scholarly journals Capacidades, reconocimiento y representación: las contribuciones de Nancy Fraser, Iris Marion Young y Amartya Sen a la teoría de la justicia de John Rawls

2017 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 53-76
Author(s):  
Jesús Rivero Casas
2020 ◽  
pp. 136843102098378
Author(s):  
Isabelle Aubert

This article explains how the issue of inclusion is central to Habermas’s theory of democracy and how it is deeply rooted in his conception of a political public sphere. After recalling Habermas’s views on the public sphere, I present and discuss various objections raised by other critical theorists: Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth and Iris Marion Young. These criticisms insist on the paradoxically excluding effects of a conception of democracy that promotes civic participation in the public debate. Negt, Kluge and Fraser develop a Marxist line of analysis that question who can participate in the public sphere. Honneth and Young criticize in various ways the excluding effect of argumentation: are unargumentative speeches excluded from the public debate? I show how Habermas’s model can provide some responses to these various objections by drawing inspiration from his treatment of the gap between religious and post-metaphysical world views.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-98
Author(s):  
Nathalie De Almeida Bressiani

Partindo de uma breve exposição, focada na questão do reconhecimento dos modelos de Teoria Crítica desenvolvidos por Iris Marion Young e Nancy Fraser, esse artigo busca apresentar algumas das principais questões e difi culdades no que diz respeito à possibilidade de promover o reconhecimento das diferenças sem comprometer a igualdade e mostrar a importância da participação política e de concepções de democracia deliberativa, sem as quais parece impossível, tanto para Young quanto para Fraser, pensar adequadamente as questões de justiça nos dias de hoje.


Hypatia ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 173-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neus Torbisco Casals ◽  
Idil Boran

Originally, the idea of interviewing Iris Marion Young in Barcelona came about after she accepted an invitation to give a public lecture at the Law School of Pompeu Fabra University in May 2002. I had first met Iris back in 1999, at a conference in Bristol, England, and I was impressed deeply by her personality and ideas. We kept in touch since then and exchanged papers and ideas. She was very keen to come to Spain (it seems that her mother had lived some years in Mallorca) and she finally travelled to Barcelona with her husband and daughter in spring 2002.The lecture, which she entitled “Women, War, and Peace,” was meant to be the closing session of a course on Gender and the Law, and was also part of a series of seminars annually organized by the legal philosophy department (the Albert Calsamiglia Seminar). Her work was quite well-known among several Catalan philosophers and political scientists and professor Angel Castiñeira—who, at the time, was the director of Idees (Ideas), a Catalan journal published by the Centre d'Estudis de Temes Contemporanis (Center for the Study of Contemporary Issues)—suggested that she could give a second lecture, which they would publish together with an interview I could prepare. She accepted both proposals, and I started to think of a questionnaire for the interview while I was at Queen's University in Canada earlier that year. Idil Boran, a philosopher and good friend who did her doctorate at Queen's, offered to help me with this endeavour, since she also admired Iris as both a scholar and a person. Together we prepared the questions and sent them to her once she was back in Chicago, as there was not time to conduct the interview in person while she was in Barcelona.In fall 2002, she sent some answers to our questions, but the document was unfortunately incomplete. She was busy at the time, so we didn't want to pressure her to finish the interview. Eventually, the editors of Idees decided to publish the manifest about the war in Iraq subscribed by a large number of American Intellectuals together with fragments of Iris's (antiwar) lectures and an article that she wrote together with Daniel Archibugi, “Envisioning a Global Rule of Law.”1 The interview was thus left unpublished. Both Idil and I thought it would be worthwhile to publish it somewhere else, but, for one reason or another, Iris didn't have the time to complete it and we kept postponing the project. At some point, she said that the questions she left unanswered were too complex or challenging to give a short or quick answer, and that she would need to reflect on them to provide detailed responses.Later, we learned she was ill and we didn't feel it was right to insist on those questions being answered. The issue came up again when she accepted to participate as a keynote speaker at the World Congress of Legal Philosophy held in Granada in June 2005. She then said she would come first to Barcelona (where she and Nancy Fraser had been invited to a workshop by the Catalan Women Institute) and suggested we could sit in a cafe and talk about the issues left out in those unanswered questions. Unfortunately, she had to cancel this trip because of her medical treatment, and I did not have the privilege of sharing time with her again. The following series of questions and responses are the product of this rather extended interview process.Neus Torbisco Casals


Author(s):  
Benjamin L. McKean

In a dizzying global economy full of injustices that threaten our freedom, people who want to promote justice should be disposed to solidarity with each other. When global supply chains assemble products from every corner of the global and workers’ economic futures seem ever more uncertain, the very neoliberal theories that helped usher in this world also provide a powerful way to understand and navigate it. Those who want to resist the injustices of today’s global economy need to reorient their way of seeing so that it is possible to act more effectively. By drawing on a diverse range of thinkers from G. W. F. Hegel and John Rawls to W. E. B. Du Bois and Iris Marion Young, Disorienting Neoliberalism provides an account of freedom that can inform transnational movements for justice. By explaining how neoliberal institutions and ideas constrain the freedom of people throughout the supply chain from worker to consumer, the book provides a new orientation to the global economy in which it is possible for people to see one other as partners in resisting a shared obstacle to freedom and thus be called to collective action. Cultivating this disposition to solidarity better expresses freedom than the pity and resentment which global inequality so often gives rise to. In doing so, the book shows how political theory can be a source of orientation to the world, illuminating how ideals can help guide action even when they may be impossible to realize.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (74) ◽  
pp. 181
Author(s):  
Flávio Pansieri
Keyword(s):  

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/2177-7055.2016v37n74p181O presente artigo tem como intuito abordar o tema da justiça na obra do filósofo John Rawls e do economista Amartya Sen. O objetivo é apresentar, em um primeiro momento, a noção de justiça de Amartya construída sob uma ótica prática, ou seja, vinculada a uma ótica prospectiva de resolução de problemas sociais. Em seguida, serão abordados os princípios de justiça de John Rawls e a crítica de Sen a esta concepção denominada por ele de institucionalismo transcendental. O intuito é estabelecer um paralelo entre duas concepções distintas do justo, no afã de se contribuir com o debate contemporâneo acerca do tema. 


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
CéAcile Fabre ◽  
David Miller

Is it possible, in a multicultural world, to hold all societies to a common standard of decency that is both high enough to protect basic human interests, and yet not biased in the direction of particular cultural values? We examine the recent work of four liberals – John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and Onora O' Neill – to see whether any of them has given a successful answer to this question. For Rawls, the decency standard is set by reference to an idea of basic human rights that we argue offers too little protection to members of non-liberal societies. Sen and Nussbaum both employ the idea of human capabilities, but in interestingly different ways: for Sen the problems are how to weight different capabilities, and how to decide which are basic, whereas for Nussbaum the difficulty is that her favoured list of capabilities depends on an appeal to autonomy that is unlikely to be acceptable to non-liberal cultures. O' Neill rejects a rights-based approach in favour of a neo-Kantian position that asks which principles of action people everywhere could consent to, but this also may be too weak in the face of cultural diversity. We conclude that liberals need to argue both for a minimum decency standard and for the full set of liberal rights as the best guarantors of that standard over time.


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