Representatives.


2017 ◽  
Vol 111 (4) ◽  
pp. 653-667 ◽  
Author(s):  
FILIP KOSTELKA

This article challenges the conventional wisdom that democratic consolidation depresses voter turnout. Studying democratic legislative elections held worldwide between 1939 and 2015, it explains why voting rates in new democracies decrease when they do, how much they decrease, and how this phenomenon relates to the voter decline observed in established democracies. The article identifies three main sources of decline. The first and most important is the democratization context. When democratizations are opposition-driven or occur in electorally mobilized dictatorships, voter turnout is strongly boosted in the founding democratic elections. As time passes and the mobilizing democratization context loses salience, voting rates return to normal, which translates into turnout declines. The second source is the democratic consolidation context, which seems to depress voter turnout only in post-Communist democracies. Finally, new democracies mirror established democracies in that their voting rates have been declining since the 1970s, irrespective of the two previous mechanisms.


2001 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph L. Klesner

During the last decade, patterns of voter turnout in Mexico have changed dramatically. Turnout patterns now resemble those of established democracies, where affluent and politically engaged citizens are more likely to participate than poorer, less informed, and rural voters who make up the Institutional Revolutionary Party's traditional base. Because those Mexicans most likely to vote are also those most likely to support the opposition, especially the National Action Party, changing partisan biases in electoral participation have had crucial consequences for Mexico's political system. Durante la úúltima déécada, los patrones de participacióón de votantes en Mééxico han cambiado dramááticamente. Estos se asemejan ahora a los de las democracias establecidas, donde los ciudadanos acomodados e interesados en políítica son máás propensos a participar que los máás pobres, los menos informados y los votantes rurales que forman la base tradicional del Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Como los mexicanos máás propensos a votar son aquellos tambiéén máás propensos aapoyar ala oposicióón,especialmente alPartido Accióón Nacional, el cambio de las tendencias de los partidarios en la participacióón electoral ha tenido consecuencias decisivas para el sistema políítico mexicano.


Author(s):  
André Blais ◽  
Ruth Dassonneville ◽  
Filip Kostelka

This chapter examines the relationship between voter turnout and political inequality. It investigates which groups are less (more) likely to vote, whether these groups are less (better) represented in Parliament, and whether their interests and values are less (better) defended in the actual policies that are adopted and implemented by governments. Existing research finds that economically and socially disadvantaged groups are more likely to abstain when voter turnout is low in established democracies. While low voter turnout does not systematically benefit a particular political camp, there is evidence that it produces a bias in public policy and reduces government responsiveness. The chapter concludes by discussing avenues for future research.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimondas Ibenskas

AbstractWhile party splits are a relatively frequent phenomenon in many new and established democracies, the systematic empirical research on electoral competition after schisms is limited. The analysis of more than 200 splits across 25 European countries in the post-war period addresses this gap in the research. The study shows that the vote shares of rump and splinter parties in the first election after fission are related to their membership strength and the share of splinter legislators. This relationship is present in both Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. Additionally, economic growth affects the support of rump parties that hold government office while party system fragmentation and party funding regulations correlate with the electoral performance of splinter parties.


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